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Credit markets are central to our understanding of business cycles and macroeconomic
policy, and in their macroeconomic importance there is considerable evidence that credit
markets are unlike markets for other products. By way of illustration, the documenta-
tion for the Federal Reserve Board’s baseline macroeconomic model, FRB/US, mentions
"Debt" 29 times and "Interest" 82 times, while "Auto" is mentioned only twice, both times
referring to "Auto Loan", a type of credit. [44] Nonetheless, credit markets are still markets,
and in many ways are particularly amenable to microeconomic analysis. My dissertation
focuses on a micro-level empirical analysis of a credit market with particular macroe-
conomic import and policy relevance, namely, the market for government-guaranteed
mortgages.
During the 2000s U.S. mortgage borrowing experienced its most volatile cycle in the
postwar record, with mortgage debt more than doubling between 2000 and 2008 before
declining by more than 10% over the following five years. The consequences of the boom
and bust for both borrowers and the wider macroeconomy were significant, with millions
losing their homes to foreclosure or their jobs to the ensuing deleveraging-driven reces-
sion. [159, 160] Recent research has focused on variations in credit supply as a primary deter-
minant of both the boom in mortgage borrowing [158] and subsequent collapse, [102] as well
as the concurrent rise and fall of residential real estate prices [4, 78] and employment. [166] In
the wake of the Great Recession many have called for countercyclical policy intervention
in the mortgage market, both to restrain over-leveraging during booms and to provide
additional access to refinancing credit during busts. [122, 177] Moreover some analysis has
placed the blame for the volatile U.S. credit cycle on the policies of Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac, the two largest government-sponsored enterprises, which have been labeled as
excessively risky, [3] actively destabilizing, [110, 180] and regressive. [75, 94, 124] Nevertheless,
though many have called for their reform [76, 108] these two agencies appear to be a con-
tinuing feature of the U.S. housing finance system [90] and are currently well-positioned
to implement countercyclical credit supply policies. In my dissertation I propose a novel
countercyclical policy intervention by the government-sponsored enterprises and analyze
its impact on mortgage borrowers.
Chapter 1, “A Descriptive Analysis of the U.S. Mortgage Market and the Government-
Sponsored Enterprises”, sets the stage for my subsequent analysis. I first provide a de-
scription of the institutional arrangement of the U.S. mortgage market, with a particular
focus on the goals and policies of the government-sponsored enterprises. In so doing I de-
scribe the key friction embedded in this market that necessitates policy intervention: that
some fixed-rate mortgage borrowers cannot refinance into lower interest rates, hindering
monetary transmission to consumption. [43] I next review the relevant literature related
to borrowers and mortgage credit demand, lenders and mortgage credit supply, and the
effects of realized and proposed mortgage market policies. I then lay out a model of the
mortgage refinancing process to help contextualize my results. The model generates two
key predictions regarding the effects of guarantee fees on credit supply and the effect of
liquidity preference on both applications for refinancing credit and the realized volume
of refinancing. Finally, I describe the data sources used in my analysis and provide a brief
outline of my empirical strategy for analyzing the mortgage market.
In Chapter 2, “Guarantee Fee Increases and Mortgage Credit Supply”, I study the effect
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mortgage default insurance premiums, known as guar-
antee fees, on the supply of mortgage credit. I show that higher guarantee fees, which
function much like a tax on mortgage origination, reduce the incentive for lenders to pro-
vide credit. In the short-term, lenders absorb some of the fee increase through lower rev-
enues, but in the long-term there is essentially complete pass-through from guarantee fees
to interest rates. The extent of pass-through to interest rates is lower in more concentrated
markets and higher for riskier borrowers and for nonbank mortgage lenders, suggesting
a strategic response on the part of lenders. As a result of the increase in guarantee fees,
the probability of refinancing declines for borrowers with government-guaranteed mort-
gages, which I interpret as evidence of tightened credit constraints. My estimates suggest
an elasticity of refinancing with respect to interest rates of between 1.7% and 2.8%, very
much in line with prior estimates, and imply that the combined effect of a pair of large fee
increases implemented in 2012 was to reduce the total volume of refinancing in the U.S.
by roughly $205 billion annually. I also find that default rates for borrowers with agency
mortgages increased slightly following the guarantee fee increases by between 1.9% and
4.2% of the estimated change in refinancing rates, also in line with prior estimates, sug-
gesting that tightening credit conditions may have contributed to higher default rates. I
discuss the macroeconomic implications of these findings and connect the results to the
policy debate regarding the future of the U.S. housing finance system.
Chapter 3, “Unemployment and the Value of Refinancing Credit”, pivots towards the
demand side of the mortgage market. In this chapter I provide evidence that unem-
ployed borrowers would like to refinance, but are unable to do so because of credit con-
straints. These constraints generate a crucial endogeneity problem in that unemployment
affects both demand for and access to credit, making it difficult to estimate preferences
directly. I employ three different empirical techniques to shed light on underlying prefer-
ences and the distributional consequences of increased credit supply. First, I analyze the
effect of unemployment on applications for refinancing credit and realized refinancing
rates, with a focus on how this effect varies with other credit risk characteristics. I find
that the overall effect of unemployment on refinancing is negative, although this effect
varies considerably across borrower types. Low-credit risk borrowers, especially those
with significant home equity, are more likely to refinance at higher unemployment rates,
and likewise for these borrowers unemployment rates do not significantly increase the
risk that they are unable to obtain credit. I interpret these results as evidence that for
low-risk borrowers, the “demand” effect of greater liquidity preference outweighs the
“supply” effect of reduced credit access, but not so for high-risk borrowers. Second, I
study the effect of unemployment rates on the refinancing behavior of borrowers who
were eligible for a government-sponsored enterprise program, the Home Affordable Re-
finance Program, that removed or severely attenuated the relationship between access to
credit and unemployment. I find that within this cohort, a 1% increase in unemployment
rates leads to a 3.4% to 4.4% increase in the annualized probability of refinancing, im-
plying that the effect of unemployment on credit demand is positive. Finally, I employ
a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate how takeup under the Home Affordable
Refinance Program varied across high- and low-unemployment regions. My baseline es-
timates indicate that a 1% increase in unemployment rates leads to a 3% to 7% increase
in program takeup, with borrowers in the top quartile of local unemployment rates re-
financing under the program between 40% and 50% more often than borrowers in the
lowest quartile. While these results combine both demand and supply effects, they do
suggest that policies aimed at improving credit access will disproportionately benefit the
unemployed.
In Chapter 4, “Guarantee Fees as a Countercyclical Policy Tool”, I combine the in-
sights from the prior two chapters to analyze how to use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
guarantee fees to regulate mortgage credit supply over the business cycle. My earlier
results suggest that policies aimed at increasing the supply of refinancing credit, includ-
ing reductions in guarantee fees, will be most-beneficial for borrowers during periods of
widespread unemployment, and conversely that policies which constrain credit supply
will be least-costly for borrowers during periods of low unemployment. Motivated by
this finding, I simulate the effects of an alternative countercyclical guarantee fee policy
that shifts credit supply from periods in which unemployment is low into periods when
unemployment is high, and compare the results both to the observed path of guarantee
fees and to other alternative credit supply policies. In order to quantify the effects of an
alternative policy of lowering guarantee fees during high-unemployment periods, I de-
sign and estimate a structural model of the mortgage market with two important features.
First, the model allows credit supply, and hence the credit constraints facing households,
to be endogenously determined by, among other things, guarantee fees, and for the ef-
fect of fees to vary with the competitive landscape. Second, the model permits borrower
valuations for refinancing credit, and thus the shadow value of credit constraints, to vary
with individual-level employment status. These two features micro-found the results
from chapters two and three and permit regime-invariant calculations of welfare under
the counterfactual policy. I estimate the model with a novel combination of techniques,
some of which have not been used previously in this literature, and use the estimated
parameters to simulate the model under alternative policy scenarios. My structural esti-
mates suggest that unemployed borrowers derive 130% to 220% greater utility from cash-
on-hand than employed borrowers, and I find that the alternative guarantee fee policy
results in 2.3% greater borrower welfare over an entire business cycle, while also reduc-
ing default rates and providing 6.3% greater revenue for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
My results also indicate that the effects of the alternative guarantee fee policy are quan-
titatively similar to a combination of a stricter loan-to-value-ratio cap and an affordable
refinance program, two policies that have been either implemented or strongly consid-
ered by U.S. policymakers.
My research is intended to inform the policy debate surrounding the future of the
government-sponsored enterprises and U.S. housing finance reform more generally. To
the extent that the government maintains some role in the mortgage market, the question
of how best to regulate credit provision over the business cycle will remain an important
one. While other policy instruments are also no doubt necessary, countercyclical guaran-
tee fees are a potentially valuable tool, and to my knowledge the question of how best to
set them across the business cycle has not been considered previously in either the eco-
nomics or policy literature. I hope that this research will prove valuable in the design of
future housing finance policies.
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Chapter 1
A Descriptive Analysis of the U.S.




The economic experience of the U.S. and other advanced countries during the 2000s
and early 2010s has highlighted the importance of credit markets to both individuals and
the macroeconomy. For a variety of reasons, the relative contributions of which are still
subject to considerable debate in the economics literature, credit supply expanded
dramatically in the period roughly from 2003 to 2007 in the U.S. Partly as a result,
household debt as a fraction of GDP increased by nearly 30%, driven largely by
home-equity borrowing, and the U.S. underwent a simultaneous boom in house
prices, [4, 78] employment [166] and consumption. [161] Prompted by increasing losses on
high-risk consumer lending, eventually resulting in a financial crisis, the supply of credit
tightened beginning in 2007, and the attendant decline in borrowing and spending led to
the deepest postwar U.S. economic contraction, now known as the Great Recession. The
recovery from the Great Recession was considerably slower than from past U.S.
recessions, and foreclosure and unemployment rates remained elevated for several years
following the official start of the recovery in late 2009. Many have attributed the slow
recovery to frictions in U.S. credit markets, [73, 104, 160, 161, 173] and in particular the
refinancing friction inherent in fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) contracts. [34, 65, 136, 165] Based
on this assessment many have therefore called for policy intervention both to restrain the
supply of credit during credit market booms [137] and to expland the availability of
refinancing credit during recessions1. My dissertation analyzes the market for FRM
credit in the U.S., with a particular focus on policy interventions designed to mitigate
credit frictions and lean against destabilizing cycles in this large and systemically
important market.
There are two aspects to such countercyclical policy interventions. On one side the
goal of typical stimulative policies employed during downturns is to transfer funds
1jaffee2011future,scharfstein2011economics
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towards those with high marginal propensities to consume. This for example is the
theory behind unemployment insurance, [140, 144] as the unemployed are likely to spend a
substantial fraction of any income and hence support current aggregate consumption.
On the other side, the goal of macroprudential policies is to lean against the buildup of
systemic risk, often by targeting credit risk and overall leverage. [110] For this purpose
many advocates of countercylical credit policies advocate for policymakers to utilize a
“second instrument" in addition to the typical policy lever used by central banks, the
level of short-term interest rates, as interest rates are a blunt tool and the level
appropriate for managing aggregate demand may be inappropriate for managing credit
growth and vice-versa. [24] While the Bank of England has developed a macroprudential
toolkit that enables it to regulate, for example, mortgage lending standards, [24] a similar
set of tools has not yet been developed in the U.S. In many ways, the U.S. agencies
best-positioned to regulate the supply of credit across the business cycle are Fannie Mae
(FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FHLMC)2, and in my dissertation I analyze the effects of
their policies and assess the prospects for potential alternative policies.
Since the Great Recession FNMA and FHLMC, the two largest of the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), have become the primary conduit for a
variety of mortgage-market-specific policy interventions. Though they have a variety of
tools and goals, one of the GSEs primary roles is to sell insurance against defaults on
mortgages meeting certain criteria. Prior to 2008, the two agencies had been nominally
private, although with strong government guidance and what many assumed to be an
implicit government backstop. In September 2008, following combined losses of $109
billion in that year due to increasing default rates, the implicit guarantee became explicit
as the two agencies were nationalized and their insurance obligations assumed by the
federal government. Since then the GSEs have operated essentially as government
2These are not their real names. They are, respectively, the Federal National Mortgage Association and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, although the nicknames developed by traders proved popular
and today they are better known as such.
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agencies and have implemented two of the signature post-recession policy interventions
in the housing market, a pair of programs designed to reduce default rates and increase
refinancing. At the same time, at the direction of the U.S. government the two agencies
have also considerably raised their default insurance premiums, known as guarantee
fees, in order to repay the treasury for funds used to honor their prior obligations. These
fee increases have predictable effects on the mortgage market, leading to higher interest
rates, reduced refinancing volume, and greater default rates3. As a result, the GSE’s
realized pricing policies over this period were strongly procyclical4: during the boom
from 2003 to 2007, they pursused a low-fee policy that eased credit constraints, and from
the Great Recession onward they implemented a high-fee policy that tightened credit
constraints. Moreover their policies vis-a-vis their guarantee fees worked against other
concurrent policy interventions, for example by raising mortgage interest rates at a time
when Federal Reserve interventions were working to lower them, or by increasing
defaults and reducing refinancing at a time when other GSE policies were attempting to
engineer the reverse.
Thus at the core of my dissertation is a policy proposal for the GSEs to set their
guarantee fees countercyclically so as to lean against credit cycles. The object of such a
policy would be to tighten credit constraints during boom times at which
unemployment rates are low, and to then loosen credit constraints during and after
recessions when unemployment rates are elevated. In order for such an alternative
policy to be both effective and revenue-neutral relative to current policy the benefits
from credit shifted into high-unemployment periods must exceed the loss from reduced
credit supply during low-unemployment periods. In Chapters 2 and 3 of my dissertation
I document two key stylized facts in support of this premise. First, in Chapter 2 I show
that increases in guarantee fees, which function much like a tax on mortgage origination,
3I document each of these effects empirically in Chapter 2.
4The term “procyclical" is used in two different ways. In the policy literature, it typically implies “exac-
erbating business cycle fluctuations", while in the macroeconomic literature it ususally denotes “covarying
positively with GDP". Throughout, whenever I use the term “procyclical" I intend the former.
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lead to higher mortgage interest rates and, concurently, declines in the propensity to
refinance and increases in the propensity to default with plausible elasticities. Then in
Chapter 3 I use exogenous variation in the tightness of credit constraints induced by GSE
policy interventions to provide evidence that the households that value the refinancing
option the most, and as a result benefit most from credit supply expansions, are those in
high-unemployment areas. The former finding could potentially be driven by a desire
on the part of households facing unemployment spells to refinance for
consumption-smoothing purposes, [51, 123] while the latter may simply indicate that the
first borrowers to be cut off from from credit markets when credit conditions tighten and
last to return as credit loosens are the unemployed. As a consequence, the benefit to
borrowers facing income shocks during recessions from increased credit supply induced
by lower guarantee fees may exceed the loss from reduced credit supply owing to higher
guarantee fees during booms. To quantify this intuition, in Chapter 4 I estimate a
structural model of the mortgage market and use the model to simulate the effects of
various GSE policies. The results of these simulations indicate that a countercyclical
guarantee fee policy would benefit borrowers overall by combining both the stimulative
and macroprudential aspects of countercyclical policy, and in quantitative terms would
approximate the combined effects of a refinancing stimulus program and a tighter cap
on household borrowing limits. Moreover while government agencies such as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) have at times endeavored to implement through-the-cycle insurance pricing
policies, [100, 110, 172] to my knowledge the proposal that the GSEs charge countercylical
default insurance premiums is novel.
In addition to the policy proposal and counterfactual analysis described above, my
dissertation makes several other substantive contributions to the existing economic and
policy literatures. First, in Chapters 2 and refch:chapter3 I provide new empirical
evidence on the effects of two key GSE policy interventions, namely, increases in
5
guarantee fees and targeted refinancing programs. To my knowledge there is no prior
direct evidence regarding the effects of the former, while I provide the first evidence
regarding heterogeneity in takeup under the latter program. Second, my results in
Chapter 3 provide new empirical evidence on the relationship between credit demand
and unemployment and the distributional consequences of credit supply expansions
that may inform both policy work and academic research on computable general
equilibrium models. These two sets of results also help motivate the structural model
that I develop in Chapter 4, although the model endogenizes both findings. In so doing I
extend the current literature on household financial management, and in particular
structural models of refinancing and default, in order to incorporate endogenous credit
constraints and latent liquidity preference. I employ a novel set of empirical techniques
in order to estimate the primitives of the model structurally using a unique dataset. My
bottom-up approach to analyzing the mortgage market is, for reasons I will discuss later,
particularly suitable to analyzing housing finance policy interventions, and while I focus
only on simulations of a few GSE policies, my microfounded model structure is capable
of analyzing a range of other policy interventions, including changes to GSE credit
standards and Federal Reserve asset purchase programs. In this regard I hope the model
and simulations I present in this dissertation prove valuable both to academics and
practitioners.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2 I provide a
description of key institutional details regarding the mortgage market. As my focus is on
the effects of GSE policy on mortgage borrowers, I describe in turn the manner in which
credit constraints impact borrowers and the manner in which GSE policy affects credit
constraints, and conclude with a discussion of recent GSE and other market-specific
policy interventions. Then in Section 1.3 I survey the literature as it relates to my
dissertation. Widespread perceptions that the Great Recession had its roots in the
mortgage market have led to a proliferation of research in that area, and I describe a
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variety of recent research into household financial management, the determinants of
credit supply, the causes and consequences of credit constraints, and the effects of GSE
policies. In Section 1.4 I sketch a simplified model of the refinancing market and use the
model to generate two key predictions in order to inform the results from Chapters 2, 3,
and 4. Then in Section 1.5 I review a number of data sources used throughout my
dissertation, which include detailed individual-level data on both the demand for and
supply of refinancing credit, and describe in brief some procedures to clean and
augment the data. Section 1.6 with an overview of the remaining analysis in Chapters 2,
3, and 4 and how the results from those chapters can inform both the academic and
policy literatures.
My dissertation is intended to add to the debate surrounding the future of the GSEs
and future U.S. housing finance policies more broadly. All evidence suggests that the
GSEs in some form will continue to play an important role in the mortgage market
moving forward, [76, 108, 189] and as a consequence their ability to regulate the provision of
mortgage credit across the business cycle will remain a valuable policy tool. While other
instruments must also be part of U.S. housing finance policy, a countercyclical guarantee
fee policy may prove a potentially valuable and as yet underexplored addition. I hope
that this research contributes to the design of future beneficial housing finance policies.
1.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND ON THE AGENCY
MORTGAGE MARKET
In this section I describe the institutional arrangement of the agency mortgage
market. The primary focus of my dissertation is the transmission of changes in GSE
policy to borrower-level outcomes and ultimately welfare. As such, the purpose of this
section is to establish the institutional features that allow this transmission to take place.
In explaining these mechanisms, I first outline the process of mortgage refinancing, with
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particular emphasis on how credit constraints can impede borrower’s choices. I then
turn to the supply side and explain the process by which mortgage loans are originated,
the incentives facing mortgage lenders, and how GSE policy can affect the willingness of
lenders to extend credit and the prices they charge. I conclude with a discussion of
actual policy changes with a direct impact on the agency mortgage market implemented
from the start of the Great Recession through the end 2012.
1.2.1 The Mortgage Refinancing Process
Mortgage refinancing constitutes a large market in the U.S., and choosing when to
refinance is perhaps the most important financial decision a typical household will
make. Through a combination of government policy and historical accident,
homeownership and FRMs are much more common in the U.S. than in most other
countries. The market share of FRMs usually hovers around 70%, while the total volume
of refinancing can range from $1-1.5 trillion per year, as it has in the wake of the Great
Recession, to as much as $2.75 trillion in 2003 during the peak of a refinancing wave.
FRMs feature level payments each month regardless of changes in interest rates, so as
mortgage interest rates decline, borrowers who took out mortgages previously at high
interest rates can often save money on their monthly payments by taking out a new loan
at a low rate and paying off the old loan. Borrowers can also further reduce their
monthly payments by extending the term of their loan in order to spread their payments
over more periods. Although relative to adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) FRMs reduce
the exposure of borrowers to interest rate risk, they introduce the problem of how and
when to refinance. Deciding when to refinance and shopping effectively for a
competitive interest rate offer is a difficult financial problem, and some evidence
suggests households behave sub-optimally in this regard5.
5See Agarwal et al (2013), [7] Agarwal and Evanoff (2013), [8] Bucks and Pence (2008) [46] and Woodward
and Hall (2012) [188] for a discussion of lack of borrower sophistication in the mortgage market.
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Homeowners can also in many cases choose to increase the balance on their mortgage
via cash-out refinance. This tool is especially valuable given the composition of
middle-class U.S. household balance sheets. According to the 2013 Survey of Consumer
Finances, 67% of U.S. households own a residence, with a median value of $170,000. By
contrast just 16% of households own stocks or bonds, with a median value of $25,0006.
While households can easily convert financial asset wealth to consumption spending by
selling their assets in liquid markets and spending the proceeds, monetizing housing
wealth is comparatively difficult. Houses are indivisible, and one cannot sell half a
house. Moreover, real estate markets are highly illiquid, sellers have high transaction
and search costs, and houses often have sentimental or flow consumption values that
make selling a home unattractive. Cash-out refinance provides an alternative to sale that
allows households to monetize their housing wealth by essentially selling a fraction of
their home equity. When their home is worth more than the principal outstanding on
their mortgage, households can refinance into a higher balance, giving them free cash to
spend on consumption goods after paying off the existing loan. Greenspan and Kennedy
(2008) [101] suggest that the four most-common uses of home equity wealth extracted via
cash-out refinancing are to consolidate non-mortgage debts, to make home
improvements, to spend on consumption goods, and to finance the purchase of financial
assets. Three of these uses (all save consumption expenditure) are related in that they are
essentially investments. Mortgage debt is particularly suitable as a means to finance
such investment because by virtue of being secured by real property and having
tax-deductible interest payments in the U.S., the after-tax interest cost of mortgage debt
is much lower than that on other debts such as credit cards and personal loans, making it
cost-efficient for borrowers to increase the size of their mortgage in order to retire other
types of debt. These interest savings function equivalently to those from rate-term
refinancing, or refinancing into a similar balance at lower rates in order to reduce one’s
6The quoted medians are among those who actually hold that asset class, so across all households me-
dian residential real estate assets are much higher than median financial assets.
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monthly payments, in easing household budget constraints. However, choosing how
much equity to extract when refinancing is also a difficult decision, as any increase in
debt reduces the borrower’s equity stake in the home and thus increases the risk that
their wealth will be eroded completely if house prices decline. Hence withdrawing
mortgage equity can potentially increasing a household’s risk of default7, and as with
refinancing overall some evidence suggests that households sub-optimally
over-leverage8.
Moreover, borrowers also face substantial fixed costs in completing a refinance
application, including both monetary and non-monetary costs. In a typical timeline, a
borrower will supply several potential primary market lenders (known as “originators”)
with their desired loan balance and estimates of certain credit risk information, such as
their credit score and income. Due to the difficulty in navigating the refinancing market,
in many cases borrowers actually contract with brokers or correspondents (“third-party
originators” or TPOs) who shop for the best available offer in exchange for a fee, saving
borrowers the time and search costs. The originator will quote a best-offer interest rate
based on these estimates, subject to revision on verifying their credit risk. Using these
offers, the borrower will make a formal credit application to one or more originators,
typically paying an application fee, at which point the originator will verify their credit
risk (often involving additional fees, such as for home appraisals or document review)
and decide whether or not to grant the application. If the originator grants the loan
application, they will then send out a rate offer sheet detailing the tradeoff between the
interest rate the borrower pays, any upfront fees (“points”) they must pay or be paid to
secure the offer, and the length of time (“lock-in period”) they have to decide whether or
not to accept the offer. Borrowers who accept pay off the balance remaining on their
existing mortgage as well as, in some cases, a prepayment fee that is often a stipulated
7See Laufer (2013) [145] and Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011) [158, 159] for a evidence of increasing default risk
from cash-out refinance.
8See Duca and Kumar (2014) [69] or Disney and Gathergood (2011) [67] for evidence on the link between
financial literacy and mortgage equity withdrawal.
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fraction of the existing balance.
In some cases, borrowers who would like to refinance may be unable to do so due to
credit constraints. Borrowers with risky credit profiles, measured as either a high
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, high debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, or low credit score (FICO), are
more likely to have their refinancing applications denied9. Moreover even in cases
where a risky borrower’s application is approved, the high interest rate charged by the
lender to compensate for that risk may be too high for the borrower to pay, leading the
borrower to turn down the offer. Some evidence suggests that mortgage borrowers may
not have wanted to deleverage so rapidly following the Great Recession, but were
constrained in their ability to access credit by reductions in credit supply10. Hence
easing credit supply conditions may improve borrower welfare both by reducing the
interest rates offered to borrowers and by reducing the likelihood that borrower
applications will be denied. Moreover to the extent that refinancing at a lower rate or
longer term can reduce a borrower’s monthly payments, constraints that inhibit the
capability of borrowers to refinance their mortgages during recessions may increase
default rates as borrowers who are unable to afford their monthly payments turn to their
next-best alternative11.
On a macroeconomic level, the mortgage market is in many ways a key driver of
business cycles and refinancing in particular is an important channel of monetary
transmission in the U.S. Because the majority of U.S. home mortgages are fixed rate, in
order to benefit from a decline in interest rates most mortgage borrowers must actively
choose to refinance in order to lock in a new lower rate. However, the ability of
fixed-rate borrowers to refinance depends on their creditworthiness, and in particular, if
a borrower does not have sufficient equity it is typically very difficult for them to obtain
9See Goodman and Li (2014) [95] for a discussion of how these characteristics affect access to credit.
10See Gropp et al (2014) [102] and Bhutta (2012) [37] for a discussion of credit supply restrictions during and
after the Great Recession.
11See Gerardi et al (2013, 2015), [92, 93] Keys et al (2014), [136] and Tracy and Wright (2012) [185] for evidence
of the effect of refinancing constraints on default.
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credit. These constraints on refinancing due to tightened credit supply are considered by
both academics and policymakers to be a contributing factor in prolonging recessions12.
In addition, some evidence suggests that homeowners have a higher propensity to
spend out of income during recessions, when they are more likely to be unemployed or
otherwise income-constrained13. Likewise, loosening credit constraints during
expansionary periods may lead to over-borrowing and contribute to unsustainable asset
price appreciation and increasing economic fragility14. The experience of the U.S. over
the most-recent business cycle highlights the importance of mortgage markets, and in
particular variations in mortgage credit supply, as a driver of macroeconomic outcomes.
1.2.2 Mortgage Originators
Mortgage markets in the U.S. are highly segmented, and in most cases the primary
originator who issues a mortgage loan to a household is not the ultimate investor. [181]
Historically, primary originators were often small local enterprises with specialized
knowledge in evaluating borrowers’ creditworthiness, although this has changed in
recent years as primary originators consolidated and expanded geographically
following a wave of deregulation15. Smaller primary mortgage originators are often
unable to bear the risks associated with issuing and holding FRMs. Because they
mortgages only in one area, locally-concentrated originators are highly exposed to
idiosyncratic local economic shocks, such as a decline in oil prices causing a rise in
mortgage defaults in an oil-producing region. Many specialized nonbank mortgage
lenders also lack the capital necessary to hold a large volume of loans on their balance
12See Mishkin (2007), [165] Bennett et al (2001), [32] and Black et al (2010) [39] for a discussion of the refi-
nancing channel, or Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), [104] Midrigan and Phillipon (2011), [173] and Tenreyro
and Thwaites (2013) [184] for a discussion of the effect of credit constraints on recessions.
13See Cooper (2013), [59] Zhou and Carroll (2012), [191] Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014), [123] and Carroll et al
(2014) [51] for evidence on income shocks, home-equity borrowing and the marginal propensity to spend.
14See Khandani et al (2013), [137] Duca et al (2011), [70] Chen et al (2013) [53] and Laufer (2013) [145] for a
discussion of the the contribution of weakening credit standards to individual and systemic risk.
15See Loutskina and Strahan (2011) [150] for an overview of this trend.
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sheet, and these originators account for a fairly high market share in the U.S.. Mortgage
holders also face prepayment risk16 because borrowers tend to refinance when mortgage
rates are low, so from the investor’s perspective refinancing exchanges a high-yielding
note for cash at precisely the time when that cash cannot be reinvested at a high rate.
Moreover, FRMs are long-dated assets and their value falls significantly when interest
rates rise, although due to prepayment risk their value does not rise as much when
interest rates fall1718. Certain institutional investors, especially pension funds and
insurers, also have long-maturity liabilities and as such are less susceptible to
asset-liability maturity mismatch and hence better able to bear the risk associated with
holding high-duration FRMs to maturity, while other investors such as hedge funds are
better able to hedge away prepayment risk. Since these larger investors often lack
expertise in evaluating borrower creditworthiness, a common arrangement is for
primary originators to specialize in underwriting mortgages and then sell the loans to
investors on the secondary mortgage market.
For the majority of secondary market sales, mortgage loans are packaged into a
mortgage-backed security (MBS) through a process called securitization that pools risks
across multiple borrowers prior to sale. In the simplest form of securitization, a primary
originator bundles multiple previously-originated FRMs into a simple MBS known as a
pass-through pool. The monthly proceeds from this pool depend on the
weighted-average coupon (WAC), or average interest rate paid on the underlying
mortgages. Investors in the pool receive a share of the proceeds proportional to their
stake, and the price they are willing to pay for the pass-through pool depends on the
16Prepayment denotes any event in which the mortgage balance is paid off in full prior to maturity,
including refinances and sales.
17The asymmetry of this relationship is known as negative convexity.
18Due to prepayment and default the duration of a mortgage, or the sensitivity of their price to interest
rates, is actually random, and most market participants use model-derived estimates of expected duration.
Absent any prepayment or default, the scheduled payments on 30-year FRMs have a duration of 7 to 12
years depending on the interest rate, so market participants often gauge mortgage yields relative to 10-year
treasury bonds. The realized duration of most mortgages, factoring in prepayment, is between 5 and 10
years.
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WAC, as well as other risk factors. By pooling the risk of prepayment and default across
multiple mortgages MBS reduce the risks associated with investing in mortgages.
Primary originators receive the cash from selling the securities upfront and a fee, known
as a servicing fee, on an ongoing basis as compensation for collecting payments from
borrowers, which then can choose to retain for themselves or use to hire a third-party
servicer19. On the cost side, many primary originators must secure the cash necessary to
complete the loan origination for the entirety of the lock-in period, and this money is
often borrowed from larger warehouse lenders. Originators thus face the risk that a
borrower will reject their credit offer prior to the end of the lock-in period, leaving them
with no mortgage with which to repay the interest on their warehouse loan. Borrowers
often reject offers because prevailing mortgage interest rates have declined, which tends
to ceteris parabus increase the value of existing mortgages, so originators also face pricing
risk in that borrowers will tend to disproportionately accept offers when the value of
their mortgage has declined.
In order to reduce their exposure to this pricing risk, a large fraction of simple
pass-through pools are sold forward in a standardized futures market known as the TBA
market. As described in Vickery and Wright (2013), [186] originators can sell MBS at any
time for delivery at a specified date in the future. Importantly, the actual securities to be
delivered are not specified at the time of the trade, rather, only the general features such
as the coupon of the security are arranged in advance20. Delivery dates are scheduled
well in advance by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, and there
is usually one delivery date each month for each class of securities, although 15-year
mortgages and 30-year mortgages for example will have different delivery dates. Two
days prior to the delivery date, TBA sellers must inform buyers of the securities they will
deliver, and failure to deliver results in harsh punitive payments that it is essentially
19A simplified pictorial representation of the cash flow between different participants in an agency MBS
transaction is shown in Figure 1.1 and will be discussed more fully in Section 1.2.3.
20Only certain types of MBS, specifically those backed by the GSEs, are eligible for inclusion in a TBA
deal.
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always in the incentive of the seller to avoid. Because the composition of TBAs is hidden
until two days prior to delivery, prices reflect market expectations of the value of
delivered securities, with a downward adjustment to account for the fact that lenders
will preferentially deliver their lowest-quality mortgages. Moreover because there are a
relatively limited set of categories of TBAs21, and fewer still with liquid markets, the
mortgage rates that originators are willing to offer are substantially determined by a
narrow set of market prices.
However, mortgage credit supply is not entirely driven by secondary market
conditions, and lender strategies at the primary-market level are an important
determinant. In many markets, mortgage lending is a concentrated industry22 and
lenders tend to behave as if they have a certain amount of market power23. An
important consequence is that in concentrated markets, lenders may be able to profitably
charge higher interest rates without fear that the borrower will reject the offer and apply
to a different lender. In addition lenders are able to preferentially sell or securitize their
riskiest loans and hold their least-risky loans on balance sheet24. The anonymized nature
of the TBA market only increases the scope for adverse selection, although there is also a
secondary market for specific MBS with superior risk features that enables these pools to
sell at a premium. In addition, while only government-guaranteed mortgages can be
pledged to a TBA transaction, mortgages can also be privately securitized through
broker-dealers; while issuance in the private-label secondary market was significant
prior to the great recession, it has since effectively ceased. Thus the extent to which
credit supply varies with secondary market prices will depend on how reliant the lender
is on securitization, as lenders with balance-sheet capacity can hold the mortgages they
21TBA coupons are traded in .5% increments.
22See Loutskina and Strahan (2011) [150] for a discussion of how deregulation has driven increasing ex-
pansion by large lenders and Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013) [178] for a discussion of local-market concen-
tration.
23See Allen et al (2013, 2014), [14, 15] Amromin and Kearns (2014), [17] Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013), [178]
and Gurun et al (2013) [105] for examples of monopolistically-competitive behavior in the mortgage market.
24See Agarwal et al (2012), [5] Downing et al (2009), [68] and Keys et al (2012) [134] for a discussion of ad-
verse selection.
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issue until conditions improve.
1.2.3 The Government-Sponsored Enterprises
Absent government intervention, the secondary market for mortgage loans would
become a lemons market. As mentioned above, primary originators have a strong
incentive to use the private information gained from screening borrowers to retain on
their balance sheet their least-risky mortgages and sell their most-risky mortgages. In
order to support a functioning secondary mortgage market, FHLMC and FNMA offer to
guarantee repayment of all principal and interest on a mortgage meeting their standards
on schedule in exchange for a fee. To the extent that investors price the GSEs’ implicit
government guarantee, this removes all default risk on agency MBS25, allowing primary
originators to in effect pay an insurance premium, known as a guarantee fee, to convert a
risky mortgage loan into a stable and relatively safe callable annuity. Note that this does
not actually remove the incentive for adverse selection; primary originators still have an
incentive to securitize their highest-risk loans, but the GSE guarantee makes investors
indifferent to the idiosyncratic default risk associated with these mortgages, as FHLMC
and FNMA bear all of the credit risk26. In order to mitigate adverse selection, FHLMC
and FNMA specialize in rating and pricing default risk on mortgages they guarantee,
and vary their fees depending on the primary originator and characteristics of the loans.
While my dissertation focuses on the policies of FNMA and FHLMC with respect to
their guarantee fees and their support of secondary markets, these two agencies have
other policy goals and tools, and there are also a variety of other government-sponsored
enterprises27. One of FNMA and FHLMC’s other important policy instruments is
25This assumes all market participants act (as it appears that they do) as though the U.S. Government
will guarantee the obligations of the GSEs in case of any serious problem (as it appears that they will).
26Agency MBS still face prepayment risk, or the risk of lower yield due to borrowers refinancing their
loans in low-interest-rate environments, but there is less scope for adverse selection with regard to prepay-
ment risk.
27Throughout I use the term “GSE” to refer solely to FNMA and FHLMC.
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portfolio purchases of either agency MBS28 or privately-issued MBS29. The GSE’s
portfolio purchases make them some of the largest institutional investors in the
mortgage market, and through these MBS purchases they are able to affect originator
incentives to underwrite certain types of loans. Crucially, the GSEs are charged with
increasing the availability and affordability of credit for homeowners in low-income
areas, and a certain mandated fraction of their portfolio purchases must contribute
towards this goal, typically by purchasing loans originated in low-income areas. Some
commentators have suggested that efforts to meet these affordable housing goals
contributed to an unstable expansion of risky credit prior to the Great Recession30,
although contemporary research does not support this proposition31. By their charter
the GSEs are only allowed to purchase or guarantee mortgages meeting certain quality
standards, and importantly there are limits on the size of loans meeting their standards.
Loans for amounts greater than this threshold, the conforming loan limit, are referred to
as “jumbo” loans and are ineligible for the GSEs guarantee. The GSEs have also
historically varied credit risk standards for loans they underwrite, by example changing
their income documentation requirements or minimum down-payment requirements,
and evidence suggests both that their changes to their credit standards have important
consequences for credit supply [175] and tend to be procyclical and exacerbate credit
cycles [83] and that these changes. Other organizations and government-sponsored
enterprises fulfill a role similar to the GSEs in other settings, as for example Farmer Mac
(another GSE) supports secondary markets for agricultural mortgages in a similar
fashion and GNMA (a government organization) securitizes and guarantees home
mortgage loans issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the FHA. In the
remainder of my analysis on focus on the GSEs guarantee fee business for FRMs in
28Those backed by FNMA, FHLMC, or another non-GSE company, Ginnie Mae (GNMA).
29Those arranged by a private financial institution with no government backing.
30See Acharya et al (2011) [3] or Calomiris and Haber (2015) [48] for variations on this argument.
31See Avery and Brevoort (2015) [21] or Bolotnyy (2014) [41] for evidence on the role of affordable housing
goals in the late-2000s mortgage crisis.
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particular, although it is worth noting that other aspects of their policy stance also have
important macroeconomic consequences.
Within their guarantee fee business, the GSEs indirectly influence the provision of
credit in the primary market by directly altering originator incentives to underwrite new
mortgages. Recall from Section 1.2.2 that the prices of MBS depend on the WAC, as
shown in the simplified schematic of a securitization transaction in Figure 1.1. As shown
in the diagram, any increase in guarantee fees leaves less of the WAC available to divide
between the coupon and the originator’s excess servicing spread, both of which
determine the originator’s profit on the transaction. For each security an originator
offers to FNMA or FHLMC, the GSE quotes two types of fees, an upfront “delivery fee”
assessed immediately as a proportion of the principal balance and an ongoing
“guarantee fee” assessed on a continual basis. Due to differences in prepayment speeds
and hence duration across mortgages, it is difficult to make apples-to-apples
comparisons of the cost to originators of delivery fees relative to guarantee fees.
However, the GSEs permit originators to freely convert upfront delivery fees to
annualized guarantee fees and vice versa by dividing them by a present value multiple.
This “buy-down” (if reducing the ongoing fee) or “buy-up” (if increasing the ongoing
fee) multiple, typically a number between 4 and 732, varies negatively with expected
prepayment speed, so at higher expected refinancing rates the upfront fees translate into
larger ongoing fees. Hence in this analysis I treat guarantee fees and annualized delivery
fees equivalently and refer to the combined annualized figure as the guarantee fee. After
choosing the pool coupon and paying any fees, the primary originator then sells the
MBS on the secondary market, in many cases to one of the GSEs themselves33, and in
some cases also sells the servicing rights, which trade at present-value multiples similar
32See Fuster et al (2013) [84] for more details on converting between ongoing and up-front fees.
33There are many additional options available to originators securitizing via the GSEs. In particular,
securitization is often locked-in through futures contracts before the mortgage loans are actually issued, as
described in Section 1.2.2, and there are separate products for other types of loans such as ARMs and 15-
or 40-year mortgages. This exposition describes only the most basic securitization of 30-year FRMs for the
purposes of making clear how a primary originator would respond to GSE policy.
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Figure 1.1: Simplified Schematic of an Agency MBS Deal
Notes: Red boxes represent agents, green boxes represent cash flows, arrows represent payer and
recipient of cash flow. MBS shown in circle. Borrowers pay monthly payments and points at
origination. GSEs recieve fee and guarantee payments in case of default. Investors pay MBS price
and receive coupon payments. Lenders receive servicing payments monthly and points and price
of MBS at origination.
to those for up-front fees. In the case that a borrower defaults on their mortgage, the GSE
will continue making regular payments for a specified length of time, typically 120 days,
and if the borrower has not resumed making payments, the GSE will then pay off the
remaining balance. Hence while GSE securitization essentially removes all risk of
default, all else equal, higher guarantee fees lead to some combination of lower MBS
coupons and lower servicing spreads, reducing the profitability of a securitized
mortgage.
In determining the disposition of an originated mortgage or “funding” channel,
primary originators typically compare multiple options34. Originators usually decide
how to fund a loan after deciding upon the interest rate and whether the loan
application will be approved, and subsequently compare whether to securitize the loan
via GNMA, the GSEs, or private-label, and whether to retain the loan on balance sheet
for their own portfolio. GSE securitization and portfolio placement are typically
reserved for the highest-quality credits, while private-label and GNMA securitization
34The remarks in this paragraph on how lenders make mortgage funding decisions are based on dis-
cussions with industry participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Mortgage Contract Design
Conference in May of 2015. Owing to Chatham House Rules in effect for the conference, I am unable to
attribute these remarks to particular individuals.
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are only used for lower-quality credits. For mortgages where GSE securitization and
portfolio placement are the viable options, primary originators will be more willing on
the margin to originate mortgages and to securitize when the prices those mortgages
command on the secondary market are higher, or equally when guarantee fees and
upfront fees are low. Prior studies have demonstrated that active secondary markets
increase the supply of mortgage credit in the primary market35. If the primary originator
intends to hold a mortgage on balance sheet, their risk and expected profit depend on
factors affecting default and prepayment risk, such as the borrower’s income and credit
score. If the primary originator intends to sell a mortgage loan, their decision whether or
not to grant credit also depends on the price the loan will command on the secondary
market, and thus the guarantee fee. For the conforming 30-year FRMs on which this
paper will focus, GSE securitization has retained a dominant position since the start of
the Great Recession, and what little private exposure has persisted in this market
segment has been mostly originators holding loans in portfolio. [82, 96]
Between March 2008 and April 2012, the GSEs increased their fees seven times on
various mortgage products. As shown in Figure 1.2, the result was that by 2013 average
guarantee fees were more than double their 2007 levels36. The GSEs have always varied
their guarantee fees based on experience with particular mortgage originators, but an
important change in policy over this period was to introduce considerably more
risk-based pricing of delivery fees at the loan level. Prompted by increasing default rates
on guaranteed mortgages, in March 2008 FHLMC and FNMA raised their delivery fees
by 25 basis points (bp) on all newly-securitized loans and began varying their delivery
fees based on FICO scores and LTV ratios for all loans37. These fees were raised again for
35See Gabriel and Rosenthal (2007) [86] and Loutskina and Strahan (2009) [149] for examples.
36Figure 1.2 shows the average charged fee, which is unadjusted for sample composition. The decline in
average fees in early 209 reflects tightened credit conditions that locked higher-risk, higher-fee borrowers
out of the market. Hence while average fees were lower in 2009, the actual fee schedule was greater.
37Prior to March 2008 guarantee fees varied depending on some loan characteristics, such as whether
the borrower was an investor and whether the property was an apartment or single-family home, but only
certain types of loans (“A-Minus” Mortgages) were priced differentially depending on FICO and LTV.
20
some loan types, including cash-out refinances, high-LTV loans, and low-FICO loans in
June 2008. In late July 2008 the Housing and Economic Recovery Act significantly
increased government oversight of the ostensibly private GSEs, and in September 2008
FHLMC and FNMA were officially placed into conservatorship under the newly-created
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), becoming wards of the state. Subsequently
delivery fees were raised three more times, in November 2008, April 2009 and March
2011, on high-LTV and low-FICO loans. In April 2012 and again in December 2012
guarantee fees were raised by 10 basis points across the board, the former mandated by
congress to fund the payroll tax cut and the latter mandated by FHFA [80]38. On a
mortgage with a $200,000 balance, a 10 bp increase in guarantee fees will translate to
roughly $4,000 in additional payments over the life of the mortgage, so each of these fee
increases was economically meaningful. With the exception of the
congressionally-mandated increase, all of these fee increases were intended to correct for
perceived mispricing of default risk. As shown in Figure 1.3, which is based on FHFA’s
annual report to congress, [80] the GSEs did not merely adjust their fees upward in order
to make them actuarially fair; rather, they set their fees so as to make positive profit in
2009-2012 in order to make up for losses incurred in 2008 and previously39. The extent of
this intertemporal cross-subsidization was higher for refinance loans, and cash-out
refinances in particular, than it was for home purchase loans. Despite the stated rationale
for the other fee increases, the congressionally-mandated fee increase highlights the
extent to which the GSEs have become an explicitly public enterprise, and it would not
be a novel development for the government to treat guarantee fees as an instrument of
public policy.
38A typical rule-of-thumb conversion from delivery fees to guarantee fees uses a present-value multiple
of 5, so a 10 bp increase in guarantee fees corresponds to a 50 bp increase in delivery fees, or double the
increase in March 2008
39Note that both the GSEs themselves and their conservator acknowledge both this cross-subsidization
and its rationale.
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Figure 1.2: Average Charged Guarantee Fee
Notes: Average guarantee fees charged on FNMA MBS. Grey shading indicates NBER recession
dates.
Figure 1.3: Intertemporal Guarantee Fee Cross-Subsidization
Notes: Estimated gain/loss on GSE mortgage guarantee business.
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1.2.4 Policy Interventions in the Mortgage Market
In addition to changes in guarantee fees, since start of the Great Recession there have
been a number of new policy measures implemented in the U.S. directed specifically at
the U.S. mortgage market. The most relevant intervention for my analysis, as mentioned
in Section 1.2.3, was the bailout of the GSEs themselves. Starting in early 2007, defaults
began rising among mortgages guaranteed by the GSEs, and in 2008 the GSEs lost a
combined $109 billion on their guarantee business. In order to forestall a loss of investor
confidence in the GSE’s guarantee that could disrupt secondary markets, the federal
government committed in September 2008 to honor all of their obligations in exchange
for direct oversight and an 80% equity stake in the enterprises, effectively nationalizing
them. The GSEs lost nearly as much combined in 2009, and over time more equity
injections were required, although since 2012 the GSEs have been profitable. Since that
time the FHFA has exercised significant authority in directing the GSEs business
operations, beginning with the dismissal of their top executives and continuing with
restrictions on their political activities and dividend payments, among others. The
agencies have also been required to remit a substantial fraction of their earnings to the
treasury, and as of 2015 have repaid all of the bailout funds they received.
Under the direction of the FHFA, the GSEs have also been the conduit for two key
pieces of mortgage-market-specific policies. As shown in Figure 1.4, in January 2009 the
GSEs introduced the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a program
designed to help borrowers avoid default. HAMP offered mortgage servicers incentive
payments to modify the terms of delinquent or at-risk mortgages in order to reduce their
monthly payments for a specified length of time. The goal of the program was to shift
servicer incentives away from foreclosure and towards forbearance (delayed payments)
via a subsidy. The program was generally considered to be unsuccessful, [113] as
relatively few borrowers received modifications and many program participants
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re-defaulted as soon as the period of lower payments expired. As shown in Figure 1.4, in
June 2009 the FHFA also created the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) to
streamline the refinancing process for borrowers with little home equity. As discussed in
Section 1.2.1, borrowers with little or no home equity are often unable refinance, and the
decline in home prices starting in 2007 left many borrowers in this position and thus
unable to benefit from sizable reductions in both short-term interest rates and mortgage
rates. The HARP program allowed these borrowers to refinance, provided they met a
number of eligibility requirements, including that their original loan be guaranteed by
FHLMC or FNMA, that the loan be originated prior to June 2009, and that they be
current on their mortgage with a current LTV above 80%. Under the direction of the
FHFA, FNMA and FHLMC created special programs40 that allowed lenders to securitize
with or sell to the GSEs on very favorable terms loans meeting these stipulations, again
with the goal of incentivizing lenders to grant HARP refinances. The initial program
guidelines had very strict requirements for the guarantees lenders made regarding the
quality of their loans, placing lenders at risk that the GSEs would find fault with their
underwriting standards, cancel the guarantee, and transfer the defaulted loan back to
the lender, and also originally featured a 105% LTV ratio cap for eligibility. Because
lender participation and borrower takeup were so low relative to predictions, both of
these features were relaxed in several stages starting in late 2009. In response to what
was widely deemed a failure, the FHFA created HARP 2.0 in January 2012, removing the
LTV caps entirely and reducing the legal risks facing lenders.
In Chapter 3 I exploit the design of the HARP program extensively in my empirical
design, hence a more detailed discussion of these design features is warranted. As
mentioned above, the HARP program only allowed borrowers to refinance if they met a
number of eligibility requirements. First, the loan must have been guaranteed by FNMA
or FHLMC, as the program was run through the GSEs. Second, the loan must have been
40Respectively, DU Refi + and Relief Refinance.
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Figure 1.4: Timeline of Mortgage-Market Interventions
Notes: Changes to GSE fees shown in red, other GSE policy interventions shown in blue, Federal
Reserve interventions shown in green.
sold to or securitized by one of the GSEs prior to June 2009, the official start date of the
program41. Third, the borrower must have had a current LTV ratio of at least 80%, and,
at various times in the program’s history, an LTV ratio below some cutoff. Fourth, the
loan size cannot have been above the GSE’s maximum size (the aforementioned
conforming loan limit) and cannot have been originated as part of certain special GSE
programs42, although in most cases loans other than 30-year fixed-rate mortgages were
permitted43. Finally, the borrower must have been current on their mortgage at the time
of the refinance, with no missed payments in the past six months and no more than one
missed payment in the past twelve months. There was an additional requirement placed
on lenders that the refinance loan provided tangible benefit to the borrower, although
lenders could meet this requirement either by offering a lower interest rate or by moving
from an adjustable-rate to fixed-rate mortgage, and as such almost all refinances
qualified, as average interest rates declined sharply prior to program implementation.
Despite the fact that these HARP-mandated programs provided strong incentives for
lenders to refinance eligible borrowers regardless of their creditworthiness, lender
discretion still played some role in determining access to credit. Typically, by selling to
41This requirement had the effect of preventing borrowers from using HARP twice.
42In particular, Alt-A mortgages were excluded. Combined with the first requirement, this essentially
restricted the HARP programs to only prime borrowers.
43For example, 15- and 40-year mortgages qualified, as did most varieties of ARMs.
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or securitizing with one of the GSEs the lender transfers all credit risk to the GSEs, and if
this can be done cheaply then the lender can often issue mortgages profitably with very
little risk. In choosing whether or not to grant refinancing credit to a HARP-eligible
borrower, lenders had to account for two principal risk factors. First, if the lender did
not provide credit, the borrower could simply apply to another lender, costing them lost
business44. Second, if the lender did provide credit, they faced GSE putback risk, or the
risk that the GSEs (or an investor) would find flaws in the underwriting or
documentation and transfer all credit risk back to the lender. Under the original HARP
guidelines, the lender on the borrower’s existing mortgage45 had a dramatic advantage
over other lenders in offering a HARP refinance because of differences in documentation
requirements and putback risks. These guidelines had the effect of muting competition
for HARP refinances by conferring a pricing advantage to one lender relative to all
others46, simultaneously reducing both risk factors. Nonetheless, at all times in the
program’s history borrowers could and did go to lenders other than their original lender.
Moreover, while lender participation in the HARP program was totally voluntary, most
lenders did in fact participate, signaling that they believed loans issued under the HARP
guidelines to be profitable. However as a result of this program design, borrowers with
impaired credit were still required to find a lender willing to overlook their credit risk in
order to refinance.
All the same, the HARP program was developed in order to help high-credit-risk
borrowers refinance, and several features of the program attenuated the effect of
borrower credit risk on access to credit. The original guidelines left scope for lenders to
deny eligible applicants on the basis of their increased credit risk, and some borrowers
were denied because of, among other things, low FICO scores or high LTV ratios47.
44If the original lender actually held the mortgage note or securities in which the note was packaged,
they also lost in this scenario from unprofitable prepayments on their loan portfolio.
45Technically the servicer, or the entity that administers the loan, but in many cases these were the same
bank.
46See Amromim and Kearns (2014) [17] for a more detailed discussion of this asymmetry
47The changes to HARP introduced in January 2012 severely reduced the scope for denying applicants.
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However, several factors mitigated the otherwise highly negative effect of
non-employment on credit access. First, under the program guidelines, in cases where
the borrower refinanced with their original lender and their payments did not increase
by 20% or more lenders were not required to re-verify either their income or
employment status. Since in almost all cases borrower payments declined48, and in most
cases borrowers refinanced with their original lender49, a large fraction of HARP
borrowers were not required to verify their income or employment. Hence if these
borrowers had been employed when they received their original mortgage, for the
purposes of underwriting their HARP refinance their credit risk would still be evaluated
based on those prior earnings. Second, even in cases where borrowers were required to
provide documentation, they could either provide verification of their assets as an
alternative to income or submit documentation for their unemployment insurance
benefits. While the requirements for documenting assets rather than income were fairly
strict, unemployed borrowers could use their unemployment benefits to document their
income provided that the new mortgage payment did not exceed the rather high
threshold of 45% of their monthly income. As a result, while access to HARP refinancing
credit still depended on the borrower’s employment status, the importance of
documented employment was attenuated relative to a typical refinance.
The initial HARP program was announced in March 2009, and FHFA directed the
GSEs to implement the program as soon as possible. FNMA began its DU Refi +
program in March50, while FHLMC rolled out its Relief Refinance mortgages in June.
The initial program guidelines had very strict requirements for the guarantees lenders
made regarding the quality of their loans (and hence high putback risks) and there was
initially a 105% LTV ratio cap for eligibility. Due to unusually low program takeup, at
the end of 2009 the LTV cap was raised to 125%. Nonetheless by September 2011 fewer
48Tracy and Wright (2012) [185] estimate an average payment reduction of 26% for HARP refinances.
49Agarwal et al (2015) [12] estimate that 54% of HARP refinances were via the original lender.
50HARP loans issued by FNMA from March through May 2009 functioned somewhat differently from
other HARP loans.
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than 1 million HARP refinances had been completed, well short of initial estimates of 4-5
million. As a result the FHFA changed the program guidelines dramatically, creating
HARP 2.0 in January 2012. This iteration of the program removed all LTV ratio caps,
waived certain fees and underwriting requirements51, and severely reduced the strength
of guarantees and putback risks facing HARP lenders. Following the implementation of
HARP 2.0, takeup under the program increased dramatically, and more than 2 million
borrowers refinanced through HARP in 2012. Following several extensions the program
is currently scheduled to end at the end of 2016.
While my dissertation focuses primarily on the GSE policies outlined above, certain
other mortgage-market trends and policy interventions are crucial to understanding the
context of these policies. Between mid-2007 and late-2008, mounting losses on
private-label mortgage securities caused considerable financial-market turmoil. In
response, the Federal Reserve intervened on several occasions between March 2008 and
November 2008 to either backstop financial institutions or facilitate their sale or
liquidation52, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury developed the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) in October 200853 to purchase distressed securities from financial
institutions in order to lean against fire-sale dynamics and put more cash on their
balance sheets. Over the same time period, the Federal Reserve also lowered its Federal
Funds Rate target in successive increments, finally reaching the zero-lower-bound for
short-term interest rates in December 2008. In order to provide additional
accommodation by lowering longer-term interest rates, the Federal Reserve in
November announced a program of asset purchases referred to as quantitative easing
(QE), as shown in Figure 1.4. The initial program aimed only to purchase treasury
securities, but in March 2009 the Federal Reserve amended their mandate and began
purchasing agency MBS as well. Evidence suggests that these purchases had a
51In particular, property appraisal requirements.
52These interventions, known as the Maiden Lane transactions, are not shown in Figure 1.4.
53Also not pictured in Figure 1.4.
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substantial effect on MBS prices54, leading to a reduction in secondary-market MBS
yields and subsequently conforming mortgage interest rates, which fell from a peak of
6.48% in August 2008 to 4.23% shortly after the conclusion of QE in October 2010. As
shown in Figure 1.4, the Federal Reserve subsequently implemented two additional
rounds of MBS purchases (QE2 and QE3)55, in each case contributing to substantial
declines in mortgage interest rates. Conforming mortgage rates reached their lowest
point ever in December 2012, shortly after the announcement of QE3, at 3.35%; as a
result of the combined effects of the HARP program and low mortgage interest rates,
refinancing activity ticked upward in 2012 and 2013.
1.3 RELATED LITERATURE
My dissertation relates to many different strands of the existing economic literature,
and some discussion of each is warranted. First, Chapters 3 and 4 are primarily an
empirical analysis of individual default and refinancing decisions, and as such these
chapters are closely related to a rich literature on household financial decision-making.
Second, Chapters 2 and 4 provide an analysis of the effects of government policy on
mortgage credit supply, and hence are related to a series of papers which analyze the
determinants of credit supply, and in particular the effects of secondary market
conditions on the primary mortgage market. Third, my research is connected to a
number of papers which analyze the effects of credit constraints, both at the individual
and macroeconomic level. Fourth, as an analysis of the effects of GSE policies, this paper
is also related to a series of prior research papers analyzing the effects of GSE policy and
policy pieces discussing options for housing finance reform. Finally, the analysis in
Chapter 4 in particular is related to several other strands of the economic literature,
including papers analyzing the use of credit supply policies as proxies for traditional
54See Cahill et al (2013) [47] and Hancock and Passmore (2014) [109] for evidence of these effects.
55As well as a similar program known as Operation Twist in September 2011, not pictured.
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stabilization policy, papers related to insurance cycles in other contexts, and the broader
empirical industrial organization literature concerning the estimation of dynamic
models. In this section, I review the relevant literature in each of these areas.
1.3.1 Household Financial Decision-Making
At its core Chapter 4 is a structural model of borrowers, and in particular how they
make choices and the costs of constraints on their choice set. This model builds upon
several pre-existing structural models of borrower default and prepayment behavior. As
a starting point, Hurst and Stafford (2004) [120] estimate a structural model of refinancing
and emphasize the consumption-smoothing motive as a rationale for refinancing in
high-interest-rate environments56. Bajari et al (2013) [22] and Ma (2014) [154] study
refinancing and default behavior with a single-agent dynamic discrete choice model.
Chen et al (2014) [53] and Laufer (2013) [145] enrich this type of model with credit
constraints, continuous borrowing decisions and idiosyncratic income risk, although
they estimate the model by matching aggregate moments rather than individual choices
as in Bajari et al (2013) [22] and Ma (2014). [154] Hembre (2014) [113] similarly focuses on
policy simulation by estimating a structural model of default behavior similar to that of
Laufer (2013) [145] and using the model to evaluate the Home Affordable Refinance
Program. My model builds on this prior work by more fully developing the structural
aspects of endogenous credit constraints and latent employment status, allowing me to
conduct additional counterfactual analyses on these margins, while continuing to
leverage the richness of individual-level data.
While the papers cited above model borrower behavior as forward-looking and
rational, prior evidence suggests that this is at best an approximation. Agarwal et al
(2013) [7] show that borrowers fail to refinance optimally, leaving considerable money on
56While direct evidence of a consumption-smoothing motive for household refinancing is scarce, Sullivan
(2008) [183] and Bethune (2014) [35] provide some evidence in other credit markets.
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the table, and in particular are too insensitive to changes in interest rates. This finding
that borrowers are inattentive or inertial in their decisions confirms work by Andersen et
al (2014) [20] and Lee and Ko (2011) [146] showing that borrower refinance decisions are
subject to a variety of choice frictions. However, even when borrowers are explicitly
made aware of the benefits of refinancing, they still do not tend to refinance optimally, as
demonstrated via an experiment in Johnson et al (2015). [128] This sub-optimal may be
due to the fact, as suggested by other studies, that borrowers may not even understand
either their current mortgage product or the set of available products. Bucks and Pence
(2008) [46] show using discrepancies between survey and administrative data that
borrowers do not know their own mortgage terms, while Agarwal et al (2013) [8] show
that borrowers typically have an inaccurate conception of their own credit risk, leading
them to in many cases accept higher-priced loan offers. Troublingly, Lacko and
Pappalardo (2010) [142] report that simply providing borrowers with more information
does not seem to improve their ability to procure better mortgage loans. This may be
because, as noted in Woodward and Hall (2012), [188] borrowers do not shop around for
mortgage loans very intensively, or, as noted in Disney and Gathergood (2011) [67] and
Duca and Kumar (2014), [69] borrowers with low financial or mathematical acumen are
simply incapable of navigating the market effectively. While my model is largely
agnostic with respect to most of these issues57, I do incorporate some insights from this
literature in the structural model I present in Chapter 4.
There is also considerable disagreement regarding the importance of unemployment
status for borrower refinance and default decisions, especially vis a vis their home
equity. Using a hazard-rate analysis, An et al (2010) [18] show that borrowers default
more often and refinance less often when unemployment rates in their area are high or
they have low home equity. Other papers explore these relationships in more detail. Elul
57The model presented in Section 4.2 features no definition of “optimal” outside of that suggested by
observed choices, hence borrower choices are tautologically optimal. Moreover the extent to which choices
are sensitive to particular key variables is not imposed but rather left as a function of parameters estimated
from borrower behavior.
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et al (2010) [77] suggest that both unemployment and negative equity are necessary
preconditions for default, and that negative equity alone is not enough, while Bhutta et
al (2010) [36] argue that borrowers with extremely negative home equity may default
even while liquid for strategic reasons. In contrast Gerardi et al (2013, 2015) [92, 93]
suggest in a series of papers that purely negative-equity-driven default is quite rare and
that individual employment status is the best single predictor of mortgage default,
irrespective of the borrower’s equity position. Quercia et al (2012) [174] document that
these effects vary by income: high-income borrowers default strategically and their
prepayment decisions weight highly on the refinancing option value, while low-income
borrowers tend to default for illiquidity-driven reasons and are actually more likely to
refinance when unemployment rates are elevated. While these findings seem to confirm
the consumption-smoothing model of Hurst and Stafford (2004), [120] in general the
relationship between unemployment and refinancing is complicated by the presence of
credit constraints. Indeed, Bethune (2014) [35] finds that unemployed borrowers are both
more likely to apply for credit and more likely to be denied, so even if a
consumption-smoothing motive is active the covariance between unemployment and
refinance may still be negative. While I do not take a strong stand on these questions, the
structural model I present in Chapter 4 accommodates both strategic and
illiquidity-driven default and acknowledges that borrowers who fail to refinance may be
credit constrained.
Much of Chapter 3 is intended to provide evidence in support of the
microfoundations underlying many models of household financial decision-making, in
particular those related to home-equity borrowing as a consumption-smoothing tool.
This literature traces its roots back to Aiyagari (1994), [13] who models an economy
composed of agents facing idiosyncratic labor income risk and strict borrowing
constraints. The Aiyagari (1994) [13] model assumes that agent’s preferences are such that
the shadow value of easing credit constraints is highest for borrowers in low-income
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states. This very reasonable assumption also appears in several subsequent papers in the
computable general equilibrium tradition, such as Krusell and Smith (1998), [141]
Gourinchas and Parker (2002), [99] and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), [152] often
via the same form of the agent’s utility function and borrowing constraint. Moreover
many empirical structural models of household borrowing behavior, such as Hurst and
Stafford (2004), [120] Chen et al (2014), [53] and Laufer (2013), [145] parameterize agent
preferences analogously and use the data to estimate only the parameters governing the
labor income process. The analysis I present in Chapter 3 relates closely to these prior
studies by providing empirical support for the assumptions underlying these models.
While direct evidence on use of household borrowing as a consumption-smoothing
tool during periods of unemployment is relatively scarce, some previous studies do shed
light on this issue. Sullivan (2008) [183] shows using U.S. micro-data that most borrowers,
with the exception of the very wealthy and those with no assets, tend to run up their
credit card debt when they become unemployed. He interprets this as evidence that
borrowers with no assets would like to borrow when unemployed but lack access to
credit. Dynarski et al (1997) [72] uses many of the same data sources to study how
households smooth labor income shocks. They find that during unemployment spells,
households tend to lean more heavily on government transfers and less on dissaving to
make up for lost income, with the largest effects on low-income households, and
interpret these findings as suggestive of binding liquidity constraints. Crossley and Low
(2014) [62] use Canadian survey data to study the consumption response of workers
facing unemployment. They find that only a small fraction of households are totally
liquidity constrained in that they cannot borrow at all, but that consumption declines
most sharply for this subset. Gropp et al (2014) [102] address the question of whether the
household delveraging observed since the 2008 U.S. recession is due to demand
(households wanted less credit) or supply (lenders tightened credit availability). They
find that in comparison to homeowners, renters deleveraged relatively more in counties
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with larger home price declines, suggesting that credit availability tightened in those
areas, or by implication, that borrowers in those areas did not actually wish to delever.
Each of these studies attempts to infer the presence of credit constraints from household
behavior, under the assumption that save for differences in credit access, different types
of households should behave similarly with respect to their borrowing. By contrast,
Bethune (2014) [35] directly observes credit constraints in the form of applications for
unsecured loans. He finds that unemployed borrowers both apply for credit more often
(or have greater demand) and are denied more often (or face tighter supply), with the
supply effect outweighing the demand effect. The empirical analysis I present in
Chapter 3 complements this literature by using several novel techniques to control for
the effect of credit supply in order to identify the effect of unemployment on demand for
refinancing credit.
Finally, a substantial prior literature relates home-equity borrowing directly to
Aiyagari (1994) [13]-type models of precautionary saving by providing evidence that
households do in fact build up a buffer stock of home equity to draw upon when facing
income shocks. Caroll et al (2003) [50] use U.S. micro-data to show that for all save the
lowest-income households, those facing higher ex-ante unemployment risk tend to build
up more home equity but not other types of wealth. Benito (2009) [31] studies the
mortgage equity withdrawal decisions of U.K. borrowers using survey data and shows
that they are more likely to borrow when facing a negative income shock. Aggregate
evidence, such as that in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) [153] and Zhou and Carroll
(2012), [191] also supports the proposition that households tend to self-insure via housing
wealth. Other studies confirm that borrowers tend to borrow against their home equity
to support consumption. Cooper (2013) [59] shows using U.S. micro-data that
borrowing-constrained households have a higher marginal propensity to borrow out of
rising home equity and interprets this evidence that housing wealth influences
consumption through collateral channels. Similarly Gan (2010) [89] shows that in Hong
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Kong, households with positive equity shocks tend to consume more, but especially if
they refinance. However, credit constraints can and do interfere with home-equity
borrowing as a consumption smoothing tool, as demonstrated in Bhutta and Keys
(2014), [38] who show that the probability of equity extraction is negatively related to
local unemployment rates. My analysis in Chapter 3 contributes to this literature by
providing empirical support for another aspect of Aiyagari (1994) [13]-type models of
idiosyncratic labor income risk.
1.3.2 Determinants of Credit Supply
My dissertation and Chapter 2 in particular are also related to a sizable literature on
mortgage credit supply, and in particular how secondary market conditions affect
primary market credit supply. Several recent papers have studied the effect of upstream
conditions on bank lending. Jiménez et al (2011) [127] show that the ability of banks to sell
securitized mortgage loans on the secondary market leads to greater mortgage credit
supply. In two similar papers, Loutskina and Strahan (2009) [149] and Loutskina
(2011) [151] study the effect of secondary market conditions on the relationship between
bank’s liquid funds and lending volumes. The former uses exogenous variation in ease
of securitization derived from GSE conforming loan standards to show that banks with
more abundant or cheaper deposit funding supply relatively more credit to less liquid
nonconforming loans, while the latter uses a model-constructed index of
“securitizability” to show similar effects across multiple loan categories. Taken together,
these three papers suggest that for highly liquid loans, such as conforming mortgages,
upstream secondary market conditions are at least as important a determinant of credit
supply as the lender’s own financial status, a result confirmed by Gabriel and Rosenthal
(2007). [86] This study corroborates many of these findings by analyzing the extent of
pass-through from guarantee fees to MBS prices and subsequently mortgage interest
rates. Other recent papers examine aspects of supply and demand for MBS. Merrill et al
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(2014) [157] study the factors driving upstream demand for loans and find that their
favorable treatment for regulatory capital requirements was an important determinant.
Fuster et al (2013) [84] quantify the factors determining the spread between the the rate
that borrowers pay (the primary mortgage rate) and the coupon rate that MBS investors
receive (the secondary mortgage rate), finding that while some of the increase is
attributable to guarantee fee increases, most is unexplainable. In studying the effect of
guarantee fees on credit supply, the analysis I present in Chapter 2 is most-closely
connected to these studies of the interaction between secondary and primary market
credit conditions.
Other recent papers also examine the strategic incentives facing mortgage lenders. In
a pair of related studies, Keys et al (2010) [133] and Keys et al (2012) [134] examine how
ease of securitization affects the intensity with which originators screen borrower credit
risk, and find that while lenders do exert less effort in screening borrowers whose
mortgages will be easier to sell, the effect is concentrated in subprime mortgage lending.
Stanton et al (2014) [181] document high levels of local-market concentration in mortgage
credit supply as well as coordination between upstream and downstream participants.
Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013) [178] and Allen et al (2013, 2014) [14, 15] study the effects
of such concentration in mortgage lending on credit supply. The former find that
measures of concentration are associated with reduced pass-through from lender costs to
mortgage rates, consistent with oligopoly pricing, while the latter find that borrowers
and high-risk borrowers in particular receive less favorable mortgage terms in more
concentrated markets. Similar evidence for the effects of concentration on pricing in
mortgage markets is presented in Amromin and Kearns (2014). [17] My results in Chapter
2 support these findings by documenting how guarantee fees reduce lender incentives to
originate new mortgages and quantifying how the extent of pass-through to interest
rates varies by levels of market concentration and borrowers risk.
Chapter 4 develops a model of mortgage credit supply that incorporates many of the
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insights from these and other papers. The models of credit supply I present in Sections
1.4 and 4.2 are based on the work of Einav et al (2012), [74] who study subprime auto
loans, and Crawford et al (2014), [61] who study small-business lending, with three key
adaptations to leverage the data I have available and more closely match key
institutional features of the agency mortgage market. First, lenders face a choice in my
model between holding loans and securitizing them via the GSEs, and as documented in
Agarwal et al (2012), [5] Downing et al (2009), [68] and Keys et al (2012), [134] in
equilibrium they will adversely select their most-risky loans for securitization. Second,
as discussed in Allen et al (2013, 2014), [14, 15] Amromin and Kearns (2014), [17] Scharfstein
and Sunderam (2013), [178] and Gurun et al (2013), [105] local-market competitiveness
partially determines the strength of lender offers in the model, with higher-priced offers
in less competitive markets. Those papers all note that mortgage lending appears to
follow a model of monopolistic competition, and the evidence from Amromin and
Kearns (2014) [17] and Gurun et al (2013) [105] as well as that mentioned previously
suggest that sub-optimal consumer choice may play a role in generating these market
inefficiencies. Finally, because I do not observe interest rate offers for loan applications
that are denied, the estimate procedure I describe in Section 4.3 employs a
selection-correction procedure similar to that in Jiménez et al (2012, 2014) [125, 126] in order
to estimate the credit supply function.
1.3.3 Effects of Credit Constraints
In its own way, each chapter of my dissertation analyzes the effects of credit
constraints on household financial decisions, and as such each is closely connected to
several recent papers studying similar household-level effects. Laderman (2012) [143] and
Krainer and Laderman (2011) [139] demonstrate that tight credit supply conditions that
prevent borrowers from refinancing lead to higher rates of mortgage default. Similarly,
Keys et al (2014) [136] and Tracy and Wright (2012) [185] show that borrowers making lower
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monthly payments, as may result from refinancing at low interest rates, are less likely to
subsequently default. These results provide some support for an option-theoretic model
of the type estimated in Bajari et al (2013) [22] in which borrowers on the margin choose
between refinance and default. As such, we may expect reductions in credit availability
to lead to higher levels of mortgage default. The results I show in Chapters 2 and 4
provide detailed evidence in support of these effects by connecting changes in credit
supply conditions to refinancing activity and subsequently to default rates.
A closely-related literature uses exogenous variation induced by credit supply
policies to identify household responses to changes in credit supply. The gold standard
for such variation is the randomized control trial, and Karlan and Zinman (2002) [131]
provide evidence for variation in credit demand using such an empirical design. Other
studies rely more heavily on natural experiments. Gross and Souleles (2002) [103] show
that borrowers tend to spend more when their credit card debt limits increase,
particularly if they were close to their previous limit. Hochguertel et al (2005) [116] exploit
changes in usury laws to estimate credit demand elasticity with respect to interest rates,
and find that demand is less price-sensitive in poorer regions. Leth-Petersen (2010) [148]
studies borrowing following a change in Danish law that permitted households to
borrow against home equity. He finds that those with low levels of liquid assets tend to
borrow more, with the exception that those who are unemployed tend to borrow less.
Abdallah and Lastrapes (2012) [1] study a similar legal change in Texas and find that,
consistent with binding liquidity constraints, measures of consumption (retail sales)
increase relatively more in lower-income counties when home-equity borrowing is
permitted. Agarwal and Qian (2014) [10] demonstrate the converse, showing with data
from Singapore that borrowers reduce their debt levels when home equity borrowing is
prohibited. Finallly, Markwardt et al (2014) [155] use the Danish policy reform to show
that home-equity borrowing and unemployment insurance are substitutes, suggesting
that both are used for consumption-smoothing purposes. The results I provide in
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Chapters 2 and 3 in particular contribute to this literature by studying household-level
responses to a pair of GSE policies that materially affected credit availability.
At the macroeconomic level, there is also a substantial literature on the effects of loose
or tight household credit constraints to which my dissertation is related. Tenreyo and
Thwaites (2013) [184] and Mora (2014) [167] find that credit constraints can interfere with
monetary transmission to consumption, a result that U.S. central bankers such as
Mishkin (2007) [165] and Bernanke (2007) [34] have attributed to mortgage refinancing
frictions. As a result, if as noted in Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) [123] and Carroll et al
(2014) [51] and modeled in Aiyagari (1994), [13] the marginal propensity to spend is
highest for income-constrained households, then easing credit constraints
countercyclically can lead to significant stimulus. Eggertson and Krugman (2012), [73]
Midrigan and Philippon (2011), [173] and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) [104] study
theoretically the negative impact of tightened household borrowing constraints, while
Mian et al (2013) [161] and Mian and Sufi (2012, 2014) [160, 162] provide evidence in support
of these theories. Di Maggio et al (2014) [65] and Keys et al (2014) [136] confirm many these
findings at the individual level, showing that lower monthly mortgage payments (as
might result from refinancing) lead to increased household consumption spending.
Other papers consider the effects of loose credit constraints. Jeske et al (2013) [124] find
that the mortgage subsidy provided by the GSEs leads to above-optimal levels of
borrowing, while Khandani et al (2013) [137] and Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011) [158, 159] show
that loosening household credit constraints can lead to an over-accumulation of debt,
leading to higher subsequent default rates. The results I present in Chapter 4
complement this literature by analyzing the effects of a policy that tightens credit
constraints during booms and loosens them during busts.
39
1.3.4 Effects of Government-Sponsored Enterprise Policies
As an analysis of GSE policy, my dissertation is closely related to the literature
studying the impact of GSE policies, especially with regards to credit supply. DeFusco
and Paciorek (2014) [64] estimate the elasticity of mortgage demand with respect to
interest rates and use the model to simulate the effect of guarantee fee increases,
assuming a given level of pass-through to interest rates. The results from Chapter 2
build on their work by estimating the extent of pass-through using loan-level data, and
my results are broadly consistent with theirs. Ambrose et al (2004) [16] and Kaufman
(2014) [132] estimate the effect on mortgage interest rates of GSE securitization, and find
that GSE-eligible loans enjoy interest rates roughly 10 to 25 bp below otherwise similar
mortgages. Passmore et al (2005) [170] invert this question by studying the determinants
of the conforming loan spread, or difference in interest rates between conforming and
non-conforming loans, and estimate that just less than half of the spread is derived from
the funding advantage the GSEs have over private lenders due to their implicit
government backing. My paper follows these studies in examining how exogenous
changes in guarantee fees affect the conforming loan spread. Bostic and Gabriel
(2006) [42] and Lehnert et al (2008) [147] both study the effect of GSE portfolio purchases on
credit supply and both find that they have no measurable positive impact on credit
provision. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2010) [87] investigate the extent to which GSE
securitization crowds out private mortgage credit and find that the extent of crowd-out
varies over the business cycle. In particular, during expansionary period such as from
2003 to 2006 there is significant crowd-out, although the GSEs still increase mortgage
credit supply; by contrast during the recession from 2007 to 2009 there was essentially
zero crowd-out as non-agency mortgage credit dried up. On a related note, Peek and
Wilcox [171] demonstrate that historically the GSEs served to reduce intertemporal
variation in mortgage credit supply by increasing their market presence during periods
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in which private credit supply tightened. More recently, Fuster and Vickery (2013) [85]
show that following the breakdown of the non-agency mortgage market in 2008, FRM
origination became rarer relative to ARM origination, suggesting that securitization is
virtually a requirement to manage the inherent risks of FRM origination. Hurst et al
(2014) [121] quantify the redistributive impact of the GSEs’ policy of not varying
guarantee fees across U.S. regions and find that the effects are quite large in comparison
with other redistributive programs. My results contribute directly to this literature by
analyzing the effects of changes in GSE policy on credit availability, both for observed
policies in Chapters 2 and 3 and counterfactual policies in Chapter 4.
Moreover, following the GSE’s entry into government conservatorship in September
2008, a number of policy papers have proposed reforms to the US housing finance
system. Proposals have tended to advocate for either a largely private system in which
insurance premiums are set on the open market or a public system retaining many of the
features of the GSEs are currently constituted. Jeske et al (2013), [124] Acharya et al
(2011), [3] Scharfstein and Sunderam (2011) [177] and Elenev et al (2015) [75] fall into the
former camp, while Mosser et al (2013) [168] and Dechario et al (2011) [63] expand on the
privatization proposals by advocating for a cooperative model. Hancock and Passmore
(2011) [108] and Goodman (2014) [97] note that any privatized system would likely be
subject to the same destabilizing dynamics witnessed with private-label securitization,
and hence, at a minimum, the government would be needed as a catastrophe re-insurer.
Goodman et al (2014) [96] note that pricing such catastrophe insurance is a difficult
problem, and Jaffee and Quigley (2011) [122] discuss some of the political pressures to
under-price such insurance. Smith and Weiher (2012) [180] and Dynan and Gayer
(2011) [71] discuss the need for countercyclical GSE policy, but focus respectively on
capital requirements and market shares58. Frame et al (2015) [83] analyze how GSE policy
relates to the tightening of mortgage credit supply post-recession, and while they do
58Although they do not discuss this issue, these could potentially be achieved with countercylical guar-
antee fees.
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discuss the conflict between their increased profitability and macroeconomic policy
goals they focus primarily on the GSE’s efforts to better control lender fraud59. My
dissertation contributes to this policy debate by proposing and analyzing the effects of a
change to GSE policy. However, to my knowledge, none of the proposals mentioned
above, nor any of the private proposals surveyed in Ellen et al (2010) [76] discusses the
effects of a countercylical guarantee fee policy.
Finally, several prior papers have analyzed the effects of other GSE policies at both
the household and aggregate levels. Zhu (2012) [192] studies the future default behavior
of HARP-eligible borrowers using administrative data. After applying a selection
correction to control for program takeup, he finds that eligible borrowers who
refinanced under HARP are about 50% as likely to subsequently default, indicating that
the program achieved its objective. Remy et al (2011) [176] perform a cost-benefit analysis
of a simulated HARP-type program and find that relatively few defaults, roughly 2.8%
of the total, would actually be averted, and that as a result the program would actually
cost the government a small amount of money on net. Tracy and Wright (2012) [185]
estimate a model of mortgage termination using loan-level data and simulate the effects
of a payment reduction equivalent to what borrowers would receive from a HARP
refinance. Their estimates suggest a reduction in default on the order of 25%, or only half
as large as what Zhu (2012) [192] estimates actually occurred. Amromim and Kearns
(2014) [17] show that borrowers who refinanced via HARP tended not to actively shop for
better deals with different mortgage lenders, in part because the design of the program
itself incentivized borrowers to refinance with their original lender. They find that
lenders responded to this behavior by pricing against their captive market, leading
HARP refinancers to receive interest rates .15-.2% higher than comparable non-HARP
borrowers. At the macro-level, Agarwal et al (2015) [12] examine both the direct and
59Specifically, in the wake of the recession the GSEs strengthened the representations and warranties
required of mortgage lenders, allowing them to put-back defaulted loans, or to effectively cancel their
guarantee agreement, if the loan was fraudulent or if the representations were otherwise violated.
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indirect effects of HARP and find that borrowers tended to benefit from refinances under
the program and that the increase in refinancing stimulated household consumption.
The results I show in Chapter 3 complement this literature by analyzing the factors
predicting take-up under HARP.
1.3.5 Other Related Literature
Several recent papers have analyzed, as my dissertation does, how credit supply
policies can proxy for elements of traditional stabilization policy. Hurst et al (2014) [121]
study the redistributive impact of a guarantee fee policy that is constant across space,
and find that by transferring resources towards default-prone areas, this policy provides
aggregate insurance comparable to the effects of fiscal stimulus. Similarly, Kimball
(2012) [138] argues that providing access to credit during recessions is likely to be a
cost-effective form of stabilizing transfers. Regarding home lending specifically, Krainer
and Laderman (2011) [139] and Tracy and Wright (2012) [185] argue that easier refinancing
credit conditions can help prevent foreclosure, while Markwardt et al (2014) [155] shows
that home-equity borrowing can be a substitute to traditional unemployment insurance.
Hurst and Stafford (2004), [120] as mentioned above, explain this effect through
consumption-smoothing refinance, and Carroll et al (2003) [50] among others have shown
that moderate-income households tend to insure against unemployment through
home-equity-based precautionary saving. Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011) [140] and
Landais et al (2014) [144] study the optimal policy for a more traditional stabilizing tool,
unemployment insurance, and find that the optimal policy varies with the business
cycle. Chapter 4 contributes to this literature by analyzing how to use credit supply
policy to lean against the business cycle.
In analyzing optimal insurance pricing policies for the GSEs, the analysis I present in
Chapter 4 is also connected to several papers that study insurance cycles in other
settings. As discussed originally in Winter (1991), [187] insurance cycles refer to the
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tendency of insurance premiums to follow a catastrophe dynamic of steeply rising
premiums following periods of large losses. In many cases, including arguable the case
of the GSEs themselves, this catastrophe dynamic is regulation-driven as insurers seek to
recapitalize. Abruzzo and Park (2014) [2] and Murphy et al (2014) [169] study the
destabilizing effects of procylical futures exchange margins, or cases in which low losses
lead to low margins and hence excessive borrowing and vice versa. The issues
surrounding futures margin cyclicality are in many respects directly analogous to GSE
guarantee fees, in that low premiums during boom times lead to increased leverage
while increases in premiums following crises choke off credit supply. Similar dynamics
occur in capital regulation, as Gordy and Howells (2014) [98] and Balla and McKenna
(2009) [23] discuss with regards to, respectively, the Basel II capital requirements and
loan-loss provisioning. Despite the presence of a deep and forward-looking public
backstop and the absence of regulatory pressures, most government programs also face
insurance cycles. Pennacchi (2009) [172] note that the 2005 Federal Deposit Insurance
Reform Act literally requires the FDIC to set procyclical insurance premiums, and
Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011) [163] discuss the disastrous performs of the
National Flood Insurance Program. Moreover as discussed in Hill (2010), [114] the same
boom-bust-bailout dynamic observed with FHLMC and FNMA actually occurred
previously with a smaller GSE, Farmer Mac, in the mid 1980s. Farmer Mac, as with its
larger cousins, pursued a procyclical lending policy, despite the fact that the presence of
the bailouts themselves suggest that policymakers actively desire the GSEs to lend
countercyclically. In calling for through-the-cycle pricing on behalf of FNMA and
FHLMC, Hancock and Passmore (2014) [110] note that the FHA attempts to set its
mortgage insurance premiums across the cycle, although in fact much as the GSEs did
the FHA raises its premiums six times between 2008 and 2013. [100] As such, any
countercyclicality in market shares for either the FHA or the GSEs is in spite of their
pricing policies, as both were subject to the same insurance cycle dynamics.
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Finally, the model I develop and estimate in Chapter 4 follows in the tradition of
structural industrial organization and as such is related to several recent papers in this
field. My estimation technique follows the semi-parametric approach of Hotz and Miller
(1993) [117] as applied to mortgage markets by Bajari et al (2013), [22] with first-stage policy
functions estimated using the methodology from Barwick and Pathak (2011) [26] and
Bazdresch et al (2014). [29] To this general framework I add three key ingredients drawn
from other areas of industrial organization. First, my model includes both discrete and
continuous choices, and for identification I rely on the results from Blevins (2010). [40]
Second, the model features persistent unobserved heterogeneity. The technique for
estimating the process for the latent unobservables is drawn from Diebold et al
(1999), [66] with a modification from Chung et al (2004) [55] introduced in order to address
the label-switching problem, while identification relies on the results from Connault
(2014). [58] Third, the model incorporates endogenous credit constraints; the framework
for modeling these constraints is drawn from Einav et al (2012) [74] and Crawford et al
(2014), [61] while the multi-stage estimation procedure is adapted from Ho (2009). [115]
1.4 A MODEL OF THE AGENCY REFINANCING PROCESS
In this section I outline a model of the agency refinancing market featuring both
borrower demand for credit and lender supply decisions. Lenders in the model offer
contracts and set contract terms to maximize their profit, as in Einav et al (2012), [74]
while borrowers solve a dynamic value-maximization problem in making their refinance
decisions as in Bajari et al (2013). [22] The general framework follows these earlier papers,
although several features are adapted to more closely match the institutional details of
the agency refinancing market. In several ways this model provides context for the
remainder of the paper. First, the choice variables in the model, both discrete and
continuous, correspond to the data I will describe in Section 1.5, and the model
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Figure 1.5: Extensive Form of Model
Notes: Timing of actions in stage game. Red/blue nodes denote borrower/lender decisions.
demonstrates their importance to understanding the mortgage refinancing process.
Second, the model generates two key predictions regarding the effect of guarantee fees
on credit supply and the effect of liquidity preference on applications and denials that
serve as a framework for interpreting the results I will present in Chapter 3. Finally, the
model forms the basis for the stage game played between borrowers and lenders in the
full structural model I develop in Chapter 4.
The extensive form of the stage game played by borrowers and lenders is shown in
Figure 1.5. Borrowers initially choose whether to submit a refinancing application, and if
so, they choose how much to borrow. If the borrower submits an application, she pays a
known fixed cost τB, and the lender then decides whether to approve the application,
and if so, what interest rate to offer. Borrowers then have an opportunity to reject
high-interest-rate loan offers. If the borrower accepts the offer, the lender receives a
payoff based on the interest rate on the loan, the LTV ratio, and prevailing guarantee
fees, while the borrower obtains value VR from refinancing as a function of the interest
rate and LTV ratio. If instead the borrower either chooses not to apply, is denied, or
rejects a credit offer, she continues with her current mortgage and obtains a value VC60.
At the conclusion of the stage game, borrowers move on to the next period and play the
60Consistent with the evidence from Woodward and Hall (2012), [188] I assume that borrowers do not
submit multiple applications.
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stage game again next month.
Borrower i decides to Apply (A) based on a private-information type (ηi,t, VCi,t) which
indexes, respectively, her preference for liquidity (cash) and her continuation value61.
The former can be thought of as measuring the slope of the utility function in the
borrower’s current state62, while the latter encompasses a set of beliefs about the future.
Lender j decides whether to Deny (D) applicants based on a private-information type k j,
which measures funding costs, as well observed fixed underwriting costs τL and
guarantee fees pt. Borrower i chooses a LTV ratio ci,t ∈ [0, c̄] when submitting her
application, which in turn determines the amount borrowed, while lenders approving
applicants extend interest rate offers ri,j,t. Borrowers internalize the risk of being denied
in their choices, while lenders internalize the risk that their high-interest-rate offers may
be Rejected (R) by the borrower. I assume that lenders expect a distribution of borrower
types (ηi,t, VCi,t) ∼ F(η, VC), and likewise that borrowers expect a distribution of lender
types k j ∼ G(k) each month.
I solve the model via backwards induction. Equilibrium is described as a set of
policies for the borrowers rejection decision (R), application decision (A), and LTV
choice (c), and the lender’s denial decision (D) and interest-rate offer (r) such that
borrowers maximize their expected value and lenders maximize their profit. If the
borrower has received a credit offer for a loan with LTV ratio ci,t and interest rate ri,j,t,
the borrower’s rejection policy is given by:
R(ci,t, ri,j,t, ηi,t, VCi,t) = 1[V
C
i,t ≥ VR(ci,t, ri,j,t, ηi,t)]
where VR denotes, analogously to VC, the value of refinancing. By inverting VR, this
policy can effectively be described as a threshold rule in the offered interest rate, above
which the borrower rejects all offers. Given this policy, lenders offer interest rates to
61For ease of exposition, I suppress any other observable characteristics, such as the borrower’s credit
score.
62Essentially, the marginal value of cash-on-hand in an Aiyagari [13]-type model.
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maximize their expected profit63:
r∗(ci,t, pt, k j) = argmax
r
EP(ci,t, r, pt, k j)
where the expectation EP, taken over borrower types (η, VC), is written explicitly in
Appendix A. If the expected profit from the lender’s optimal interest rate does not
exceed her fixed underwriting costs, the lender denies the application, leading to denial
policy:
PSEC(ci,t, pt, k j, τL) = 1[EP(ci,t, r∗(ci,t, pt, k j), pt, k j) ≤ τL]
Borrowers choose their optimal LTV ratio to maximize their expected value, where the
expectation is taken over lender types, which in turn determine the risk of denial and of
high interest rate offers:
c∗(pt, ηi,t, VCi,t, τL) = argmax
c
EV(c, pt, ηi,t, VCi,t, τL)
Finally, the borrower chooses to submit an application only if the expected value of the
application at the optimal interest rate less any fixed costs exceeds her continuation
value:
A(pt, ηi,t, VCi,t, τL, τB) = 1[EV(c
∗(pt, ηi,t, VCi,t, τL), pt, ηi,t, V
C
i,t, τL)− τB ≥ VCi,t]
Else, the borrower continues. I assume that the relevant types remain private
information in every period, in other words, that borrowers and lenders do not learn
from one stage game to the next.
63In solving the lender’s problem I ignore issues of incentive compatibility and assume that at the un-
constrained optimal interest rate, borrowers are incentivized to select the LTV ratio corresponding to the
optimum for their type. This assumption makes the model more tractable for the purposes of generating
the necessary predictions, although selection into LTVs by borrower type will be explicitly accounted for in
the full structural model in Section 4.3.
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Under certain assumptions, enumerated in Appendix A, this game features a unique
equilibrium (A∗, c∗, D∗, r∗, R∗) for each combination of types (ηi,t, VCi,t, k j) and prevailing
guarantee fees pt. With several additional assumptions64, one can also prove the
following pair of propositions:
Proposition 1. Interest rates and denial rates both increase with guarantee fees, or






∗(pt, ηi,t, VCi,t, τ), pt, k, τ)g(k)dk
dpt
≥ 0
Proposition 2. Application rates and denial rates both increase with liquidity preference, or








∗(pt, ηi,t, VCi,t, τ), pt, k, τ)g(k)dk
dηi,t
≥ 0
These propositions are closely related to the analysis I will present in Chapters 2 and
3. The first proposition states that guarantee fees lead to tighter credit constraints, both
by passing through to interest rates and by increasing the probability that a loan
application is denied65. In this sense the model is consistent with the evidence that I will
present in Chapter 2 regarding guarantee fees and credit supply. The second proposition
provides a framework for interpreting the evidence on unemployment and the shadow
value of credit constraints that I will present in Chapter 3. It states that as liquidity
preference increases, borrowers apply more frequently and for larger loan balances66,
but as a result their applications are denied more frequently. As such the relationship
between liquidity preference and actual observed refinancing is ambiguous, since actual
refinancing is the product of A, D and R. In this sense the model also captures the
intuition from Bethune (2014), [35] who shows that borrowers who become unemployed
64The theoretical results rest on “assumptions” per se, but in the full model these will mostly depend on
the estimated values of certain parameters.
65The second term is the ex-ante expected probability that a loan application is denied.
66The first term is the expected value of submitting a refinancing application, and the mechanism by
which it increases in η is through choice of loan balance.
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are both more likely to apply for credit and more likely to be denied. Hence in
interpreting the evidence on unemployment and refinancing, we must bear in mind that
even if, as prior reserarch suggests, [123] the unemployed have high liquidity preference,
one may not observe additional refinancing without controlling for credit supply.
This model also forms the basis for the structural estimates to be presented in Chapter
4. The goal of my estimation procedure is to recover estimates for VC, VR, and π using
data on outcomes D, R, c and r. In order to do so, I will need to place additional
structure on the form of borrower’s and lender’s preferences. To provide motivation for
that additional structure, in Chapter 3 I present some reduced-form evidence on
borrower and lender behavior in the data. Combined with Proposition 2, these results
will provide some suggestive evidence in favor of the claim that the shadow value of
credit constraints is greater for unemployed households.
1.5 DATA SOURCES
In this section I describe the key data sources used in the following three chapters. As
the goal of my analysis is to trace the impact of GSE policies on credit supply and
subsequently on borrowers, I require data on both credit supply and borrower
outcomes. The stylized model from Section 1.4 suggests that at a minimum, I should be
able to observe the outcomes of refinancing applications, the interest rates offered to
refinancing borrowers, and data on when borrowers actually choose to refinance. I refer
to the latter as “demand data” and the former two as “supply data”, although as noted
in Section 1.4 refinancing is a product of both borrower and lender choices. My primary
source of borrower-level demand data is panel data on borrower refinancing and default
decisions provided by FNMA and FHLMC. To estimate the structural model I develop
in Chapter 4, as well as some regression specifications in Chapter 3, I merge this data
with more detailed property-level data obtained from county recorder’s offices. My
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primary source of loan-level supply data is data on refinancing applications from the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Loan Application Register, supplemented with
data on interest rates from the same FNMA and FHLMC borrower-level sources. For
much of the analysis to be presented in Chapter 2, I also use data on the characteristics
and prices of 30-year fixed-rate MBS issued via FNMA or FHLMC obtained from
Bloomberg. I then supplement these primary datasets with a variety of other data
sources in order to measure additional non-individualized variables and aggregate
effects. In what follows, I describe each of these data sources in turn, as well as my
process for cleaning, merging, and supplementing these datasets.
1.5.1 Borrower-Level Data Sources
I assemble the main borrower-level from the FHLMC Single-Family Loan-Level
Dataset and FNMA Single-Family Loan Performance Dataset. These datasets contain
detailed monthly loan-level panel records of all single-family first-lien 30-year FRMs
sold or securitized via FHLMC or FNMA between 1999 and 2013, excluding mortgages
originated through some government programs67, with certain special features68 or with
insufficient documentation. The data is separated into a header file and a dynamic file,
both of which I use for various purposes. For each loan, the header file provides detailed
credit risk information, such as the LTV ratio and FICO score for the borrower, at
origination. In each subsequent month, the dynamic file provides time-variant variables
such as the current balance of the loan, as well as the borrower’s choice of whether to
make a payment, default, or prepay. I refer to the combined header-dynamic file as the
“GSE dataset”, and for each record I observe borrower decisions between the origination
date and either the time at which the borrower defaults or prepays or December 2013,
whichever comes first69.
67Including HARP, VA or FHA loans.
68Such as Alt-A loans or loans with prepayment penalties.
69Additional details on the construction of this dataset are provided in Appendix B.
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My sample consists of all loans contained in the GSE dataset originated nationwide
between 1999 and 2013, although for various purposes I use subsets of the data. In
evaluating the effect of guarantee fees on interest rates in Chapter 2, I use the header file
only, as the crucial outcome is the interest rate obtained at origination, and restrict
attention solely to refinance loans and not home-purchase loans. The dataset used to
study this effect consists of 35,701,979 refinance mortgages originated between Q1 2000
and Q2 2013, and in estimating the effect of policy changes I restrict attention to the
21,435,660 refinance mortgages, and in particular the 2,077,099 refinance mortgages
originated in a two-year period around the time of the two 2012 guarantee fee increases.
To evaluate the effects of guarantee fees on the propensity of households to refinance or
default in Chapter 2, I use the full header-dynamic dataset. To avoid conflating the
effects of guarantee fee increases with the effects of HARP 2.0, which was implemented
concurrently with the first guarantee fee increase, I restrict attention to a sample of loans
that were ineligible for HARP, specifically those that were originated after June 2009.
This leaves an unbalanced panel of 150,759,569 monthly servicing records for 6,973,525
mortgages observed between July 2009 and June 2013. These two sub-samples are
described in more detail in Section 2.4, while summary statistics are provided in Table
A1 and Figure A1 in Appendix C. In much of the analysis presented in Chapter 3, I focus
on a different subset of loans originated in a 1-year window around the cutoff for HARP
eligibility of June 2009, or loans originated from June 2008 to May 2010. This subset
comprises 177,175,761 monthly observations of 4,664,219 distinct loans observed from
origination through December 2013 and represents a substantial fraction of all loans that
were eligible for HARP. For some specifications, I further restrict attention only to
HARP-eligible loans during the period following the implementation of HARP 2.0,
comprising some 24,063,716 loan-month-level observations for 1,975,070 distinct loans
originated in the period just prior to the introduction of the HARP program. These two
subsamples are described in more detail in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 and the composition of
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these subsamples by month of origination is provided in Table A2 in Appendix C. To
estimate the structural model I outline in Chapter 4, as well as certain specifications in
Chapter 3, I use an augmented version of this dataset comprising only loans originated
in California70, which I describe in more detail in Section 1.5.4. The full details regarding
the construction of the baseline GSE dataset can be found in Appendix B.
1.5.2 Credit Supply Data Sources
The primary dataset I use to estimate credit supply is the HMDA Loan Application
Register, a regulatory database containing a record of every mortgage loan application at
almost all U.S. mortgage lenders71. I observe this data annually from 2000 to 2012. Each
record identifies the lender who received the application, certain credit risk information
such as the borrower’s income and desired balance, and the location of the property
securing the loan. Crucially, the data also contain information on the disposition of the
loan: whether the application was denied, whether the borrower subsequently rejected a
credit offer, and if the loan was originated, whether it was then sold to FNMA or
FHLMC. I use this dataset in Chapters 3 and 4 to estimate whether and on what terms
lenders will extend credit, and subsequently use certain of these estimates as inputs for
the borrower-level structural model I develop in Chapter 4. In order to more closely
match the scope of my borrower-level data, I restrict attention to what could be
considered the agency market, as it is the average disposition of loans in this market
which most-closely approximates the credit supply constraints facing borrowers
70I restrict attention to California when estimating my structural model for several reasons. First, mort-
gage market institutions, in particular rules regarding foreclosure, vary considerably across states, hence it
is helpful to use observations only from a single state. Second, the process of matching observations to local-
area house price indices and unemployment rates involved substantial manual input, as towns have to be
matched by name and naming conventions differ across data providers, so it would be infeasible to repeat
this process nationwide. In light of these two considerations, I chose the state which would be most-likely
to provide sufficient intertemporal and geographic variation in house price growth and unemployment
rates to identify the model; California, with a highly heterogeneous population and large exposure to both
the house price boom and Great Recession, was the most-natural candidate.
71Very small lenders and lenders who are only active in rural areas are exempt from the regulation.
Estimates place the coverage at roughly 85-90% of all mortgage applications in the U.S.
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comprising the GSE dataset. To that end I exclude any loan applications that would not
qualify for sale to the GSEs, including those with balances above the conforming loan
limit and subprime loans72, and because I estimate the structural model in Chapter 4
using only data on loans from California, I also restrict attention only to applications
from California. Certain credit risk information, in particular FICO scores and LTV
ratios, are not provided in the HMDA data; following Bayer et al (2013) [28] and
Goodman and Li (2014), [95] I impute these data using the observed mean within a given
year, lender, postal code, income decile, and origination balance decile in the GSE
dataset. Summary statistics on the credit risk characteristics and outcomes for
applications in this dataset are provided in Tables A4 and A5 respectively in Appendix
C, while the details of the cleaning and imputation procedure are described in Appendix
B. The structural model I estimate in Chapter 4 also requires data on interest rates at
origination, and for these purposes I use the same dataset on refinance originations
described in Section 1.5.1.
1.5.3 Secondary Market Data Sources
My analysis makes use of secondary market data on MBS in two key ways. First, in
my analysis of the effects of guarantee fee increases on agency MBS in Chapter 2, I use
data on the characteristics and prices of 30-year fixed-rate MBS issued via FNMA or
FHLMC. Second, my structural estimates in Chapter 4 require estimates of two types of
model primitives derived from secondary-market-level data, namely, a pricing model for
MBS at origination as function of their average characteristics, and the elasticity of
guarantee fees with respect to the MBS-level average LTV ratio. I assemble the main
secondary market dataset I use for these two purposes by merging data from FHLMC’s
Historical Daily New Issues PC Reports and FNMA’s PoolTalk database with either
72I do not directly observe whether a given loan is subprime, but rather infer that all loans made to lenders
on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s subprime specialist lender list were subprime.
See Gerardi et al (2008) [91] for a discussion of the accuracy of this imputation.
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daily or weekly MBS price information obtained from Bloomberg. The FHLMC and
FNMA data contain characteristics of issued MBS at the time of issuance, such as the
mean, min, max and quartiles of the interest rate, FICO and LTV of the mortgages
backing the MBS, as well as the coupon on the MBS, the origination date and the initial
balance. In order to measure the effects of guarantee fee increases at high frequencies in
Chapter 2, I collected data on all 30-year fixed-rate MBS issued via FNMA or FHLMC in
a two-week window around each of the 2012 guarantee fee increase dates. I merge this
data with daily-level mid prices from Bloomberg, resulting in a sample of 26,525
MBS-trading day observations for 2,696 MBS issued in a window around April 1st, 2012
and 32,913 MBS-trading day observations for 3,646 MBS issued in a window around
December 1st, 2012. To measure the effects of guarantee fee increases at longer horizons
in Chapter 2, I also collected data on all FNMA 30-year fixed-rate MBS issued in a
two-year period bracketing the two 2012 guarantee fee increase dates. I merged this data
with weekly mid prices from Bloomberg, resulting in a sample of 680,110 MBS-week
observations for 58,106 FNMA securities issued between July 2011 and June 2013. For
the structural estimates in Chapter 4, I use a sample consisting of all FNMA and FHLMC
30-year fixed-rate mortgage MBS with a pool size of at least $1 million issued between
February 2004 and March 2013, as the timing of origination more closely matches that of
the other datasets I employ for structural estimation73. I observe 40,307 such MBS at
origination, as well as their origination price and average characteristics. The full details
regarding the assembly of these datasets can be found in Appendix B, and summary
statistics are shown in Table A3 in Appendix C.
1.5.4 Dataset Assembly Procedures
I supplement the datasets described in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 by importing a number
of aggregate and sub-aggregate variables and using them to impute certain data
73Data was not available for MBS issued between 2000 and 2003.
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elements. For the GSE datasets I use in Chapters 2 and 3, I first obtain house price
indices from Zillow and apply them at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-month
level, or, in cases where no MSA is listed in the GSE data, the state-month level, as these
are the smallest levels of geographic identification available for all observations in the
GSE dataset. I impute house prices by compounding the the observed price at
origination, in turn imputed from the balance and LTV at origination, by percentage
changes in local-area house price indices. Second, I merge local-area unemployment
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)74, as with home prices merging at the
MSA-month level wherever available and the state-month level if the MSA in
unobserved75. I also impute servicing decisions, monthly payments, home equity, and in
some cases monthly balances directly from the GSE data via the appropriate formula, in
the case of home equity using the imputed house price76. Finally I import monthly data
on average mortgage interest rates from Freddie Mac and average interest rates from the
Federal Reserve in order to measure how much mortgage rates have changed since the
borrower took out their initial loan, a proxy for the value of refinancing.
I use a variety of other datasets in a more limited fashion for three specific purposes.
First, to test the effect of guarantee fees on interest rates at higher frequencies in Chapter
2, I use daily data on state-level average jumbo and conforming refinancing rates
provided by Bankrate.com. This data is comprised of 66,612 state-trading day
observations for the pair of average refinance interest rates for every trading day from
October 2009 through November 2014. Second, as an input to the structural model I
present in Chapter 4, I also estimate borrower expectations as a model primitive using
74Unlike the headline figures reported each month, local-area unemployment statistics are not seasonally
adjusted. Because I am more interested in a predictor of individual unemployment status than in identify-
ing long-term trends, I feel the unadjusted figure is more useful.
75The MSA is not listed if the borrowers lives in a rural area. I considered using statistics on unemploy-
ment rates and house prices for rural areas within states, but those statistics are relatively noisy, and there
few enough loans in rural areas to make this a minor concern.
76Monthly ending balances are censored in the data for the first six months the loan is active. For FRMs,
monthly payments and balances are a fixed nonlinear function of the initial balance, interest rate, and term,
and can thus be reconstructed manually.
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vector autoregressions on county-month-level unemployment, house price, and interest
rate data. Finally, in many of my baseline regression specifications in Chapters 2 and 3 I
instrument for home prices using the housing-supply-elasticity instrument from
Gyourko et al (2008) [106] and for unemployment using the instruments from Bartik
(1991), [25] which measure the change in unemployment relative to a base year that
would be predicted by national-level trends. I construct instruments for house price
using the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI)77 and for
unemployment rates using national employment data and county-level industry-mix
data from the 2000 Decennial Census. I discuss the construction and validity of these
instruments in more detail in Sections 2.4, 3.2, and 3.3, and details on how each of these
three datasets are assembled can be found in Appendix B.
The primary dataset I use for estimating the structural model in Chapter 4 is
generated in several steps by merging property-level loan data with the subsample of
GSE data consisting only of loans from California. The property-level dataset
(henceforth “deeds data”) contains administrative data on the universe of recorded
home loans in California between 2000 and 2012 collected from county recorders and
clerks, containing such information as the loan principal, the borrower’s name and
address, the date of origination, and appraisal information such as the property
characteristics and appraised value78. I merge these two datasets using techniques
adapted from Goodman and Li (2014) [95] and Mayer et al (2014). [156] In order to merge
the datasets, I first organize the deeds data into a sequence of loan observations for each
property, and use the name of the borrower to classify the transaction as a refinance (if
the names match), default (if the name is a bank), or continuation (if the loan is last in
the sequence). After removing some observations absent in the GSE data, such as ARMs
77See Gyourko et al (2008) [106] for details on how this index is measured.
78These data were collected from county recorder’s offices by an anonymous data provider and made
available to me through the Paul Milstein Center for Real Estate at Columbia Business School. Because
refinancing loans also generate a new deed of trust, the records include refinances in addition to sales and
defaults.
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or loans with balances above the conforming loan limit, I assign the mortgages into bins
based on discrete variables shared with the GSE data, such as the loan purpose, lender,
location, and termination reason. Within each bin, I generate a distance metric between
each potential GSE-deeds match based on the origination and termination dates and
origination balance, which may not match exactly due to differences in record keeping. I
then use a deeds-optimal Gale-Shapley algorithm [88] to match the two record types,
representing preferences using the negative of the distance metric and discarding all
matches above a specified cutoff79. By construction, the match resulting from this
algorithm tends to over-represent relatively uncommon circumstances, as mortgages
issued in rural areas, for example, where there are fewer loans within each bin, are easier
to match. This problem causes the weights for the sample of matched loans to be heavily
biased relative the U.S. as a whole, making it difficult to extrapolate the results of my
analysis. To address this concern, I resample the data in order to more closely conform to
the GSE aggregate statistics. I generate origination sampling probabilities for each
GSE-deeds matched pair according to the observed distribution in the GSE dataset of
several key variables, including origination year, postal code, and termination reason.
For each matched pair terminating in refinance, I also generate sampling probabilities
based on the refinancing balance by fitting a Normal distribution to the aggregate
statistics reported in the Freddie Mac Cash-Out Refinance Report. I then draw 200,000
observations at random according to these sampling probabilities. As above I
supplement each observation with local-area data on unemployment rates, house price
appreciation and mortgage rates in order to finalize the dataset, henceforth referred to as
the “matched dataset”. The full details of the matched dataset assembly procedure can
be found in Appendix B, while the average characteristics of borrowers in this dataset is
shown in Table A6 in Appendix C.
79While it is possible that this procedure may identify false matches, as in Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2012) [60] the estimates should be unaffected so long as any mis-classification is random conditional on
observables.
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Matching these two datasets provides three key benefits relative to using solely the
GSE data. First, the merge enables me to observe complementary data elements not
present in the GSE dataset, including characteristics of the property itself, such as the
size of the house, and far more detailed location data. I use this enhanced geographic
detail, which allows me to observe the borrower’s exact address rather than their MSA
or state, to import more accurate local unemployment rates and home prices at the
place-level rather than the MSA- or state-level. Accurate data on these figures are
available at the place-level from the same sources, the BLS and Zillow respectively, and
enable me to distinguish between, for example, Compton and Beverly Hills, which are
within the same MSA but have different trends with respect to unemployment rates and
house prices. Second, the deeds data allows me to distinguish between home sales and
refinances, which the GSE dataset does not, and so I can be confident that the matched
dataset consists only of refinances and not sales80. Finally, because I observe the loan a
borrower refinanced into in the deeds data, I impute the balance and hence the LTV of
their refinance application, which would be impossible using the GSE dataset alone, as
loans are only observed until prepayment. As suggested in Section 1.4, this variable, the
borrower’s LTV choice on refinance, will be a crucial target for my structural estimation
procedure in Chapter 4.
Figure 1.6 compares the distribution of originations by year in the GSE dataset, deeds
dataset, and matched dataset. By construction, the three datasets match very closely.
Owing to the design of the sampling scheme, several broad trends in the characteristics
of originated and refinanced loans are common across the datasets. In particular, annual
patterns in the percent of loan originations made as refinancing loans, the percent of
refinanced loans increasing their balance, the median home price appreciation on
refinance, and total home equity cash extraction as a percent of refinancing volume are
80In Sections 2.4, 3.2, and 3.3 I discuss the assumptions needed to interpret changes in prepayment, which
includes sales and refinances and is the outcome observed in the GSE dataset, as indicative of changes in
refinancing behavior.
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Figure 1.6: Comparison of Origination Year Distribution Across Datasets
Notes: Distribution of observations by origination year in GSE, deeds, and matched datasets.
all quite similar for the different datasets. The comparisons of these statistics across
datasets are shown Figures A2, A3, A4, and A5 in Appendix C.
At various points throughout my analysis I will treat imputed house prices or
local-area unemployment rates as a proxy for the corresponding individual-level
characteristic, and some discussion of the validity of this approach is warranted.
Regarding home prices, it is standard practice in the literature81 to impute home prices
from observed purchase prices compounded at local-area aggregate appreciation rates.
While this procedure may introduce some measurement error in home prices, one might
reasonably suppose that individuals themselves estimate their own current house price
in a similar fashion, making this imputed value is the best determinant of individual
behavior, and in any event more accurate estimates of home values do not exist.
Regarding unemployment, in most specifications I use local unemployment rates as a
proxy for borrower-level unemployment, as individual-level measures are unavailable.
81See An et al (2010), [18] Bajari et al (2013), [22] or Tracy and Wright (2012) [185] for examples of this impu-
tation.
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While this may lead to systematic bias in the estimated effect of unemployment, the
results from Gyourko and Tracy (2014) [107] suggest that using sub-aggregate rates as a
proxy will bias any estimated coefficients towards zero, so any measured effect of
unemployment will represent a lower bound on the true effect. Of greater concern is the
possibility that the population of interest in most of my analysis, homeowners with
GSE-guaranteed mortgages, may systematically differ from the aggregate in terms of
either unemployment rates or house price appreciation. While I cannot address this
concern directly, comparisons of the estimated unemployment rate among homeowners
derived from Current Population Survey (CPS) microdata suggest that the
unemployment rate for homeowners tends to track the overall unemployment rate
closely. Moreover whenever possible I apply home price indices for the applicable type
of home (e.g. single-family, condominium, etc.), and because GSE-guaranteed mortgages
are a large share of the market, this figure may be quite representative of the average
GSE-mortgagee’s realized home price appreciation. Nevertheless, it is important to keep
in mind in the analysis that follows that employment status and house prices are not
observed on an individual basis.
1.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter provides an introduction to the mortgage market and the GSEs that will
help frame the remainder of my analysis. The descriptive analysis presented in Section
1.2 offers some insight into how GSE policy can affect credit constraints and in turn
borrower welfare. Changes in guarantee fees affect the profitability of selling or
securitizing via the GSEs, which on the margin will change the profitability of
originating new mortgages. As a consequence, when guarantee fees increase borrowers
may receive higher interest rate offers or may have their applications denied, leaving
them unable to reduce their monthly payments via refinancing and consume the
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resulting savings. Crucially, however, the extent of this pass-through from guarantee
fees to credit constraints depends on the relative value of different loan funding
channels for mortgage originators, and the cost to borrowers from reduced credit supply
depends on how highly they value the refinancing option. Section 1.4 formalizes this
intuition with a stylized model. I show analytically that under certain assumptions,
increases in guarantee fees lead to higher interest rates and higher application denial
rates, while borrowers with higher liquidity preference are both more likely to apply for
refinancing credit and more likely to have their applications denied. In the following
chapters, I first provide empirical support for each of these two results, and
subsequently analyze via simulation the effects of a policy that reduces guarantee fees at
times when liquidity preference is likely to be higher on average.
The remainder of my analysis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I analyze the
effects on the mortgage market of two large guarantee fee increases implemented in
2012. Using an event-study framework, I provide the first empirical evidence for the
effects of guarantee fee increases, and find that in the short-run lenders absorb some of
the fee increase through lower revenues, while in the long-run virtually all of the fee
increase is transmitted to mortgage interest rates, consequently reducing refinancing
volumes and increasing the propensity to default. These results provide evidence for the
mechanisms described in Section 1.2 and analyzed in Section 1.4 regarding the effects of
guarantee fee increases and also offer an empirical grounding for the model of credit
supply I develop in Chapter 4. In Chapter 3 I analyze the relationship between
unemployment, credit constraints, and refinancing in order to address the question of
how the value of refinancing varies with unemployment. I use exogenous variation in
the sensitivity of credit constraints to unemployment induced by the HARP program to
show that the unemployed are both more likely to refinance when credit constraints are
attenuated and benefit more from credit-expanding policies such as HARP. These
results, which provide the first direct evidence of heterogeneity in takeup under the
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HARP program, both suggest that liquidity preference of the sort described in Section
1.4 is higher for the unemployed and help ground the structural model of credit demand
I develop in Chapter 4. Finally in Chapter 4 I extend the literature on household
financial management by designing a structural model of the mortgage market featuring
endogenous credit constraints and latent borrower liquidity preference. I estimate the
model using a novel combination of empirical techniques and use the calibrated model
to simulate the effects of various credit-supply interventions on the part of the GSEs. My
analysis indicates that borrowers would benefit from a countercyclical guarantee fee
policy, and I conclude with a discussion of the merits of such a policy relative to other
proposed or implemented alternative policies.
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Chapter 2




In this chapter I analyze the effects of changes in guarantee fees on the mortgage
market, and in particular on credit constraints. As discussed in Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4,
during the financial crisis in 2008, default rates for mortgages insured by the GSEs rose
by an order of magnitude, leading to a combined $109 billion loss for the two agencies in
that year. In response, the government effectively nationalized FNMA and FHLMC in
September of 2008 in order to forestall a loss of investor confidence in their insurance
obligations. Thereafter the two agencies, formerly nominally private, set their policy
explicitly as government policy. Following the financial crisis, the policy stance of
FNMA and FHLMC changed considerably, and of particular relevance for my analysis,
they raised their guarantee fees substantially in order to recoup losses incurred during
the crisis. My analysis uses an event study framework to analyze the effects of two large,
discrete guarantee fees increases implemented in 2012, both of which can be seen in
Figures 1.2 and 1.4. As the focus of my dissertation is on credit supply policies and how
credit constraints affect borrowers, my analysis in this chapter traces the impact of these
fee increases on credit supply in order to motivate the structural model I develop in
Chapter 4.
Building on the insights from Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 regarding the manner in which
guarantee fees affect credit supply, I analyze the effects of the GSEs policy change in
several stages. First, using data on pools of mortgages traded over the secondary
market, I study the effect of the fee increases on issuance volumes, the coupons paid on
new MBS, and the prices at which those MBS trade. Second, using data on refinancing
loans and dynamic borrower behavior, I analyze the effect of the fee increases on
mortgage interest rates and borrower behavior. I evaluate the extent to which these fees
are passed through to mortgage interest rates, and subsequently what effect the resultant
change in credit supply has on the propensity of borrowers to either refinance or default
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on their mortgages. Throughout much of this analysis I treat the change in guarantee
fees as an exogenous shock to the profitability of lending and to credit supply. Because
the first of these fee increases was mandated by congress as part of the Temporary
Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, and the second was mandated by the FHFA as
part of their long-term strategy for the GSEs and announced to coincide with the release
of their annual report to congress, [80] I assume that the policy changes were uncorrelated
with other developments in mortgage markets. I then compare outcomes for affected
mortgages before and after the exogenous policy change on both the secondary and
primary market.
My results suggest that guarantee fees have varying effects on the mortgage market at
different horizons. In the short-term, mortgage lenders partially mitigate the effects of
the fee increase by both accelerating the pace at which they package and issue new MBS
in order to avoid the fee and by reducing the excess interest rate spread they retain from
newly-issued securities. However, at fixed interest rates, the coupons paid on and prices
commanded by MBS declines following the increase in guarantee fees, resulting in lower
revenues for mortgage lenders. In response, lenders pass the vast majority of the fee
increase on to borrowers in the form of higher mortgage interest rates, with a
pass-through rate of between 85% and 100% depending on the specification. I find that
lenders adjust to the policy change quite rapidly, with essentially all of the pass-through
completed after three weeks. Consistent with earlier findings, the extent of this
pass-through is higher for riskier borrowers and for nonbank lenders who are more
reliant on GSE securitization, but is lower in more concentrated lending markets. As a
result of this supply-side response, the probability that a borrower refinances declines
and the probability of default increases, likely reflecting a tightening of household credit
constraints. The magnitude of these effects is consistent with previous analyses that
assume full pass-through from guarantee fees to mortgage rates. Applying my estimates
to an aggregate figure for the quantity of mortgages affected yields an estimated decline
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of roughly $205 billion per year in the volume of mortgage refinancing.
The key contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is to provide direct
evidence of the effects of changes in guarantee fees on the mortgage market.
Contemporary trade publications recognize the importance of guarantee fees for
determining mortgage credit supply, [57, 189] yet to my knowledge no prior research has
investigated such a connection directly. The change in credit supply induced by the
GSE’s policy changes is of particular relevance for macroeconomic policy as it partially
determines refinancing activity and thus the extent of monetary policy transmission or
other housing finance policies targeting the refinancing channel, such as HARP. While
this analysis is most directly relevant for evaluating changes to GSE policies themselves,
it is my hope that my estimates prove useful for a variety of macroeconomic
policymakers. A secondary contribution of this analysis is to provide novel evidence on
the effects of credit constraints. Changes in guarantee fees provide a very tractable
setting in which to analyze the effects of credit supply, as unlike changes in interest rates
they are essentially exogenous, have effects solely on certain segments of the mortgage
market and not on other markets, and do not affect rates of discount or available
investment returns. While my findings regarding the elasticities of refinance and default
to changes in credit supply largely confirm prior research, additional evidence on this
subject using a novel identification strategy is not without merit. Finally, the results from
this chapter will help inform the simulation study of the effect of alternative guarantee
fee policies that I conduct in Chapter 4.
The analysis in this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 I briefly describe the
secondary market data used in this study, present some suggestive patterns, and analyze
the effect of guarantee fees on MBS traded on the secondary mortgage market. Section
2.3 studies how lenders respond to these changing secondary market conditions, an in
particular the timing and extent of pass-through to primary market interest rates. In
Section 2.4 I turn to the effects of these supply-side responses on borrowers, which is the
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main focus on my analysis, and estimate how the resulting change in credit supply
affects household refinancing and default behavior. Section 2.5 concludes with a
discussion of the relevance of these findings for macroeconomic and housing finance
policy and contextualizes my results within my dissertation as a whole and the broader
academic and policy literature.
2.2 EFFECTS ON THE SECONDARY MARKET
In this section I analyze the effect of guarantee fee increases on the secondary market.
Recall from Section 1.2.2 that investors trade mortgages as MBS on the secondary market
well after they are originated, and that the prices these MBS command in part
determines the interest rates originators are willing to offer. In order to analyze how
guarantee fees affect the prices or MBS on the secondary market, I use a dataset
consisting of all 30-year fixed-rate MBS issued via FNMA or FHLMC in a two-week
window around each of the 2012 guarantee fee increase dates, as well another consisting
of all FNMA 30-year fixed-rate MBS issued in a two-year period bracketing the two 2012
guarantee fee increase dates, as described in Section 1.5.3. In my analysis, I first consider
how originators respond in the short-term to the fee increase via their securitization
schedules and via the excess servicing spread they receive. I subsequently analyze the
effect of the fee increase on MBS prices, the largest component of originator profits, in
order to measure how the fee increase affects the incentives to originate new mortgages.
2.2.1 MBS Issuance
Several patterns are immediately apparent from the MBS issuance data. Table 2.1
shows total MBS issuance volume in the weeks just prior to and just after the two
guarantee fee increases implemented in 2012. These fee increases essentially function
like taxes on mortgage securitization. Hence if originators are aware of the fee increase,
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as we should expect in this case as both were announced months in advance, they
should seek to avoid the tax as much as possible by shifting the timing of their
securitization. Table 2.1 provides evidence for such shifting, as the total volume of MBS
issuance falls considerably just after the fee increase. In both month-long windows,
originators issued half of their securities, or twice what we would expect if originations
were uniformly distributed across weeks, in the week just prior to the fee increase.
Figure 2.1 shows similar shifting for FNMA securities. In the months directly after the
fee increase, denoted by vertical lines, issuance fell sharply, with a corresponding peak
in the month just prior. Taken together these patterns suggest that originators
accelerated their securitization schedules forward in order to dodge the increase in fees,
providing suggestive evidence that these fees do have an effect of lending incentives.
Figure 2.1 also shows that over a longer horizon, fee increases appear to have no effect
on issuance volume. Both fee increase dates result in temporary disruptions to an
otherwise smooth trend as some securitization is shifted into the prior month, but with
little evidence of long-term market disruption. The absence of obvious effects at
horizons longer than a month may suggest the presence of a compensating market
response on the part of originators. Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 thus suggest a short-term
shock to the market followed by reequilibration. In this section, I examine the nature of
the short-term shock on secondary markets in detail, while Sections 2.3 and 2.4 considers
the longer-term response by, respectively, lenders and borrowers.
2.2.2 MBS Characteristics
In this section I assess the short-run impact on the secondary mortgage market of the
two guarantee fee increases implemented in 2012. My hypothesis is that guarantee fees
affect MBS prices and hence originator profitability through the cash flows for MBS
deals outlined in Figure 1.1 and Section 1.2.3. When guarantee fees increase, we should
expect that, holding mortgage interest rates constant, some combination of excess
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Table 2.1: Short-Term MBS Issuance Bunching
MBS Issuance ($ Billion) MBS Issuance (% of Total)
April 1st, 2012 December 1st, 2012 April 1st, 2012 December 1st, 2012
2 Weeks Prior 9.4 10.7 13.7 14.1
1 Week Prior 36.6 37.9 53.4 49.9
1 Week After 2.3 16.2 3.4 21.3
2 Weeks After 20.3 11.2 29.6 14.8
Prior 46.0 48.6 67.0 63.9
After 22.6 27.4 33.0 36.1
Notes: Total FNMA and FHLMC 30-year FRM MBS issuance in two-week window on either side
of guarantee fee increase implementation date. “% of Total” denotes measured relative to 4-week
total.
Figure 2.1: Long-Term MBS Issuance Bunching
Notes: Total FNMA 30-year FRM MBS issued by month.
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servicing spreads and coupons must decline in exact proportion, in either case leading to
lower overall origination revenues for mortgage lenders1. My framework for analyzing
these effects is an event study using the two fee increase implementation dates, April 1st,
2012, and December 1st, 20122. While lenders may have begun responding to the fee
increases as early as the announcement dates3, we should expect the policy change to
have visible effects on the secondary market only after the implementation date, as the
guarantee fee increase did not apply to securities issued prior to implementation4.
Assuming, as discussed in Section 1.2.4, that the guarantee fee increase was due to an
exogenous policy change, in what follows I treat the implementation date as an
instrument for guarantee fees. To test the validity of using this date as an instrument, I
estimate a first-stage regression of guarantee fees on whether the the security was issued
after the implementation date:
FEEi = ISSUEPOSTiβ1 + RISKiβ2 + IRiβ3 + ei
where i indexes securities, ISSUEPOSTi is an indicator for whether the security was
issued post-implementation, RISKi are risk characteristics and IRi is the coupon rate.
The guarantee fee, FEEi, is imputed as the difference between the WAC, the average
interest rate paid by borrowers whose mortgages compose the pool, and the coupon
paid on the security; hence it measures the sum of the guarantee fee and any excess
servicing spreads. The parameter of interest is β1, the effect of the security being issued
post-implementation on this combination of guarantee fees and excess servicing spreads.
Table 2.2 shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors of β1 for five separate
1My data does not allow me to observe the costs of mortgage origination, hence I can analyze only the
effect of guarantee fees on originator revenues and not on profits.
2Guarantee fees increased by the same amount on November 1st, 2012 rather than December 1st for
mortgages sold for cash rather than delivered into MBS. [80] Since my secondary market analysis uses only
data on MBS, the relevant date for this study should be December 1st, 2012.
3Respectively, December 30th, 2011 and August 31st, 2012
4In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 I discuss the timing of supply-side responses to the fee increase, and for most of
those specifications I assume lenders respond beginning on the announcement date.
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Table 2.2: Guarantee Fee Increase Event Study
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Issued Post-April 2012 0.0532*** 0.0838*** - - 0.0748***
(0.0042) (0.0138) - - (0.0020)
Issued Post-December 2012 - - 0.0379*** 0.0450*** 0.0430***
- - (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0019)
Implementation Date April 2012 April 2012 December 2012 December 2012 Both
Sample Window 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 1 Week 6 Months
Fixed Effects State State State State State, Orig. Year
N 2,696 1,554 3,646 2,338 58,106
R2 0.1975 0.2045 0.1488 0.1615 0.1459
Notes: Dependent variable is difference between MBS coupon and WAC. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Additional controls include quartiles of LTV, FICO and interest rate, weighted-average
maturity, and % refinance and owner-occupied. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-
level respectively.
versions of the event study above5. Models 1 and 2 use all FNMA and FHLMC MBS
issued in respectively a two-week or one-week window around April 1st, 2012, while
Models 3 and 4 use a similar sample of MBS issued around December 1st, 2012. Model 5
uses a sample of FNMA MBS from the longer-term MBS dataset issued beween six
months prior to the first implementation date (October 2011) and six months after the
second date (June 2013) and measures the effects of both increases jointly in the same
model6. In both April 2012 and December 2012 guarantee fees increased by 10 bp, so if
there were no adjustment on excess servicing spreads the estimated coefficient would be
.1. In each model, the estimated coefficient is somewhat smaller than .1, suggesting that
in the short-term some fraction of the guarantee fee increase is offset by originators
receiving lower servicing spreads. The extent of this offset is greater in December 2012,
so that more of the impact of the guarantee fee increase is absorbed by lower servicing
spreads, but my estimates suggest that on average lenders reduced their excess servicing
by between 20% and 60% of the guarantee fee increase. Because servicing spreads
directly determine originator revenues, the effect of the guarantee fee increase is to
reduce the incentive to issue securities regardless of whether it results in lower coupons
5The other estimated coefficients and standard errors are shown in Table A8 in Appendix D; all five
models in Table A8 are the same as those shown here.
6Since the implementation dates correspond to the beginning of months, I can measure with certainty
which regimes individual securities were issued under even if, as in the case of the longer-term MBS dataset,
I can only observe the month of issue.
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or lower servicing spreads.
While the results from Model 5 indicate that there was a sustained increase in average
guarantee fees following the GSE’s policy change, two key questions remain regarding
the timing of this effect. First, whether the partially offsetting reduction in servicing
spreads was a permanent or temporary response on the part of originators, and second,
whether the estimate effect was part of a pre-existing trend or due entirely to the policy
change. To address these questions, I estimate an event study similar to Model 5 using
month-level fixed effects in order to better understand the timing of the effect of the
policy change. I estimate:
FEEi = ΣSs=1 1[ISSUEDATEi = s]δs + RISKiβ2 + IRiβ3 + ei
with all variables as before. The parameters of interest are the δs terms, the month-level
fixed effects. Figure 2.2 plots these fixed effects by month. There does not appear to be a
trend in guarantee fees prior to the first fee increase date, suggesting that the results
from Table 2.2 are not driven by pre-existing trends. Table A9 in Appendix D shows the
estimated fixed effects underlying Figure 2.2, and the estimate for the month prior to the
first policy change date is only 1 bp above the level from five months prior. On
implementation, the estimated fixed effect jumps upward, but by considerably less than
10 bp. The estimated fixed effects continue rising after implementation for some time,
reaching 8.5 bp above the pre-period level after 3 months and the full 10 bp above the
per-period level after 7 months. For the second implementation date, the difference
between the last estimated fixed effect, March 2013, and the final pre-period month,
November 2012, is roughly as large (6.25 bp) as the difference between comparable
months for the first implementation date (7.5 bp difference between July 2012 and March
2012), indicating that the timing of adjustment is similar in both cases. While there is a
pre-trend in the months leading up to the second guarantee fee increase in December
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Figure 2.2: Guarantee Fee Fixed-Effects Estimates
Notes: Estimated month fixed effects for guarantee fee increase event study.
2012, I interpret this trend as the gradual continuing effect of the first fee increase in
April. Figure 2.2 thus suggests that in the short-term originators reduce their excess
servicing spreads in response to the guarantee fee increase, but gradually adjust by
absorbing less and less of the fee increase via lower spreads, with full adjustment after
seven months. Taken together, the models presented in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 provide
reasonable evidence that an event study using the two guarantee fee increase
implementation dates is a valid empirical design for estimating the effects of GSE policy
changes on originator revenues, as the estimates from Table 2.2 indicate that the
implementation date is a relevant instrument and the lack of a clear pre-trend visible in
Figure 2.2 suggests that the change is exogenous.
With the validity of the event-study approach established, I next assess the short-run
impact of guarantee fee increases on originator revenues. Recall from Figure 1.1 and the
discussion from Section 1.2.3 that at a given level of interest rates, guarantee fees can
affect lender revenues and hence profits through either the servicing spread or the
coupon on the security, which in part determines the security’s price. The results from
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 suggest the two policy changes had some effect on servicing
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Table 2.3: MBS Coupon Event Study
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Issued Post-April 2012 -0.0614*** -0.0637*** - - -0.0759***
(0.0042) (0.0108) - - (0.0022)
Issued Post-December 2012 - - -0.0276*** -0.0443*** -0.0432***
- - (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0020)
Implementation Date April 2012 April 2012 December 2012 December 2012 Both
Sample Window 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 1 Week 6 Months
Fixed Effects State State State State State/Orig. Year
N 2,696 1,554 3,646 2,338 58,106
R2 0.9447 0.9518 0.9258 0.9326 0.9528
Notes: Dependent variable is MBS coupon. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls
include quartiles of LTV, FICO and interest rate, weighted-average maturity, and % refinance and
owner-occupied. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
spreads, so the natural next question is what effect they had on coupons. To test this
response, I estimate models of the form:
COUPONi = ISSUEPOSTiβ1 + RISKiβ2 + IRiβ3 + ei
where all variables are as described above. As before, the key parameter of interest is β1,
the estimated effect on MBS coupons of being issued after the fee increase date.
Table 2.3 shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors from this event study7.
Because the regression controls for the WAC of the pool, this is largely an accounting
exercise. We know from tracing the flow of money in Figure 1.1 that holding fixed the
payment borrowers make into the pool, the sum of the coupon and servicing spread
must decline by the amount of the guarantee fee increase. The estimated coefficients
from Models 1 through 5 in Table 2.3, which correspond to the samples used in Models 1
through 5 in Table 2.2, bear this out, as they are largely the same. Coupons tend to fall in
the short-term by roughly half of the 10 bp increase in guarantee fees, corroborating the
results from Table 2.2 that the remaining half was realized as lower servicing spreads. As
before, coupons respond somewhat more to the April 2012 fee increase, and the overall
effect is visible at longer horizons in both cases. I also estimated a similar version of this
7The other estimated coefficients and standard errors are shown in Table A11 in Appendix D, with the
five models corresponding as above.
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model using 2-stage least squares by first predicting the change in guarantee fees at the
implementation date using the estimates from Table 2.2 and then including these
predicted values as a regressor. I estimate the model:
FEEi = ISSUEPOSTiα1 + RISKiα2 + IRiα3 + ei
COUPONi = F̂EEiβ1 + RISKiβ2 + IRiβ3 + ei
where F̂EEi is the predicted fee. Those estimates are shown in Table A10 of Appendix D,
and as would be expected, the estimated coefficients are roughly -1, implying a direct
proportional response of coupons to guarantee fees.
2.2.3 Origination Profitability
The significance of the findings from Section 2.2.2 that higher guarantee fees reduce
MBS coupons is that MBS coupons are the primary determinant of MBS prices, the
largest component of originator revenues, and hence directly determine lender
origination incentives. Thus in this section I analyze the short-term effect of guarantee
fee increases on MBS prices. Using panel data on secondary market prices, I estimate
security-day level models of the form:
PRICEi,t = ISSUEPOSTi,tβ1 + RISKiβ2 + IRiβ3 + DATEi,tβ4 + AGEi,tβ5 + ei,t
where PRICEi,t is the observed price of security i on trading day t, RISKi and IRi its risk
characteristics and coupon rate at origination, AGEi,t its time since issuance, included to
correct for any effects of the staggered timing of coupon payments, and DATEi,t are
trading-day fixed effects, included to capture any market-wide factors.
Table 2.4 presents the results from this specification, with Models 1 through 5 using
the security-day-level panel dataset versions of the datasets used in Models 1 through 5
76
Table 2.4: MBS Price Event Study
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Issued Post-April 2012 -0.2251*** -0.3272*** - - -0.2058***
(0.0152) (0.0286) - - (0.0045)
Issued Post-December 2012 - - -0.4447*** -0.3676*** -0.3515***
- - (0.0221) (0.0469) (0.0057)
Implementation Date April 2012 April 2012 December 2012 December 2012 Both
Sample Window 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 1 Week 6 Months
Fixed Effects State/Day State/Day State/Day State/Day State/Day/Orig. Year
N 20,512 6,582 23,777 7,922 499,321
R2 0.8718 0.8958 0.7453 0.7529 0.8036
Notes: Dependent variable is MBS price. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls in-
clude quartiles of LTV, FICO and interest rate, weighted-average maturity, days from issuance, and
% refinance, third-party and owner-occupied. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-
level respectively.
of Table 2.38. In each case, the decrease in prices for securities issued just after the
implementation date is a plausible multiple of the fee increase or, in turn, the decline in
coupons. Comparing Models 2 and 4 in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, the implied capitalization rate
of prices over coupons is in the range of 5 to 8 times. This difference in capitalization
rates between April and December may reflect market factors, but the range overall is
quite reasonable. As discussed in Section 1.2.3, FNMA and FHLMC both offer
originators the opportunity to reduce their ongoing guarantee fees with up-front
payments at a conversion rate known as a buy-down multiple. This multiple, which
effectively measures the same capitalization ratio, typically varies between 4 and 7
depending on market factors, suggesting that the estimates from Table 2.4 accord well
with FNMA’s and FHLMC’s own documentation. As in Section 2.2.2, I also estimate a
2-stage least squares version of the model above:
FEEi = ISSUEPOSTiα1 + RISKiα2 + IRiα3 + ei
PRICEi,t = F̂EEβ1 + RISKiβ2 + IRiβ3 + DATEi,tβ4 + AGEi,tβ5 + ei,t
where the coefficient β1 in this case directly measures the present-value multiple. These
estimates are shown in Table A12 of Appendix D, and in most cases they also fall within
8The other estimated coefficients and standard errors are shown in Table A13 in Appendix D, with the
five models corresponding as above.
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the range offered by FNMA and FHLMC. As with the estimates from Table 2.3, by
controlling for the WAC of the MBS these regression specifications essentially remove
any compensating change in interest rates on the part of originators, making this largely
an accounting exercise. Nevertheless, these results do provide direct evidence for the
transmission of guarantee fees to originator revenues through the MBS price channel.
As with MBS coupons in Section 2.2.2, I also estimate an event study similar to Model
5 from Table 2.4 using week-level fixed effects in order to assess the timing of
transmission from guarantee fees to MBS prices. The empirical model is:
PRICEi,t = ΣSs=1 1[ISSUEDATEi = s]δs + RISKiβ2
+ IRiβ3 + DATEi,tβ4 + AGEi,tβ5 + ei,t
where δs coefficients, the estimated effects on prices of issuance at any week before or
after the fee increase date, are the parameters of interest. Figure 2.3 plots these estimated
fixed effects by week, with Panel A plotting the effects in a two-month window around
April 1st, 2012, and Panel B respectively around December 1st, 2012. The estimates
suggest a negligible pre-trend in prices leading up to the implementation date,
providing further validity for the event study design. Following implementation (Week
0), prices for newly issued securities are not immediately affected, although the negative
effects in both cases become visible in Week 1, with subsequent negative estimates in
Weeks 3, 5 and 7 after the fee increase. These estimates primarily reflect the structure of
the secondary mortgage market. As discussed in Section 1.2.2, much of the trading in
agency MBS takes place through the TBA market, a standardized futures market with a
pre-set schedule of dates on which settlement occurs. As a result, the highest volume of
issuance and trading for 30-year FRM-backed agency MBS (Class A MBS) is on the
settlement date9, which is typically the second Thursday of each month. These
9Vickrey and Wright (2013) [186] provide additional detail on the mechanics of TBA market settlement
and trading.
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settlement dates correspond with the Week 1 and Week 5 fixed effects, while the Week 3
and Week 7 fixed effects correspond to settlement dates for another class of FHLMC and
FNMA mortgages10. Since there are no settlement dates for any agency products in the
first or third week of the month, corresponding to Weeks 0, 2, 4 and 6 in Figure 2.3, the
absence of strongly visible negative effects on those dates could reflect a lack of issuance
volume or a sample selection problem where only certain unusual MBS are issued off the
settlement date schedule. Recall also from Table 2.1 that issuance volume fell sharply in
the weeks just after the fee increase, suggesting that the sample corresponding to Week 0
is highly selected11. Hence if we treat Week 5, the next Class A settlement date, as a good
indicator for the effect of the fee increase, the estimated effect of the guarantee fee
increase on MBS prices is between -30 bp and -40 bp, roughly in line with the estimates
from Table 2.4. In conjunction with the evidence presented in Table 2.4, these estimates
suggest a clear negative relation between guarantee fee increases and MBS prices at
fixed levels of mortgage interest rates.
The results from this section provide some evidence for the transmission of guarantee
fees through the secondary mortgage market. At the policy implementation date,
originators shift their securitization schedule forward to avoid the higher fees, although
this shifting appears to be confined to the month directly before and after the fee
increase. Over short horizons, originators absorb roughly half of the guarantee fee
increase through lower servicing spreads, although over longer horizons essentially all
of the fee increase manifests as lower MBS coupons. The effect of the fee increase on
MBS prices is roughly what would be predicted from applying FNMA and FHLMC’s
documented present-value multiples to the change in guarantee fees. In all cases, I
control for the effect of the WAC on MBS coupons and prices, effectively removing the
10This class, Class D, includes many other FNMA and FHLMC products, but no Class D instruments
are included in this sample. Plausibly, there is additional trading volume for all Class A products, which
compose my data, on settlement dates for other classes.
11At longer horizons and lower frequencies, there does not appear to be a sample selection issue. Table A7
in Appendix D shows the average characteristics of newly-issued MBS by month, and there is no obvious
change in the months just following the fee increase implementation dates.
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Figure 2.3: Price Impact Fixed-Effects Estimates
Panel A: April 2012 Increase
Notes: Estimated week fixed effects for MBS price increase event study. April 2012 increase. Mean
estimated effect shown in blue, 95% confidence intervals shown in red.
Panel B: December 2012 Increase
Notes: Estimated week fixed effects for MBS price increase event study. December 2012 increase.
Mean estimated effect shown in blue, 95% confidence intervals shown in red.
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effects of any pass-through from guarantee fees to interest rates. In the next section, I
study the equilibrium response of mortgage originators on this margin and what effects
this response has on credit constraints.
2.3 EFFECTS ON PRIMARY MARKET INTEREST RATES
In this section I assess the equilibrium effect on primary market interest rates the two
guarantee fee increases implemented in 2012. The results from the previous section
indicate that, holding mortgage interest rates fixed, originator revenues should decline
when guarantee fees increase. However, we should not expect originators to hold
mortgage interest rates fixed in response to the policy change, and some fraction of their
increased costs should be passed-through to prices. Hence in this section I analyze the
extent to which mortgage originators respond to the fee increase by changing their
offered mortgage interest rates, or effectively the extent of pass-through. Following
Fuster et al (2013), [84] I assume that originators respond immediately after the
announcement of the policy change. In the case of the two fee increases I analyze, these
dates correspond to adjustments beginning in January 2012 and September 201212. This
assumption accords well with the expected timeline for an agency securitization, as the
whole process of originating and securitizing a new mortgage typically takes several
months. Hence, if originators learned of the fee increase three months prior to
implementation (as they did in this case), some subsequent new originations would be
securitized under the new fee schedule, providing an incentive to adjust prices
immediately. To measure the timing and extent of pass-through to mortgage rates, I
analyze the dataset on refinance mortgages originated in a two-year period around the
time of the two 2012 guarantee fee increases described in Section 1.5.1, as well as
state-day level data on average jumbo and conforming mortgage rates described in the
12The actual announcement dates themselves were December 30th, 2011 and August 31st, 2012, so I
assume originators respond on the next business day.
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same section. In my analysis I first consider the effect of the guarantee fee increase on the
primary-secondary spread, and subsequently on the jumbo-conforming spread, both
measures that should isolate the effect of guarantee fees.
2.3.1 Primary-Secondary Spread
The next step in my analysis of the effects of guarantee fee increases is to test the
extent of pass-through to mortgage rates. However, guarantee fees are only one
component of originator costs; by far the larger component is the originator’s funding
cost. Many originators, especially smaller nonbank lenders, actually borrow the cash
required to originate a mortgage from short-term warehouse lenders before securitizing
the mortgage and repaying the loan, while larger banks with internal funding sources
have their own costs of capital. This is turn raises the question of how to properly
measure originator funding costs. In principal, any point on the yield curve with a
maturity similar to mortgages13 would be a reasonable candidate, but for these purposes
I assume that originators finance themselves at the secondary market rate. There are two
reasons for this choice. First, as discussed in Vickrey and Wright (2013) [186] originators
can substantially hedge their risk of interest rate movements by selling their mortgages
forward in the TBA market, allowing them to lock in a funding rate based on secondary
market yields. Second, while the spread of the primary market rate over the secondary
market rate will directly reflect guarantee fees14, other interest rate spreads will tend to
reflect other macroeconomic factors. In particular, because mortgage yields include a
premium for bearing prepayment risk, the spread of secondary mortgage yields over a
suitable risk-free alternative interest rate will tend to vary with the extent of prepayment
13Typically between five and ten years.
14Fuster et al (2013) [84] discuss reasons why this is the case, and in their analysis they assume immediate
100% pass-through to the secondary-primary spread.
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risk15. As evidence for this relationship, I estimate the following model:
SECONDARYRATEt − SWAPRATEt = MOVEtβ1 + εt
where the secondary yield (SECONDARYRATEt) and 10-year swap rate
(SWAPRATEt), the instrument typically used to construct the yield curve for durations
similar to 30-year MBS, are measured on a weekly basis as 3-week centered moving
averages and the Merrill Lynch Options Volatility Index (MOVEt), a measure of interest
rate volatility, is measured similarly. Interest rate volatility functions in this case as a
proxy for prepayment risk, as an increase in volatility increases the likelihood that
interest rates will fall below the cutoff required for borrowers to profitably refinance.
The results of this regression, shown in Figure A6 of Appendix E, show a clear
correlation between the secondary-swap spread and interest rate volatility, as variation
in the MOVE index explains 43% of the variation in the spread16. Similar problems
would affect the choice of any other zero curve rate, especially in light of the fact that, as
discussed in Section 1.2.4, Federal Reserve policy over this time period exerted a strong
influence on long-term interest rates. Thus in what follows I measure the effect of
guarantee fees on the secondary-primary spread, assuming as in Fuster et al (2013) [84]
that this spread reflects only guarantee fees and the effects of any other supply frictions
at the primary-market level.
Motivated by the assumptions stated above, I estimate empirical loan-level models of
15Recall that owing to their guarantee agency-guaranteed mortgages effectively have no credit risk, or
all of the credit risk has been converted to prepayment risk. Hence the spread of the secondary rate over a
risk-free rate should not reflect a default risk premium.
16Other market-specific demand and liquidity factors could potentially explain the rest of this spread.
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mortgage interest rates of the following form:
SPREADi = POSTiβ1 + RISKiβ2 + MACROiβ3 + ei
SPREADi = POSTiβ1 + [POSTi × CASHOUTREFIi]β2 + RISKiβ3 + MACROiβ4 + ei
SPREADi = POSTiβ1 + [POSTi × HHIi]β2 + RISKiβ3 + MACROiβ4 + ei
SPREADi = POSTiβ1 + [POSTi × NONBANKi]β2 + RISKiβ3 + MACROiβ4 + ei
where i indexes mortgages, SPREADi measures the spread of the interest rate on
mortgage i over the average current-coupon secondary market yield, POSTi is an
indicator for whether the mortgage was originated after the fee increase announcement,
RISKi are mortgage-specific risk factors and MACROi are market-specific risk factors.
The sample of mortgages used in each case is the set of all agency fixed-rate refinances
originated in a period from six months prior to the first announcement to six months
after the second announcement (July 2011 to March 2013). In subsequent models, I
interact the post-announcement indicator with either an indicator for whether the loan is
a cash-out refinance (CASHOUTREFIi), with the Herfindahl index for agency mortgage
refinance originations for the borrower’s state (HHIi), or with an indicator for whether
the lender originating the loan is a nonbank mortgage lender (NONBANKi)17. These
interaction terms are intended to shed light on the mechanisms governing pass-through
from guarantee fees to mortgage interest rates, and some discussion of each is
warranted.
First, as discussed in Fuster et al (2013) [84] and briefly in Section 1.2.4, a potential
determinant of the primary-secondary spread is putback risk, or the risk that originators
may have to repurchase defaulted mortgages from the GSEs under a stress scenario. As
compensation for this risk, lenders may charge additional interest rate premiums to
17I identify nonbank mortgage lenders using the lender’s name. I only observe the name for lenders
originating a sufficient quantity of loans; lenders making less than roughly 1,500 loans over the full sample,
or roughly .02% of the total, are coded as “Other”. In the main specification reported here, I treat these
lenders as banks, although the results are robust to excluding them from the study.
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risky borrowers, even if they intend to securitize the mortgage, in case the loan is later
put back to them. I proxy for the default risk factor using an indicator for cash-out
refinance, as these tend to be the refinance product with the highest default risk, and
interact this term with the policy change indicator. Second, prior research such as
Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013) [178] argues that pass-through to mortgage interest rates
is attenuated in more concentrated mortgage markets due to imperfect competition. As a
measure of market concentration and hence the degree to which imperfect competition
impedes pass-through, I interact the policy change with the Herfindahl index, a measure
of market concentration, for mortgage lending in that state and year. While one might
argue that the Herfindahl index interaction presents an endogeneity problem, in that
areas with a few low-cost firms will tend to have higher concentration ratios as the more
efficient firms dominate the market, the fact that the guarantee fee increases applied
equally to all lenders and affected their cost structure in the same way suggests that this
is not a major concern. Finally, as discussed in Black et al (2010) [39] and Loutskina and
Strahan (2009), [149] lenders who are more reliant on securitization should respond more
to changes in secondary market conditions. Those authors focus on the sources and costs
of funds lenders use to originate new mortgages, and show that credit supply tends to
respond more for lenders with low levels or high costs of capital. Among lenders I
observe in the data, banks, credit unions and large insurance companies should be
better-equipped due to their size and capital base to hold mortgage loans on
balance-sheet. Non-bank mortgage lenders, by contrast, do not have access to deposits
or insurance premia as a stable funding source, borrow from more expensive warehouse
lenders, and only originate loans with the intention of securitizing them; thus, they
should be more exposed to increases in guarantee fees. As such, origination costs should
rise by relatively more for nonbank mortgage lenders than for other institutions, so I
interact the policy change with an indicator for whether the lender is a nonbank
mortgage specialist.
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Table 2.5: Refinance Interest Rate Event Study
Post-Jan. 2012 .1043*** .0992*** .1064*** .1020***
(1.58E-3) (1.59E-3) (2.20E-3) (1.59E-3)
Post-Sept. 2012 .0847*** .0628*** .1720*** .0809***
(5.98E-4) (6.21E-4) (1.50E-3) (6.22E-4)
FICO -.0017*** -.0017*** -.0017*** -.0017***
(6.13E-6) (6.09E-6) (6.12E-6) (6.12E-6)
LTV .0029*** .0029*** .0029*** .0029***
(1.33E-5) (1.33E-5) (1.33E-5) (1.33E-5)
DTI .0011*** .0011*** .0011*** .0011***
(2.10E-5) (2.09E-5) (2.10E-5) (2.10E-5)
Cash-Out Refi. .0775*** -.0084*** .0771*** .0775***
(5.35E-4) (1.25E-3) (5.35E-4) (5.35E-4)
Post-January 2012 x Cash-Out - .0720*** - -
- (1.35E-3) - -
Post-Jan. 2012 x Cash-Out - .1564*** - -
- (1.20E-3) - -
Post-Jan. 2012 x HHI - - -.0268*** -
- - (6.54E-3) -
Post-Sept. 2012 x HHI - - -.3449*** -
- - (5.65E-3) -
Post-Jan. 2012 x Non-Bank - - - .0114***
- - - (9.10E-4)
Post-Sept. 2012 x Non-Bank - - - .0224***
- - - (1.25E-3)
N 2,077,099 2,077,099 2,077,099 2,077,099
R2 0.2717 0.2792 0.2732 0.2724
Notes: Dependent variable is spread of primary mortgage rate over secondary mortgage rate,
sample is all loans originated between September 2011 and March 2013 in GSE dataset. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Additional controls include origination balance, interest rate volatility,
state house price indices and unemployment rates, and indicators for investor-owned, third-party
origination, and condominium properties. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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Table 2.5 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors from these
regressions. Model 1 includes only indicators for whether the mortgage was originated
after the announcement date, while Models 2, 3 and 4 interacts these terms respectively
with the cash-out refinance indicator, state-level HHI, and nonbank indicator. The
estimates from Model 1 suggest that in the long-run, guarantee fees pass through
substantially to mortgage interest rates. If pass-through were complete, the estimated
coefficients would be .1 (10 bp); the mean estimates in Model 1 imply 100% pass-through
following the first guarantee fee increase and roughly 85% pass-through following the
second. It is possible given the evidence from Figure 2.2 that since guarantee fees take
some time to become fully incorporated, the smaller estimate for the September 2012
announcement reflects the fact that the post-period sample is not long enough to fully
measure the extent of pass-through. The estimates from Model 2 suggest that
pass-through was more complete for cash-out refinances, and taken literally, suggest that
mortgage rates for cash-out refinances increased by more than the amount of the
guarantee fee increase. This somewhat curious result may reflect originators charging an
additional markup over the amount of the guarantee fee increase to cash-out refinance
borrowers to compensate for putback risk. Model 3 indicates that the extent of
pass-through was lower in more concentrated markets, as we would expect if mortgage
interest rates were set via oligopolistic competition. This result accords with the
evidence from Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013) [178] that pass-through from MBS yields
to mortgage rates and refinancing activity is attenuated in highly-concentrated markets.
The effect of market concentration on the extent of pass-through is considerably stronger
for the second guarantee fee increase than the first. This provides another potential
explanation for why measured pass-through from the second guarantee fee increase is
somewhat smaller in Model 1: because of the greater effect of concentration18, the
combined effect pooled across all markets is reduced. Finally, the estimates for Model 4
18The estimates, literally interpreted, suggest zero pass through for markets with an HHI above .5 after
the September 2012 increase.
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suggest that nonbank mortgage lenders increased their interest rates by more than did
conventional mortgage lenders. These results corroborate those from Black et al
(2010) [39] and Loutskina and Strahan (2009), [149] and are as one would expect given
nonbank lenders’ greater exposure to increases in the cost of securitization. Across all
models, the effects of other covariates are much as one would expect, with higher-FICO
borrowers receiving lower rates and higher-LTV and -DTI and cash-out refinance
borrowers receiving higher rates. Overall, these results are broadly supportive of the
assumption of essentially complete pass-through in the long-term from guarantee fees to
mortgage rates19 and the findings from other papers regarding the effects of increased
market concentration and secondary market reliance on mortgage pricing.
In some ways, the high estimated degree of pass-through from guarantee fees to
mortgage interest rates is difficult to square with existing stylized facts regarding the
degree of imperfect competition in mortgage markets. As discussed in Scharfstein and
Sunderam (2013), [178] mortgage markets in the U.S. are typically rather concentrated,
with the average household living in a county with a four-firm concentration of roughly
30%. In a standard model of imperfect competition, such a degree of concentration
would result in a lower rate of pass-through from costs to prices, and indeed Scharfstein
and Sunderam (2013) [178] find evidence for such reduced pass-through in the mortgage
market. However, while my results from Table 2.5 suggest that pass-through is lower in
more concentrated markets, they also indicate a higher degree of pass-through in the
aggregate than we should expect given overall levels of market concentration.
Nevertheless, my results in some ways accord well with prior estimates. Scharfstein and
Sunderam (2013) [178] in fact estimate20 complete pass-through from secondary market
yields to primary market interest rates for markets with a four-firm concentration ratio
19For example, Fuster et al (2013) [84] and DeFusco and Paciorek (2014) [64] both assume 100% pass-
through.
20The authors estimate in Table 7, Panel A a pass-through rate of 1.349− 2.956× CR4 and in Panel B of
1.349− 2.956× CR4, implying 100% pass-through for markets with four-firm concentration ratios below
11.8% or17.2%, respectively.
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below, depending on the specification, roughly 12 to 17%. Moreover both Fuster et al
(2013) [84] and DeFusco and Paciorek (2014) [64] assume 100% pass-through from
guarantee fees to mortgage interest rates in their analysis. These findings could
potentially be explained by a low degree of pass-through from idiosyncratic costs to
prices but a high degree of pass-through of aggregate cost increases. As discussed in
Miller et al (2015), [164] the degree of industry-pass through depends variously on both
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, and in their empirical setting the authors find that
aggregate cost shocks are typically passed-through completely to prices. Because the
increase in guarantee fees I analyze applied nearly equally to all firms, with only minor
heterogeneity across firms during the prevailing market environment in the ability to
avoid GSE securitization by holding originated loans in portfolio, it is not unreasonable
to expect that it should be entirely passed-through to consumers.
While there could in theory be other explanations for the measured increase in the
primary-secondary spread following the announcement of guarantee fee increases, some
simple diagnostics support the validity of this regression design. Importantly, there is
little evidence of a compositional shift post-announcement in the credit risk
characteristics of originated mortgages that could be driving these results. Table A14 in
Appendix E summarizes average risk characteristics by month and shows that the
characteristics of new refinance originations were essentially identical over this entire
period. Moreover, in addition to observable characteristics, there is little evidence for a
compositional shift on unobservables: the correlation of the regression residuals from
Model 1 in Table 2.5 with month of origination is just -.0131, suggesting that unobserved
credit risk factors did not vary systematically over this period. Finally, the results
presented in Table 2.5 are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including
measuring the effect of the guarantee fee increase on interest rates paid on conforming
purchase loans as well as refinances.21
21The estimates from those robustness checks are shown in Table A15 in Appendix E.
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2.3.2 Jumbo-Conforming Spread
Though the results from Table 2.5 suggest that over a medium-term horizon
guarantee fees are substantially passed through to mortgage rates, they offer scant
evidence on the timing of this pass-through. Because the FNMA and FHLMC data are
observed at a monthly frequency, it is impossible to measure short-term pass-through
using this microdata. As an alternative, I consider intertemporal variation in the spread
of average jumbo mortgage rates over average conforming mortgage rates at the state
level. Prices for jumbo mortgages, which are too large to qualify for the agency
guarantee, should not tend to reflect changes in originator costs that affect only
conforming mortgages; hence any difference between the two should reflect
agency-market-specific factors only, such as guarantee fees. To test what effect guarantee
fees had on conforming mortgage rates, I estimate the following empirical model:
JUMBOi,t = αi + CONFORMINGi,tβ + ΣSs=1 1[DATEt = s]δs + ei,t
where the unit of observation (i, t) is a state-day pair, αi is an unobserved state-specific
factor, β measures the tendency of conforming and jumbo mortgages to co-move, and
the coefficients δs measure variation in the jumbo-conforming spread across days. Figure
2.4 plots the estimated values of δs by trading day in a 100-day window around the two
announcement dates.22 In each case, the pre-trend in the two weeks leading up to the
announcement is relatively flat and hovers around 0, following which the jumbo
mortgage rate falls relative to the conforming mortgage rate over the next several weeks
by about 10 bp23. Thereafter the estimated fixed effects hover around -10 bp. This
decline is plausibly driven by market factors that increase the spread of conforming
22I use 5-day centered moving averages for jumbo and conforming mortgage rates to smooth out noise
in the series.
23There is a clear spike in jumbo mortgage rates visible in the January 2012 series roughly 3-4 weeks
after the announcement date. This spike coincides exactly with the month of February, and I suspect it is
mis-coded data.
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mortgage rates over some base interest rate while having no effect on jumbo mortgage
rates. The increase in guarantee fees on these dates is a reasonable candidate for such a
factor, especially in light of the results from Table 2.5 showing an increase in the spread
of conforming mortgage interest rates over the secondary rate, and FNMA’s own
analysis attributes much the decline in the jumbo-conforming spread to changes in
guarantee fees. [82] The estimated extent of pass-through, as in Table 2.5, is effectively
100% pass-through after three weeks in both cases. The estimated decline in jumbo rates
relative to conforming rates appears to persist over longer time horizons as well. Table
A16 in Appendix E estimates a similar regression on indicators for post-announcement
using a longer 6-month window before and after the fee increase, and the results again
confirm that jumbo mortgage rates fell relative to conforming rates by roughly the full
amount of the guarantee fee increase (10 bp)24. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, this high
degree of pass-through even in a relatively concentrated industry is sensible if we
assume the guarantee fee increase applied equally to all market participants. Combined
with the results from Table 2.5, these estimates provide suggestive evidence for
essentially complete pass-through from guarantee fees to conforming mortgage interest
rates.
2.4 EFFECTS ON CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
After considering the effect of the policy change on interest rates, I next study the
subsequent effect on credit constraints, and in particular the volume of new mortgage
originations. For these purposes I treat propensity to refinance as an indicator of credit
supply, as among other reasons refinance mortgages provide a much clearer “base
rate”than do home purchase loans: the set of potential customers for refinance loans is
all individuals with mortgages, which I observe for a certain market segment, but the set
24The point estimates imply pass-through of between 100% and 115%, or between 10 and 11.5 bp. In both
cases the difference between the point estimate and 10 bp is roughly one standard error.
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Figure 2.4: Jumbo-Conforming Loan Spread Fixed-Effects Estimates
Notes: Estimated daily fixed effects for jumbo-conforming spread event study. January
2012/September 2012 estimated fixed effects shown in Blue/Red. Black bar denotes event date.
of potential customers for new purchase loans is unobserved.25 Therefore in what
follows most of the discussion will center on refinance mortgages rather than home
purchase mortgages. Finally, building on the findings from several previous studies26
documenting a connection between refinancing credit constraints and default, I analyze
the effect of increased guarantee fees on default behavior. To measure the effect of
guarantee fee increases on refinancing and default, I employ the full dynamic dataset of
loans that were ineligible for HARP originated between June 2009 and June 2013, as
described in Section 1.5.1. In my analysis I consider in turn the effect of the GSE’s policy
changes on refinancing rates and default behavior, and conclude with a discussion of the
magnitude of these effects relative to prior estimates.
25I will discuss the assumptions required to interpret changes in refinancing activity as reflecting “credit
supply”.
26See Keys et al (2014), [136] Laderman (2012), [143] Krainer and Laderman (2011), [139] or Tracy and Wright
(2012) [185] for examples.
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2.4.1 Refinancing Behavior
Given the findings from Section 2.3 that guarantee fee increases result in higher
mortgage rates, the natural next question is what effect this has on origination volume. If
demand for mortgage credit is not perfectly inelastic, the increase in interest rates
(prices) should result in lower volumes (quantity). One challenge, however, is that it is
difficult to determine what demand for mortgage credit would have been in the absence
of the guarantee fee increase; in particular, the set of potential home-buyers is
unobserved, so changes in the volume of home purchase loans may reflect either
changes in the number of home buyers or changes credit supply. To avoid this problem, I
use panel data on refinancing decisions, which allows me to define a “base rate” of
potential refinance borrowers. I then treat changes in the propensity to refinance as an
indicator of credit supply.
This approach presents several crucial endogeneity concerns. First, on the supply
side, their may be other factors coincident with the guarantee fee increase that affect
access to refinancing credit. Indeed, an expansion to the HARP program implemented in
January 2012 (HARP 2.0) made it significantly easier for certain borrowers with little or
no home equity to refinance. The start of this program coincides exactly with the first
announced guarantee fee increase, complicating the use of this date for an event study.
As such, I restrict attention to a sample of borrowers who did not qualify for HARP
refinances, or those with loans originated after June 200927. There were no other policy
changes that would affect refinancing credit supply around this time, and the hope is
that in the short-term, other credit supply factors were essentially fixed28. Second, on the
demand side, there may be factors correlated with the borrower’s value of refinancing
27The HARP program contains several other cutoffs for eligibility even among GSE-backed mortgages,
but the other cutoffs, which are based on LTV and delinquency status, are manipulable and likely to raise
additional endogeneity concerns.
28I also control for month-to-month changes in interest rates, which do vary over this short time period.
In particular, the third round of Federal Reserve asset purchases (QE3) was announced in September 2012,
although that should be controlled for via interest rates.
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that vary systematically between the two guarantee fee regimes. In my empirical model,
I control for most of the key observed variables determining the borrower’s value of
refinancing: changes in interest rates, home equity, and local unemployment rates.
However, there may be unobserved variables that affect the value of refinancing; in
particular, Mian and Sufi (2011) [159] highlight unobserved local-area income growth
expectations as an unobserved factor correlated with household refinancing decisions. I
include state-level fixed effects to control for fixed differences across geographic areas in
the hope that income growth expectations do not vary considerably in over the time
horizons used for this analysis. More troublingly, however, unobserved household
expectations may be systematically correlated with unemployment rates and house
prices, as they would be in a typical macroeconomic model. This potential endogeneity
issue makes the inclusion of house prices and unemployment rates as control variables
problematic. To address this concern, I instrument for house prices using
housing-supply-elasticity instruments and for unemployment rates using Bartik
instruments that should be exogenous to income growth expectations29. Finally, in my
data I observe only the rate of prepayment, which includes both refinance and sales.
Therefore, in order to interpret changes in prepayment rates as indicative of changes in
refinancing rates I must assume that the propensity to sell for this group is held fixed
over the sample period. Since the borrowers in this sample have relatively new loans
originated just two years prior, the rate of home sales should be low for the group as a
whole. While I control for loan age to address the issue of sales, any increase in the rate
of sales over the sample period due solely to the passing of time would bias my
estimates of the effect of guarantee fees upward. As such, if there is an upward trend
over time in home sales that is not proxied via house prices and loan age, my estimates
of the effect of guarantee fee increases in refinancing will represent a lower bound of the
true effect, and a negative estimated effect on prepayment would still reflect a negative
29The full details of the process of constructing these instrumental variables is explained in Appendix B.
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shift in credit supply.
My empirical model of prepayment takes the following form:
REFIi,t = POSTi,tβ1 + EQi,tβ2 + AGEi,tβ3 + RISKiβ4 + ∆RATEi,tβ5 + ei,t
where the unit of observation (i, t) is a borrower-month, REFIi,t is an indicator for
borrower i prepaying her mortgage in month t, POSTi,t is an indicator for whether
month t is after the guarantee fee increase announcement date, EQi,t is the borrower’s
home equity and AGEi,t the age of their loan, RISKi are fixed borrower risk
characteristics observed at origination, and ∆RATEi,t is the change in market interest
rates since borrower i took out her last mortgage. As noted above, I instrument for home
equity and include the first-stage predicted value as a regressor30.
Table 2.6 shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors from this regression.
Models 1 and 2 respectively use a sample of observations from a three-month or
six-month window around the January 2012 fee increase announcement date, while
Models 3 and 4 use similar samples around the September 2012 announcement date. The
estimated coefficients are largely as one would expect. Less risky borrowers, measured
as those with either higher credit scores or more home equity, are more likely to prepay,
perhaps reflecting their greater access to refinancing credit, as are borrowers with older
loans. Borrowers whose initial mortgage carried an interest rate with a high spread over
the average are more likely to prepay, as they can derive greater value from refinancing,
and borrowers are also more likely to prepay if the prevailing national average mortgage
rate has declined since they received their initial loan. This specification omits certain
variables, including instrumented local unemployment rates, indicators for initial
mortgage purpose, house type and origination channel. Table A17 in Appendix E shows
the estimated coefficients when these variables are included, and the results are
30The main results are all robust to estimating the model with ordinary least squares using the observed
variables rather than instrumental variables, as shown in Table A19 of Appendix E.
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Table 2.6: Refinancing Probability Event Study
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post-Announcement -0.0016*** -0.0028*** -0.0013*** -0.0032***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
FICO 8.03E-05*** 6.58E-05*** 8.52E-05*** 8.25E-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Êquity 2.44E-07*** 2.14E-07*** 2.89E-07*** 2.75E-07***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Loan Age 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Initial LTV 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0018*** 0.0017***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
̂Unemp. Rate -1.86E-4 4.74E-3*** -3.17E-3*** 3.78E-3***
(2.21E-4) (1.24E-4) (2.27E-4) (1.30E-4)
Initial Int. Rt. Spread 0.0142*** 0.0121*** 0.0111*** 0.0115***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -0.0281*** -0.0191*** -0.0208*** -0.0191***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Announcement Date Jan. 2012 Jan. 2012 Sept. 2012 Sept. 2012
Sample Window 3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
N 29,872,035 52,340,967 36,057,155 63,184,479
R2 0.0755 0.0660 0.0893 0.0850
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans originated after June
2009 in GSE dataset. Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Hats denote
instrumented variables. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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substantially the same31. Moreover my results are also very similar quantitatively when
I estimate the model with ordinary least squares rather than instrumental variables, as
shown in Table A19 of Appendix E.
Turning to the estimated effect of the fee increase, each of the four models suggests
that prepayment probabilities declined following the guarantee fee increase. The
estimates suggest that the short-term effect at 3-month horizons was somewhat smaller
than the medium-term effect at 6-month horizons and that the effects of the two
guarantee fee increases were similar in magnitude. The estimates with additional
controls in Table A17 of Appendix E are also similar in magnitude. Under my
identifying assumptions and treating the estimates from Table A17 as a baseline, I
estimate that the effect of a 10 bp increase in guarantee fees is to reduce the probability of
refinance by between .17% and .24%, or between 2% and 2.6% on an annualized basis
(CPR)32. While a decline of just 2% CPR in refinancing may not seem economically
significant, on a base level of 27.5% CPR, which is roughly the sample average, this
corresponds to a decline of between 7.3% and 9.5% in refinancing rates. Moreover, the
quantity of outstanding agency FRMs is so large that even a small change in the
probability of refinancing entails a rather large change in origination volumes. Applying
the estimates from Models 1 and 3 from Table A17 in Appendix E to the total quantity of
agency FRMs outstanding shown in Figure A7 of Appendix J generates an implied
decline in refinancing volume of $7.19 billion per month from the first guarantee fee
increase and $10.01 billion per month from the second increase, for a total decline in
mortgage refinancing volume of $206.4 billion per year. As such, my results suggest that
31Appendix E also contains estimates using the implementation date as a regressor, shown in Table A18.
The estimated effect of the April 2012 guarantee fee increase are similar at three-month horizons, but at
six-month horizons they are substantially larger, possibly because the post-period in this case includes
months from after the September announcement, and the estimate has conflated the two. Moreover the
estimated effect at three-month horizons for the December implementation date is zero while the estimate
at a six-month horizon is negative, which is exactly what would result if the effect had actually begun three
months earlier in September. As such, I interpret these results as suggesting that the announcement date is
when the effects on credit supply begin.
32Mortgage prepayment rates are typically quoted as Conditional Prepayment Rates (CPR) rather than
Single Monthly Mortality (SMM), where CPR = 1-(1-SMM)12.
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increases in guarantee fees have economically significant effects on refinancing activity.
My estimates of the effect of guarantee fees on refinancing also accord well with prior
estimates. In a simulation exercise, DeFusco and Paciorek (2014) [64] apply their
estimated mortgage demand elasticity to a hypothetical increase in guarantee fees of 11
bp, which they assume is fully passed-through to mortgage rates. They estimate a
change in mortgage credit demanded of between 0.17% and 0.22% as a result of this
policy change, with an implied figure for ∂ Demand∂ IR , with interest rates measured in
percentage points, of 2.2-3.1%33. I estimate a pass-through rate from guarantee fees to
mortgage interest rates of between 85% and 100%, or a .085% to .1% increase in
mortgage rates, and a change in mortgage credit demand of between .17% and .24%,
corresponding to a ∂ Demand∂ IR elasticity of 1.7-2.8%, indicating my estimates suggest a
change in demand for refinancing credit that is very much in line with their estimates.
While DeFusco and Paciorek (2014) [64] consider demand for home-purchase mortgages
rather than refinance loans, Tracy and Wright (2012) [185] use a proportional-hazard
model to estimate a more comparable figure for ∂ Demand∂ IR . Their estimated elasticity of
between 2.3% and 2.9%34 almost exactly matches my own. The close correspondence
between my own estimates of the effect of an effective increase in mortgage rates on
mortgage credit demand and prior estimates suggests that my own results are a
reasonable estimate of the effect of the GSE’s policy change.
As with my results from Table 2.5 in Section 2.3, I also estimate an event-study type
model to demonstrate the timing of transmission from guarantee fee increases to
33The authors write that “Under these assumptions, our estimates imply that the proposed increase in
the g-fee would reduce the total dollar volume of fixed- rate conforming mortgage originations by roughly
0.17 to 0.22 percent relative to what it otherwise would have been,” and “As an example, our preferred
estimates imply that an increase in the mortgage rate from 5 percent to 6 percent - 100 basis points - would
lead to a decline in first mortgage demand of 2 to 3 percent, which strikes us as a reasonably small but
plausible estimate.”
34The authors estimate prepayment hazard coefficients for interest rates (in percentage points) of 1.000229
for borrowers above 80% LTV and 1.000288 for borrowers below 80% LTV, suggesting that a 100 bp increase
in rates should reduce prepayment by 2.3% to 2.9%.
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refinancing. This model takes the form:
REFIi,t = ΣSs=1 1[DATEt = s]δs + EQi,tβ2
+ AGEi,tβ3 + RISKiβ4 + ∆RATEi,tβ5 + ei,t
where all variables are defined as before, and the coefficient of interest are the δs terms
measuring month-by-month changes in refinance rates. These fixed-effects are plotted in
Figure 2.5. While there is some month-to-month variability in refinance rates preceding
both the January and September 2012 guarantee fee increases, neither series shows a
clear pre-trend, and to the extent that there is a downward trend prior to the September
2012 announcement, it appears to be driven by the effects of the January 2012
announcement, as the sample windows over which these fixed-effects are estimated
overlap. Moreover directly following the fee increase, in both cases we see a substantial
reduction in refinance probabilities over the following six months of roughly 5.8% CPR
or roughly .5% per month. The timing of the observed decline in refinancing rates,
combined with the lack of a clear pre-trend, suggests that it was indeed the increase in
guarantee fees which was responsible for the decline.
2.4.2 Default Rates
Building on the results from Sections 2.3 and 2.4.1 that increases in guarantee fees
tighten household credit constraints, the final step in my analysis is consider how these
credit constraints affect default behavior. Several previous studies, including Keys et al
(2014), [136] Laderman (2012), [143] Krainer and Laderman (2011), [139] Agarwal et al
(2015), [12] and Tracy and Wright (2012) [185] have documented a connection between
credit supply and default. Each of these studies shows that increasing the supply of
refinancing credit can result in lower default rates (or vice-versa), as for instance would
be the case in an option-theoretic forward-looking model of refinancing and default such
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Figure 2.5: Refinancing Probability Fixed-Effects Estimates
Notes: Estimated daily fixed effects for refinancing probability event study. January 2012/Septem-
ber 2012 estimated fixed effects shown in Blue/Red. Black bar denotes event date.
as Bajari et al (2013) [22] when the refinancing option becomes less valuable. To test what
effect the change in credit supply induced by higher guarantee fees has on default, I
estimate the following model:
DEFAULTi,t = POSTi,tβ1 + APPi,tβ2 + AGEi,tβ3 + RISKiβ4 + MACROi,tβ5 + ei,t
where DEFAULTi,t is an indicator for whether borrower i defaulted in month t35, APPi,t
is the percent home price appreciation since the borrower initially took out ther
mortgage, and MACROi,t are state-specific or other aggregate factors affecting default
such as unemployment rates or mortgage interest rates.
The estimated coefficients and standard errors from this regression are presented in
Table 2.7. My estimates suggest that default probabilities increased marginally following
the guarantee fee increase announcement dates. The estimated effects over a 6-month
35I define the month of default as the month directly following the final month in which a borrower
made a payment for the final time before defaulting. For example, if a borrower makes a final payment in
January, then makes no further payments before being declared in default in April, I date the default month
to February.
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Table 2.7: Default Probability Event Study
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post-Announcement 4.04E-5*** 1.17E-4*** 4.65E-5*** 1.11E-4***
(8.02E-6) (5.84E-6) (6.36E-6) (9.29E-6)
FICO -2.70E-6*** -2.48E-6*** -2.80E-6*** -2.58E-6***
(8.67E-8) (6.61E-8) (6.02E-8) (7.71E-8)
̂Home Price App. -5.83E-4** 4.52E-5 -8.24E-4*** -4.26E-4***
(2.96E-4) (1.66E-4) (7.81E-5) (1.10E-4)
Loan Age 8.17E-6*** 9.18E-6*** 5.60E-6*** 4.75E-6***
(3.95E-7) (2.83E-7) (2.55E-7) (3.32E-7)
Initial LTV 4.80E-6*** 4.33E-6*** 4.57E-6*** 4.10E-6***
(1.73E-7) (1.35E-7) (1.21E-7) (1.57E-7)
̂Unemp. Rate -1.66E-4*** 1.26E-5 -5.28E-5*** 8.94E-6
(2.96E-5) (1.52E-5) (9.67E-6) (2.27E-5)
Initial Int. Rt. 4.89E-5*** 5.37E-5*** 6.29E-5*** 7.90E-5***
(8.96E-6) (6.85E-6) (6.15E-6) (8.07E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. 3.30E-5 1.97E-4*** 2.80E-4*** 5.25E-4***
(6.01E-5) (1.40E-5) (1.51E-5) (3.56E-5)
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Announcement Date Jan. 2012 Jan. 2012 Sept. 2012 Sept. 2012
Sample Window 3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
N 29,872,035 52,340,967 36,057,155 63,184,479
R2 0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for default, sample is all loans originated after June 2009
in GSE dataset. Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Hats denote instru-
mented variables. Additional controls include initial DTI ratio, state-level instrument home value
indices, indicators for owner-occupied, third-party origination, initial cash-out refinance, initial
purchase loan, condominiums, manufactured housing, and planned-unit developments. ***/**/*
indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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window are considerably larger than those for the 3-month window, suggesting that the
full effect on default takes some time to manifest. This is sensible, since any impact of
guarantee fees on default would have to come through removing the refinancing option,
and households who are initially denied credit may continue paying their mortgage
while attempting to refinance on multiple occasions. The other coefficients are as one
would expect, with higher default rates for borrowers with low home price appreciation
since origination, high-LTV loans, high initial interest rates or high prevailing interest
rates, although the estimated effect of unemployment on default is inconsistent across
specifications36. The results from Table 2.7 are also robust to estimating the model with
ordinary least squares rather than instrumental variables, as shown in Table A20 of
Appendix E. Taken together with the results from Sections 2.3 and 2.4.1, these results
suggest that the tightening of credit constraints associated with increases in guarantee
fees lead to higher rates of mortgage default, as we would expect if credit-constrained
borrowers with high and burdensome monthly mortgage payments turned to default as
a second-best alternative.
My estimates for the effect of tightened credit constraints on default are also both
quantitatively reasonable and economically significant. Applying the estimated changes
in the probability to the average monthly default probability in the data for this sample
from 201237 implies an increase in the probability of default of between 20.8% and 60.4%.
While this figure may seem somewhat high, it accords well with prior estimates.
Agarwal et al (2015) [12] estimate that as a result of the HARP program, the probability of
refinancing for eligible borrowers increased by .24% per month, while the probability of
default declined by .0038% to .0095% per month38. These estimates correspond to an
36Recall from Section 1.3.1 that the effect of unemployment on default is a contentious issue in the litera-
ture.
37Default is very rare for this sample in 2012, partly because these loans were originated from 2009 to
2011 during a period of tight credit and hence represent a less risky sample, and partly because the loans
are relatively young. Hence the average default rate for the sample in 2012 is .02% per month, or .24% CPR.
38Agarwal et al (2015) [12] state that “We find that a one percentage point absolute increase in the ex-ante
share of eligible loans for HARP is associated with an increase of about 0.24 percentage points in the fraction
of loans that refinance under the program... [and] a reduction of about 0.38 basis points in the average zip
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estimated range of ∂ P(Default)
∂ P(Prepay) of between 1.58% and 3.95%, while my own estimates from
the main post-announcement coefficients of Models 1 and 3 in Tables 2.7 and A17
suggest a figure for ∂ P(Default)
∂ P(Prepay) of 1.94% to 2.38%, indicating that our results are very
much in line. This correspondence between estimated effects of guarantee fee increases
and the HARP program provides further suggestive evidence that guarantee fees affect
default primarily by closing off the refinancing channel for certain borrowers.
The results from Sections 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate that guarantee fee increases result
in tighter mortgage credit supply conditions. Following the announcement of guarantee
fee increases, originators increase their offered mortgage rates almost completely,
passing though between 85% and 100% of their increase in costs depending on the
specification. The extent of pass-through appears to be greater for riskier borrowers and
for less-well-capitalized lenders, but lower in less competitive markets. As a result of
this equilibrium supply-side response, credit supply tightens, and the propensity of
borrowers to refinance falls as a result. My estimates of the magnitude of this effect,
which largely align with previous work, suggests that total refinancing volume declined
by roughly $205 billion as a result of the two 2012 guarantee fee increases. As suggested
by prior studies, I also estimate that guarantee fee increases and the attendant tightening
of credit constraints is associated with an economically-meaningful increase in the
probability of default.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this chapter traces the effect of changes in guarantee fees on
the agency mortgage market and on credit supply in particular. The results from Section
2.2 suggest that in the short-term, increases in guarantee fees lead originators to
code mortgage interest rate,” while their estimates imply that a 1 bp change in average area interest rates
translates to a .01% to .025% change in the probability of default. Hence a 1% change in the share of eligible
borrowers results in a change in the probability of default of between .0038% and .0095%
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accelerate their securitization schedules and reduce excess servicing spreads to try to
avoid the effects of the fee increase. However, I find that holding interest rates fixed, the
prices of newly-originated MBS fall, resulting in lower revenues for originators. The
results from Section 2.2 indicate that originators respond to this potential decline in
revenues in predictable ways. I find that nearly all of the fee increase is passed through
to mortgage interest rates, although in line with previous research, I find that this affect
is stronger in more competitive lending markets, for higher-risk borrowers, and for
nonbank lenders. I shown in Section 2.4 that as a a result of this increase in interest rates,
the probability of refinance decreases and the probability of default increases for affected
borrowers. The magnitudes of these effects are of potential macroeconomic significance,
with an estimated annual reduction in refinancing volume of $205 billion. While my
documentation of these effects in response to guarantee fee increases is novel, my results
largely confirm prior studies of mortgage demand elasticity and the effects of credit
constraints on household default behavior. From discussions with industry participants
as well as from the assumptions made in several prior studies, [64, 84] it would appear
that, novel though they may be, all of these results align with common sense as well.
A key limitation of my analysis of changes in guarantee fees is that the effects of such
a policy change are dependent on the GSE’s market share and hence not
regime-invariant. At the time of the policy changes analyzed in this study, agency
securitization accounted for 60% of all new first-lien mortgages, with an even greater
market share of 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, and effectively zero private-label
securitization. [97] As indicated both by prior research [39, 149] and by my own results from
Section 2.3, the effect of changes in secondary-market conditions will depend on the
extent to which lenders are reliant on the secondary market as a funding source. Given
that a high GSE market share reflects widespread reliance on GSE securitization, the
strong measured effects of guarantee fee increases during this period are not surprising.
However, it is unlikely my findings regarding the extent of pass-through or the effect of
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guarantee fees on credit constraints would continue to hold quantitatively during
periods in which private-label securitization or other origination options are on an equal
footing with GSE securitization. Since large, discrete, and exogenous changes in
guarantee fees are relatively rare events, I cannot evaluate this claim directly. However, I
would hesitate to generalize these finding across market conditions. As an alternative, in
Chapter 4 I attempt to estimate the effect of changes in guarantee fees on mortgage
credit supply in a regime-invariant fashion in order to make quantitative claims about
the out-of-sample effects of counterfactual GSE pricing policies.
My results in this chapter are nonetheless of potential significance for
macroeconomic, monetary and housing finance policy. First, the size of the estimated
change in refinancing volume, $205 billion per year, is large enough to warrant
consideration of the macroeconomic effects of this policy change. Second, an analysis of
the effects of guarantee fees should be taken into account in predicting the effects of
changes in short-term interest rates or of other GSE policies on refinancing volume.
Finally, we might suspect in light of the estimated effects of guarantee fees on credit
supply that even given a congressional mandate to raise additional revenue, the optimal
policy for a housing finance regulator would seek to preferentially recoup losses with
higher fees when credit constraints are least likely to bind. In Chapter 4 I design a model








In this chapter I analyze how the value of access to refinancing credit depends on
employment status. Many macroeconomic models assume [13] and several empirical
studies suggest [103] that as a result of differences across borrowers in the marginal value
of cash-on-hand, the value of access to credit also differs across borrowers. An important
dimension of heterogeneity in this regard is income or employment status. However,
because access to credit depends on employment status, measuring the direct effects of
unemployment rates on refinancing activity will not entirely capture the effects of
borrower preferences. Indeed, levels of almost every type of household borrowing
declined during the 2008 recession, and while it is difficult to disentangle the demand
effect from variations in access to credit, some evidence suggests that the supply effect of
tighter credit constraints was the driving factor1. The goal of this chapter is to estimate
in a reduced-form manner how much the value of credit access varies across borrowers,
with a particular focus on how it varies with unemployment. In combination with the
results from Chapter 2 regarding the effects of guarantee fees on credit constraints, the
estimates from this chapter will inform the structural model I develop in Chapter 4 by
providing motivation for how credit supply policies can have different impacts on
employed and unemployed borrowers.
Building on the insight from Section 1.4 regarding the interaction between liquidity
preference, or demand for refinancing credit, and credit supply in determining
refinancing outcomes, in this chapter I employ several distinct approaches to address the
question of who benefits from expansions in mortgage credit supply. First I analyze the
related but slightly different question of whether the value of refinancing credit is higher
for the unemployed than for the employed. As noted in prior research, [51, 123]
consumption-smoothing motives could increase the value of cash-on-hand, and hence
1See Brown et al (2013) [45] for a discussion of recent trends in consumer indebtedness and Gropp et al
(2014) [102] for evidence of credit supply effects.
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refinancing, for borrowers with temporarily depressed incomes, such as the
unemployed. I develop a simple model to demonstrate the intuition that the relationship
between the value of refinancing and unemployment can be directly estimated from the
data, at least up to the sign of the effect, among populations for whom credit access is
not negatively affected by employment status. I then focus on two populations,
borrowers with considerable home equity wealth and borrowers who are eligible for
HARP refinances, and estimate the sensitivity of their refinancing behavior to local
unemployment rates. I interpret the results, under the framework of my simple model,
as indicative of the covariance between unemployment and the value of refinancing
credit. Second I use a difference-in-differences design to analyze how takeup under the
HARP program differed across high- and low-unemployment areas. I exploit sharp
discontinuities in eligibility for the HARP program and a discrete one-time change in the
efficacy of the program, as discussed in Section 1.2.4, to generate exogenous variation in
access to credit for some but not all borrowers. I interpret variation in the marginal
propensity to refinance under HARP across borrowers as evidence that credit supply
policies have disproportionate impact on certain borrowers, namely those for whom
takeup is highest.
My results indicate both that preferences for refinancing credit are higher among the
unemployed, and, potentially as a consequence, that credit supply policies such as
HARP disproportionately benefit the unemployed. Using data on refinancing
applications, I find that the probability of being credit constrained varies positively with
unemployment rates for the population overall. However, my results indicate that this
effect differs greatly depending on other credit characteristics, and in particular, that
among borrowers with large home equity positions unemployment has no effect on
credit constraints. Similarly I estimate that for the population as a whole, the probability
of refinancing is declining in local unemployment rates, although among borrowers with
substantial home equity the two vary positively. I further develop this insight by
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exploiting the design of the HARP program, which provides a unique opportunity to
examine how borrowers refinance when credit constraints are removed or severely
attenuated. I find that among this unconstrained population, a 1% increase in local
unemployment rates leads to a 3.4% to 4.4% increase in refinance CPR, with borrowers
in the top decile of the unemployment-rate distribution refinancing at speeds of 34.3%
CPR higher than those in the bottom decile. While in the context of the model from
Section 1.4 these results suggest that the value of refinancing credit is higher for the
unemployed, they offer no indication of how the benefits of credit supply policies are
distributed. It could be the case, for example, that although the unemployed have
stronger preferences for refinancing credit, policies such as HARP do little to alleviate
credit constraints among this population. However, my baseline estimates of takeup
under the HARP program suggest that this is not the case, and that that the program
both substantially stimulated refinancing and that takeup increased substantially with
unemployment rates. I estimate that following a change to the HARP program in 2012
that dramatically increased its effectiveness, the probability of refinancing increased
26.9% to 31.7% more for eligible borrowers than for similar ineligible borrowers. I also
find that a 1% increase in local unemployment rates leads to a 3% to 7% increase in
program takeup, and while I find the largest differences between borrowers in
low-unemployment areas and borrowers in moderate-unemployment areas, differences
in program takeup are monotonic across the unemployment distribution, with
borrowers in the highest quartile of unemployment rates 40% to 50% more likely to
refinance under HARP than those in the lowest quartile. These estimates suggest that
the HARP program disproportionately benefited the unemployed, although I cannot
address whether this is due to greater demand for refinancing credit among the
unemployed or a greater reduction in the credit constraints facing the unemployed.
This chapter makes several distinct contributions both to the academic literature
regarding the interaction between unemployment, liquidity preference and credit
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constraints, and to the policy literature concerning the effectiveness of the HARP
program. First, this paper is among the first to provide direct empirical evidence on the
covariance between unemployment and demand for credit. While some previous
studies, such as Sullivan (2008) [183] and Bethune (2014), [35] do make use of micro data to
analyze the effect of unemployment on credit utilization, my analysis extends their
results in two key ways. One, I study the effect of unemployment on demand for a type
of credit, home equity borrowing, that is both much a much larger market than the types
of credit those authors analyze2 and that prior research has identified as the most
important mechanism in the U.S. for consumption-smoothing-motivated precautionary
saving. [50] Two, my analysis controls directly for credit constraints in a way that prior
studies have not by studying populations of borrowers for whom credit constraints
should be minimal. While my two-stage approach to estimating the effects of
unemployment on both access to and utilization of credit bears some similarities with
the work of Antoniades (2015) [19] and Jiménez et al (2012, 2014), [125, 126] my
methodology is new to the literature, and to my knowledge no prior research has used
the HARP program as an instrument for credit availability. Second, on the policy side, to
my knowledge this is the first study to analyze how takeup under the HARP program
varied across borrowers, in itself an interesting policy question in its own right. These
estimates may be useful in the design and evaluation of other housing finance or credit
supply policies, and as noted in previous research [1] my finding that the value of easing
credit constraints varies positively with unemployment (or negatively with income) has
important implications for the design of stabilization policy. On the theoretical side,
while a rather large class of macroeconomic models with endogenous credit constraints
assumes that the value of credit access varies with income3, relatively few papers are
2Both studies focus on unsecured consumer credit, largely consisting of credit cards. As noted in Brown
et al (2013), [45] over my sample period U.S. total mortgage debt outstanding varied between 7 and 12 times
the volume of total credit card debt outstanding.
3See Aiyagari (1994), [13] Krusell and Smith (1998), [141] Gourinchas and Parker (2002), [99] and Lustig and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) [152] for examples.
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able to provide empirical evidence either in favor of this assumption or of the magnitude
of the effect. The analysis in this chapter is intended to provide empirical support for the
microfoundations underlying these models, as well as to inform the policy literature
concerning the effects of credit supply policies and the assumptions implicit in the
structural model I develop in Chapter 4.
The analysis in this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 I outline a simple
model of the refinancing process based on that presented in Section 1.4 and use the
model to generate several hypotheses relating unemployment to the value of refinancing
credit and subsequently to objects that I observe in the data. Section 3.2.1 uses data on
refinance applications to identify groups of borrowers for whom credit supply should be
insensitive to unemployment, and Section 3.2.2 builds on these results by analyzing how
such borrowers’ refinancing speeds covary with unemployment. Likewise Section 3.3
analyzes the refinancing behavior of another group of borrowers, those eligible for the
HARP program, who as a result of the program were even less impeded by
unemployment-based credit constraints. Finally in Section 3.4 I analyze using a
difference-in-differences design how takeup under the HARP program varied across
borrowers in high- and low-unemployment-rate areas. Section 3.5 concludes with a
discussion of how my results inform housing finance policy analysis, the academic
macroeconomic literature, and the structural model I develop in Chapter 4.
3.2 SUPPLY AND DEMAND INTERACTIONS IN THE EFFECT
OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON REFINANCING
In this section I provide descriptive evidence on how supply and demand effects
interact in the agency refinancing market and discuss what implications these have for
the relationship between unemployment and the value of refinancing credit. There are
two goals for these descriptive regressions. The first is to provide evidence in favor of a
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model of borrower behavior similar to that in Aiyagari (1994). [13] In the context of such a
model, the shadow value of easing credit constraints should be greatest for households
facing negative labor income shocks, and indeed, that the value of refinancing credit
itself is greater for the unemployed. However, the results from Section 1.4 suggest that
identifying such an effect will be complicated by credit constraints. The second goal is
describe the patterns in the data that will identify the structural model I develop in
Chapter 4, as will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.
To help frame these results, as well as those to be presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4,
consider a more simplified version of the model presented in Section 1.4. Borrowers with
an employment status u, where u = 1 denotes unemployment, and other characteristics
X derive value from refinancing VR(X, u), and prefer refinancing to continuation only if
that VR(X, u) + ε ≥ 0, where ε is a preference shock with symmetric distribution Λ.
Hence the probability that refinancing is optimal is given by
PRefi. Optimal(X, u) = Λ(VR(X, u)). Borrowers are observed to refinance only if
refinancing is optimal and they can access credit, where the probability that they can
access credit is given by 1− PConst(X, u). Thus the probability that a borrower with
characteristics (X, u) is observed to refinance is given by:





∂ PRefi. Optimal(X, u)
∂ u
× (1− PConst(X, u))− PRefi. Optimal(X, u)×
∂ PConst(X, u)
∂ u




× (1− PConst(X, u))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0




The equation above highlights the key econometric problem for identifying ∂ VR(X,u)∂ u : if
∂ PConst(X,u)




∂ u have the opposite
112
sign, or that unemployed borrowers are not more likely to refinance than employed
borrowers despite valuing the refinancing option more. In this section, I provide
evidence for how ∂ PRefi.∂ u and
∂ PConst(X,u)
∂ u vary with other credit-risk characteristics X and
attempt to interpret these results as evidence in favor of an Aiyagari [13]-type model,
while Sections 3.3 and 3.4 approach the same question from alternative angles.
My empirical approach is to estimate the quantities ∂ PRefi.∂ u and
∂ PConst(X,u)
∂ u directly from
the data. I estimate ∂ PRefi.∂ u using the matched dataset described in Section 1.5.4. This
dataset consists of 6,911,395 monthly loan-level panel records for 200,000 FRM
borrowers from California from 2000 to 2012, and provides detailed credit-risk and
location information on the borrower as well as their choices of when to refinance and
into what product. To estimate ∂ PConst(X,u)∂ u I employ the HMDA dataset described in
Section 1.5.2, which consists of 17,109,796 applications for conforming refinance
mortgages from California between 2000 and 2012. This dataset also provides detailed
credit-risk and location information, as well as information on whether the loan
application was denied or whether the borrower rejected an extended loan offer, both of
which I treat as indicative of credit constraints.
3.2.1 Credit Supply Models
The first step in my analysis is to measure how credit constraints vary with
employment status. My goal is to identify groups of individuals for whom ∂ PConst(X,u)∂ u is
zero or close to zero. The intuition is that among these groups, we should be able to infer
how the value of refinancing credit varies with unemployment based solely on how
actual refinancing varies with unemployment, at least up to the sign of the effect.
Motivated by this intuition, I estimate probit models of the probability that a borrower is
credit-constrained of the following form:
P(Consti,t = 1) = Φ(Riski,tγ1 + Unempi,t × Riski,tγ2 + Zi,tγ3)
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where Consti,t is an indicator for whether the borrower was credit-constrained, or
applied for a refinance loan unsuccessfully, Riski,t are credit-risk characteristics such as
home equity, LTV, or FICO, Unempi,t is the local-area unemployment rate, and Zi,t are
other controls such as interest rate spreads. I estimate the model using the HMDA
dataset, and in my baseline specifications treat both denied applications and rejected
offers as indicative of credit constraints4. I treat rejected offers as indicative of credit
constraints because, as discussed in Section 1.4, they represents cases in which the
borrower cannot obtain affordable credit, or is effectively constrained by prices rather
than outright denial. The key parameters of interest are γ2, which measure the
interaction between unemployment and other credit risk factors, as these parameters
will identify groups for whom the effect of unemployment on credit constraints is
negligible.
A key question is why we should expect the effect of unemployment on credit
constraints to ever be negligible. Lenders may be less concerned by the employment
status of borrowers who, by virtue of their equity position or FICO, are otherwise good
credit risks, in part because they discount the borrower’s ability to repay, and hence
employment status, if they have sufficient home equity. Two market trends suggest that
this is indeed the case. First, as discussed in Finberg (2003), [81] a series of financial fraud
cases in the mid-2000s suggests that a popular predatory lending strategy is to target
borrowers with high home equity but low income for large cash-out refinances in hope
that the borrower defaults and the lender can foreclose on the house. Second, there is a
product called a reverse mortgage, described extensively in Shan (2011), [179] that is
especially designed for borrowers with no income but abundant home equity, and until
very recently these products were not underwritten at all and lenders did not even
verify their applicant’s income or credit history. These two examples suggest that in
certain cases, particularly in cases where the applicant’s home is worth substantially
4My results are robust to only using application denials, as shown in Table A23 in Appendix E.
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more than their mortgage debts, lenders simply do not care whether the borrower has an
income or not, as the worst-case scenario for the lender entails foreclosing on the home
and selling it at a profit.
For the purposes of identifying the true effect of employment on both credit
constraints and unemployment, the probit model written above faces two key
endogeneity problems. First, there are potentially unobserved variables correlated with
both credit supply and borrower demand for refinancing credit that may themselves be
correlated unemployment rates or credit risk. Mian and Sufi (2011) [159] note that in a
permanent-income framework, households expecting higher future income should
borrow against it and spend, with the associated consumption boom pushing up home
prices and employment. As such, refinancing activity and home prices, and thus home
equity, should be positively correlated with unobserved income growth expectations
while unemployment should be negatively correlated with the same. To address this
concern, I instrument for house prices and unemployment using measures that are
unrelated with local-area income growth expectations5. In my baseline specifications, I
instrument for home prices using the housing-supply-elasticity instrument from
Gyourko et al (2008) [106] and for unemployment using the instruments from Bartik
(1991), [25] which measure the change in unemployment relative to a base year that
would be predicted by national-level trends6. Second, as discussed in Section 1.5.4 the
evidence from Gyourko and Tracy (2014) [107] suggests that using a market-wide
unemployment rate as a proxy for individual-specific employment status results in
attenuation bias in the estimated effect of employment status, or that the true effect of
unemployment is much larger in magnitude than would be suggested from using
market-level aggregate probabilities. While I do not have access to data on
individual-level employment status with which to address this concern, I do not think it
5My results are robust to using observed values for unemployment rates and home price appreciation,
as shown in Table A22 in Appendix E.
6Details on how these instruments are constructed are contained in Appendix A.
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invalidates my results, as my estimates thus represent a lower-bound on the true effect
of employment status on credit constraints and refinancing, as the bias should be
towards zero. Moreover, my estimates in this section and in Section 3.2.2 use place-level
unemployment rates rather than MSA-level as in Gyourko and Tracy (2014). [107] Places
are much smaller than MSAs and provide a better signal of of employment status,
allowing me to distinguish between, for example, Beverly Hills and Compton, both part
of the Los Angeles MSA, where the average unemployment rates over my sample period
are 5.4% and 13.4% respectively.
My estimates of the effect of unemployment rates on credit constraints across various
credit-risk bins are shown in Figure 3.1. I divide the sample into five equally-sized bins
based on three credit-risk factors: FICO, DTI, and LTV. I then estimate the effect of
unemployment on credit constraints within each bin via a probit regression. Each model
also include controls such as LTV, DTI and FICO for credit risk and mortgage interest
rate spreads and guarantee fees to control for secondary market conditions7. Figure 3.1
displays the estimated coefficients on unemployment with standard error bars, where
lower quintiles (Q1) of risk factors correspond to higher credit risk, as measured by a
low FICO score, high DTI ratio, or high LTV ratio, and higher quintiles (Q5) correspond
to lower credit risk. The mean effect of unemployment on the probability of being
credit-constrained, as we might expect, is significantly positive and marked with a
horizontal line. However, this mean effect masks considerable heterogeneity, as the
positive effect of unemployment on credit constraints is concentrated among borrowers
in the lowest three quintiles of creditworthiness. For borrowers with LTV ratios below
60% (Q3-Q5), DTI ratios below 34% (Q5), or FICO scores above 800 (Q5), the estimated
effect of unemployment on credit constraints is negative, suggesting that credit
constraints do not tighten with unemployment for these borrowers. While the estimated
negative effect may seem counterintuitive, because these estimates combine the effect on
7The estimated coefficients for these controls are not shown, but the full set of parameter estimates
including these covariates is shown in Table A21 in Appendix E.
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Figure 3.1: Credit Constraint Probit Unemployment Effects by Credit Risk
Notes: Estimated effect of unemployment on probability of credit constraints by quintiles of
credit-risk factors. Blue/Green/Grey bars measure effect of unemployment within quintiles of
FICO/DTI/LTV respectively. Higher quintiles denote lower credit risk (increase FICO, decreasing
DTI, LTV). Red line shows mean effect across all applicants. Bars indicate standard error bands.
both application denial and offer acceptance this result may indicate that unemployed
borrowers have high liquidity preference and are thus more willing to accept
high-interest-rate offers8. Moreover the effect of unemployment on credit constraints is
essentially monotonic in credit risk, suggesting that lenders preferentially deny their
unemployed high-credit-risk applicants but approve their unemployed low-credit-risk
applicants.
The estimates from Figure 3.1 are robust to several alternative specifications. First,
Table A21 in Appendix E provides additional parameter estimates from the same model
8As evidence for this interpretation, the estimates using only application denial shown in Table A23
of Appendix E are only negative for borrowers with very low LTV ratios, although the overall pattern of
attenuation in the effect of unemployment as credit risk descreases is similar to that from Figure 3.1.
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as Figure 3.1 that shed further light on this finding. The full set of parameters largely
conform to expectations, as borrowers are more likely to be credit constrained if they
have low income, a low FICO score, or a high DTI ratio, and borrowers are also less
willing to lend when lending is less profitable due to high guarantee fees or low
mortgage interest spreads over swap rates. When I estimate the model with ordinary
least squares rather than instrumental variables, as shown in Table A22 in Appendix E,
the estimates are largely as before, with the effect of unemployment attenuating sharply
as borrowers become more credit-worthy, and negative for borrowers with FICO scores
above 740. When I estimate the same model using only application denial as an indicator
of credit constraints, shown in Table A23 of Appendix E, I observe the same pattern as in
Figure 3.1, as the effect of unemployment on denial declines nearly monotonically in
creditworthiness. A key difference with these results relative to my baseline specification
is that the effect of unemployment is on average considerably higher and is only
negative for borrowers with LTV ratios below 53%. These findings suggest that
unemployed borrowers may be less willing t reject higher-interest rate offers. However,
as discussed previously, I believe that the best indicator of credit constraints is any
outcome which results in the borrower not obtaining credit, and since this includes
situations in which the borrower is priced out of the market and thus rejects credit offers,
I view my results with respect to a combination of denial and rejection as a baseline.
Moreover the fact that the effect of unemployment on application denial is positive
except for applicants with very low LTV ratios confirms the intuition discussed
previously with respect to lender incentives. Applicants with low LTV ratios have
homes worth substantially more than the balance on their mortgage, and it is for these
borrowers that we should expect lenders to be unconcerned with the applicant’s ability
to repay the loan. In combination, the results from Tables A21 and A23 suggest that there
are certain borrowers, specifically borrowers with strong home-equity positions, for
whom the effect of their employment status on credit constraints is negligible.
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3.2.2 Refinancing Models
The next step in my analysis is to examine how the sensitivity of actual refinancing
rates to unemployment varies across credit risk groups. The results from Section 3.2.1
suggest that among borrowers with abundant home equity, or potentially high credit
scores, ∂ PConst(X,u)∂ u should be negative or close to zero. Among such borrowers, the signs
of ∂ PRefi.∂ u , which I can estimate from the data, and
∂ VR(X,u)
∂ u , which is the object of interest,
should be the same. Building on this insight, I estimate probit models of the probability
of refinance with the following form:
P(Refii,t = 1) = Φ(Riski,tβ1 + Unempi,t × Riski,tβ2 + Xi,tβ3)
where Refii,t is an indicator for refinance, Xi,t are controls such as loan age, and all other
variables are defined as above. I estimate the model using the matched dataset described
in Section 1.5.4. While this dataset contains fewer observations than the full GSE dataset,
all of which are from California rather than nationwide, the key advantage it offers
relative to the full GSE dataset for probit regressions of this type is that I can observe
refinances separately from sales. As such, unlike the results presented in Section 2.4.1, I
directly observe refinance as my outcome rather than prepayment, and hence need no
additional assumptions on the effect of unemployment rates on home sales in order to
identify the parameters of interest. Those parameters are β2, which measure how the
effect of unemployment rates vary with other credit risk characteristics. As in Section
3.2.1, I use place-level variation in unemployment rates and house price appreciation
and instrument for these variables using respectively the Bartik (1991) [25] instruments
and WRLURI [106] instruments discussed in Appendix A.
My estimates of how the effect of unemployment rates on refinancing differs by credit
risk are shown in Figure 3.2. As with Figure 3.1, each bar indicates the mean estimated
effect of unemployment within five equally-spaced credit risk bins, ordered by
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decreasing credit risk, with standard error bars shown as well. I divide the sample into
bins based on FICO scores, home price appreciation since the borrower took out their
initial mortgage, and home equity. As we should expect, the mean effect of
unemployment on refinancing across all borrowers is significantly negative and is
denoted by a horizontal line. Consistent with my stylized model of the refinancing
process and with the results from Figure 3.1, I estimate that the negative effect of
unemployment on refinancing attenuates sharply and nearly monotonically in borrower
credit risk. The effect of unemployment is just under half as large for borrowers in the
top FICO quintile (Q5, above 800) as for borrowers in the bottom quintile (Q1, below
620) and just over half as large for borrowers in the highest house price appreciation
quintile (Q5, greater than 32% growth) as for borrowers in the lowest quintile (Q1,
greater than 13% decline). Moreover, the effect of unemployment on refinancing is only
negative for borrowers in the bottom two quintiles of home equity (Q1 and Q2, below
$120,000), indicating that for borrowers with sufficient home equity ∂ PRefi.∂ u is positive. In
combination with those from Section ??, these results provide some evidence that the
value of refinancing does increase with unemployment.
Other estimates based on the same refinancing probit specification also largely
conform to expectations. Table A24 in Appendix E shows the full set of covariates from
the same model as in Figure 3.2, and the estimates suggest that borrowers behave as we
would expect if they refinanced to maximize their refinancing option value subject to a
credit constraint. Borrowers are more likely to refinance if they are more creditworthy,
measured as either higher FICO scores or lower DTI ratios, or if the refinancing option is
more in the money, measured as either high home equity or large declines in mortgage
interest rates. The results from Table A24 are also largely robust to estimating the model
with ordinary least squares rather than with instruments for unemployment rates, house
price appreciation and home equity, as shown in Table A25 in Appendix E. The results
from estimating the model without instruments largely confirm the baseline estimates, as
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Figure 3.2: Refinance Probit Unemployment Effects by Credit Risk
Notes: Estimated effect of unemployment on probability of refinance by quintiles of credit-risk
factors. Blue/Green/Grey bars measure effect of unemployment within quintiles of FICO/House-
price Appreciation/Equity respectively. Higher quintiles denote lower credit risk (increasing
FICO, HP. App., Equity). Red line shows mean effect across all applicants. Bars indicate stan-
dard error bands.
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I find the same pattern of a negative overall effect of unemployment on refinancing that
strongly attenuates as borrowers become more creditworthy, although I estimate that the
relationship is not significantly negative only for borrowers in the highest home-equity
bin (Bin 5). The general pattern of a negative overall effect of unemployment on
refinancing that attenuates in home price appreciation, equity, or FICO is also more
clearly visible if we use ten rather than five credit risk categories, as shown in Table A26
in Appendix E. Indeed from Table A26 we can see that borrowers with high levels of
either home price appreciation (Bins 8 and 9, between 18% and 32% growth) or home
equity (Bins 5 and above, or greater than $120,000) are more likely to refinance, as would
be the case if lenders effectively discounted the employment status of high-collateral
borrowers who apply for refinancing credit. As with the results from Table A24, I also
estimate that the effect of unemployment on refinancing increases essentially
monotonically with creditworthiness. These results suggest that for borrowers where the
effect of unemployment on credit constraints is negligible, particularly for those with
high home equity, the probability of refinancing actually increases in unemployment.
3.2.3 Interpretation of Results
Combined with the stylized model presented previously, the results from Sections
3.2.1 and 3.2.2 provide suggestive evidence regarding the effect of unemployment rates
on the value of refinancing credit. The sensitivity of actual observed refinances to
unemployment depends on both the value of refinancing and on credit supply, and with
how those objects vary with unemployment. As suggested by certain stylized facts
regarding mortgage underwriting practices, I estimate that the sensitivity of credit
constraints to unemployment, ∂ PConst(X,u)∂ u , is very low for borrowers with low LTV ratios
or, analogously, considerable home equity wealth. Although on average I estimate that
the effect of unemployment on refinancing activity is negative, for borrowers with such
large home equity positions I estimate that the sensitivity of refinancing to
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unemployment, ∂ PRefi.∂ u , is negative. These results are not driven by either unobserved
local-area income growth expectations or by home sales, both of which I can control for.
In the context of my model, these results suggest that ∂ VR(X,u)∂ u > 0, or that the value of
refinancing credit is increasing in unemployment, as would be the case if liquidity
preference was higher for borrowers facing unemployment spells due to
consumption-smoothing motivations. However, my supply-demand framework enables
me to identify only the sign of ∂ VR(X,u)∂ u , as I do not observe any sub-group for whom
credit constraints overall have been removed. Thus in the next section, I analyze the
refinancing behavior of another set of borrowers who, by virtue of government policy,
are even less likely to be affected by unemployment-based credit constraints.
3.3 REFINANCING BEHAVIOR OF UNCONSTRAINED
BORROWERS
In this section I study how refinancing activity depends on unemployment for
HARP-eligible borrowers following the implementation of HARP 2.0. Recall from
Section 1.2.4 that the HARP program essentially allowed all eligible borrowers to
refinance, particularly following the removal of LTV ratio caps in January 2012. In
particular, the program guidelines removed almost all scope for lenders to deny
applicants on the basis of their employment status, breaking the dependence of credit
constraints on employment status. In the context of the model presented in Section 3.2,
this program design implies at a minimum that for HARP-eligible borrowers ∂ PConst(X,u)∂ u
should be close to zero, and a stronger interpretation would be that PConst(X, u) is close
to zero. This cohort provides an ideal laboratory with which to study how
unemployment affects the value of refinancing credit, as for eligible borrowers the
sensitivity of observed refinancing rates to unemployment should reflect only variation
in preferences and not in credit constraints. Building on this insight I analyze the
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sensitivity of refinancing rates to unemployment using a regression on a subset of the
GSE dataset described in Section 1.5.1 consisting only of loans eligible for HARP in the
period following the implementation of HARP 2.0.
A key issue for this analysis is how to measure whether a given loan is eligible for
HARP, as I do not observe this directly. Prior to 2013, the cutoff for determining
eligibility was determined based on the date at which the loan was delivered to FNMA
or FHLMC9. However, I observe only the origination date, not the date at which the loan
was delivered to the GSEs, and hence must make some assumptions about the timeline
for delivery. Stanton et al (2014) [181] suggest that the typical GSE securitization takes no
longer than 45 days, as originators often borrow the cash to originate new loans for that
term and must complete the securitization in order to repay their own funding line. In
the context of the GSE dataset, this timeline translates to a one- to two-month cutoff for
eligibility; however, for three reasons, in my baseline specification I use a cutoff of three
months prior to June 2009 (i.e. pre-March 2009) to measure eligibility10. First, I do not
actually need to measure eligibility, I simply need a valid instrument for credit access.
The chosen three-month cutoff is more conservative than a one-month cutoff in the sense
that I should observe a certain number of false negatives as borrowers who are in fact
eligible will be labeled as ineligible. However, I can be fairly certain that there are very
few false positives: Amromim and Kearns (2014) [17] suggest that 95% of loans that are
ever delivered to the GSEs are delivered within four months of origination, so nearly all
of the loans I label as eligible will in fact be eligible. If instead I used a one-month cutoff
(i.e. pre-June 2009), the instrument would be weaker as my eligibility criteria would be
less predictive of actual credit access due to false positives. Second, Fannie Mae actually
began originating HARP loans in March 2009, although only a very small number of
refinances were completed prior to June. Although the eligibility criteria remained the
9In 2013 this rule was modified to base eligibility on the actual origination date, in part to grant more
borrowers eligibility.
10In certain robustness tests, I show that all of my results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar
using a one-month cutoff.
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Table 3.1: Count of Mortgage Originations by Month
Pre-HARP Post-HARP
Month # Originations Month # Originations
2008-06 136,928 2009-06 296,716
2008-07 105,094 2009-07 207,276
2008-08 114,085 2009-08 174,923
2008-09 119,994 2009-09 168,540
2008-10 113,360 2009-10 167,701
2008-11 135,936 2009-11 165,077
2008-12 214,947 2009-12 151,407
2009-01 329,514 2010-01 120,959
2009-02 362,719 2010-02 110,024
2009-03 342,493 2010-03 137,321
2009-04 358,264 2010-04 132,821
2009-05 358,234 2010-05 139,886
Total 2,691,568 Total 1,972,651
Notes: Number of unique mortgages originated by month in dataset.
same, it is possible that as a result the better predictor of credit access is whether a loan
was delivered to Fannie Mae by March 2009. Finally, as I will show later the clearest
differences in prepayment behavior can be observed between loans originated before
and after March 2009. In this sense, my definition of eligibility is an empirical one,
inferring the presence of eligible borrowers from subsequent refinancing.
Table 3.1 shows the number of unique mortgages contained in the GSE dataset within
one year of the deadline for HARP eligibility; in what follows, I refer to this as the
“HARP dataset”. There is a clear decline in new issuance visible beginning in June 2009.
This corresponds to the start of the HARP program, and the decline is likely caused by
the exclusion of HARP refinances from the data1112. As a result, the dataset contains
11FNMA and FHLMC remove loans that began as HARP refinances from their loan-level data, but loans
that terminated via a HARP refinance are included.
12Alternatively the difference could be caused by borrowers refinancing prior to the eligibility cutoff.
However, because refinances take some time to complete and the program was announced only a few
months in advance, and because refinancing credit was extremely tight during this period, it is highly
unlikely that a great number of borrowers refinanced just prior to the cutoff in order to remain eligible.
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about 36% more originations from the year prior to the implementation of the HARP
program than from the year after. However, using the preferred eligibility cutoff date of
3 months prior to the delivery cutoff of June 2009, or originated before April 2009, the
sample is roughly balanced. The difference in loan counts between the pre- and
post-period within a three-month window around this cutoff date is just 2%, or 4%
within a six-month window13.
To evaluate how refinancing behavior varies with unemployment among
HARP-eligible borrowers, I estimate linear regression specifications of the following
form:
Refii,t = Unempi,tβ1 + Xi,tβ2 + ei,t
where Refii,t is an indicator for refinance, Unempi,t is the area unemployment rate, Xi,t
are other controls that proxy for the value of refinancing such as changes in mortgage
interest rates and home equity. I estimate the model on a sample of all loans from the
HARP dataset originated prior to the April 2009 cutoff during the period from January
2012 to December 2013, when HARP 2.0 was active. As such, I can be relatively certain
that borrowers in this sample can refinance under the HARP program with no
constraints, allowing me to interpret refinancing activity as indicative of borrower
preferences for refinancing credit.
Table 3.2 shows the coefficient estimates from this model. I estimate four separate
models: a baseline model (Model 1) including only a limited set of control variables, a
model with separate coefficients for each unemployment decile (Model 2) in order to
better understand non-linearities in the effect of unemployment, a model using
instruments for unemployment and home equity (Model 3), and a model with these
same instruments and a number of additional control variables (Model 4). Models 3 and
4 use the same Bartik (1991) [25] and WRLURI [106] instruments for unemployment and
13In most specifications I treat a three-month window around the cutoff as the baseline.
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house price appreciation respectively as in Section 3.2, but with unemployment rates
and house price appreciation measured at the MSA- or state-level as in Section 2.4, as I
do not observe finer geographic detail for loans in the HARP dataset14. As in Section 2.4,
I also do not separately observe refinancing and sales, but I treat trends in prepayment
as largely indicative of trends in refinancing. Across all specifications, my results
indicate that refinancing activity increases with unemployment rates. The estimates
from Model 1, which I treat as a baseline, indicate that a 1% increase in unemployment
rates leads to a 4.4% increase in refinance CPR, while the estimates from Model 4, which
I treat as a final robustness check, implying a somewhat lower 3.4% increase in CPR. The
estimates from Model 2 suggest that this relationship is monotonic and in fact convex in
unemployment rates; the difference in prepayment between the sixth decile, with an
average unemployment rate of 8.1%, and the first decile, with an average of 5.4% is 7.2%
CPR, while the difference between the tenth decile, with an average rate of 10.6%, and
the sixth decile is over 30% CPR. In addition, across all specifications the effects of the
other control variables are similar and largely in line with intuition, as I estimate that
borrowers are more likely to refinance if they have high home equity, if mortgage rates
have declined, or if the spread on their initial mortgage over average rates was high.
I perform two additional robustness tests in order to confirm that the positive
measured effect of unemployment on refinancing truly comes from demand rather than
supply effect. First I estimate the same specification but restricting the sample only to
borrowers who were eligible for HARP based on both their mortgage origination date
and current LTV ratio. HARP eligibility was restricted to borrowers with LTV ratios
above 80%, but I proxy for eligibility with an indicator for whether the borrower’s
current LTV ratio is above 75%, as current LTV must be estimated based on imputed
house prices and hence has some amount of noise, so as with the origination-date-based
eligibility criterion I treat this measure solely as an instrument for credit availability15.
14The construction of these instruments is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.
1575% is also almost exactly the sample median, and hence seemed a suitable threshold.
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The estimates from this model, shown in Table A27 in Appendix E, are considerably
larger than those from Table 3.2, and imply that a 1% increase in unemployment rates
leads to a 12.5% to 13.8% increase in refinance CPR. As before, the estimated effect of
unemployment rates on refinancing appears to be monotonic, and the larger estimates
from Table A27 relative to Table 3.2 imply that the HARP-eligible cohort is largely
unconstrained by credit supply. Second I estimate the same models as in table 3.2 but
using only a sample of HARP-elgible borrowers observed post-2013. The concern is that
if borrowers in higher-unemployment-rate areas were more likely to be constrained
prior to the implementation of HARP 2.0, there may be pent-up demand for refinancing
credit and hence we may observe an uptick in refinancing even if demand were
insensitive to unemployment. The results from Table A28 in Appendix E show the
results from this model, and these estimates indicate that pent-up demand does not
drive my baseline results, as the positive effect of unemployment on refinancing rates is
still roughly as large even a year after the implementation of HARP 2.0. On the whole,
my estimates suggest that the value of refinancing credit is increasing in unemployment,
with the strongest effects concentrated in the areas with highest unemployment.
The results from this section and from Section 3.2 provide some support in favor of
the proposition that unemployed borrowers derive greater value from refinancing credit
than do unemployed borrowers. Across all borrowers, I find that the average effect of
unemployment on refinancing is negative, but my estimates suggest that this likely
reflects credit constraints that prevent the unemployed from refinancing. Among two
distinct groups of borrowers, those with high home equity and those eligible for the
HARP program, access to refinancing credit is essentially decoupled from employment
status. My results indicate that among these groups, refinancing activity actually
increases in local unemployment rates, suggesting that the unemployed place higher
value on refinancing credit, potentially due to their consumption-smoothing motives.
These findings will help inform the model I develop in Chapter 4, in which I allow the
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Table 3.2: Refinance Behavior of HARP-Eligible Borrowers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
FICO 9.41E-5*** 9.41E-5*** 9.27E-5*** 9.20E-5***
(2.09E-6) (2.09E-6) (2.20E-6) (2.39E-6)
DTI -2.40E-4*** -2.38E-4*** -2.57E-4*** -2.46E-4***
(1.17E-5) (1.15E-5) (1.29E-5) (1.17E-5)
Initial LTV 2.67E-3*** 2.67E-3*** 2.74E-3*** 3.76E-3***
(2.56E-4) (2.57E-4) (2.63E-4) (3.97E-4)
Int. Rt. Spread 5.54E-3*** 5.71E-3*** 6.54E-3*** 8.00E-3***
(8.27E-4) (8.45E-4) (9.32E-4) (9.65E-4)
Loan Age 4.75E-7*** 4.76E-7*** 4.89E-7*** 4.93E-7***
(4.64E-8) (4.66E-8) (4.80E-8) (4.88E-8)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -6.77E-3*** -6.65E-3*** -6.54E-3*** -
(1.46E-4) (1.47E-4) (1.52E-4) -
Equity 6.11E-4*** 5.88E-4*** 5.10E-4*** 1.49E-3***
(2.06E-5) (2.35E-5) (2.91E-5) (9.08E-5)
Unemp. Rate 3.73E-3*** - 1.55E-3*** 2.91E-3***
(5.62E-4) - (4.03E-4) (4.24E-4)
Dec. 2 Unemp. - 7.37E-4** - -
- (3.48E-4) - -
Dec. 3 Unemp. - 1.95E-3*** - -
- (6.56E-4) - -
Dec. 4 Unemp. - 3.80E-3*** - -
- (8.95E-4) - -
Dec. 5 Unemp. - 6.34E-3*** - -
- (1.12E-3) - -
Dec. 6 Unemp. - 6.20E-3*** - -
- (1.25E-3) - -
Dec. 7 Unemp. - 9.63E-3*** - -
- (1.66E-3) - -
Dec. 8 Unemp. - 1.15E-2*** - -
- (1.99E-3) - -
Dec. 9 Unemp. - 2.08E-2*** - -
- (3.05E-3) - -
Dec. 10 Unemp. - 3.55E-2*** - -
- (5.29E-3) - -
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments? None None Unemp./Equity Unemp./Equity/App.
N 24,063,716 24,063,716 24,063,716 24,063,716
R2 0.1173 0.1175 0.1202 0.1209
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in GSE dataset orig-
inated in 12 months prior to April 2009 observed from January 2012 to December 2013. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include include ini-
tial loan interest rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status,
loan purpose, Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. Models 2 and 4 use instrumented val-
ues for unemployment rates and home equity, and Model 4 also includes controls for combined
LTV, age squared, instrumented home price appreciation, and quartiles of mortgage-rate changes
as indicators and interacted with changes in mortgage rates. ***/**/* indicates significance at
99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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value of refinancing to vary with employment status. However, a key question remains:
who benefits from policies that increase credit supply? It may be the case that while the
unemployed derive greater value from credit access, policies that ease credit constraints
disproportionately benefit employed borrowers while providing little incentive for
lenders to extend credit to the unemployed. In the next section, I address this question
by examining how takeup under the HARP program varies with local unemployment
rates.
3.4 TAKEUP UNDER THE HOME AFFORDABLE REFINANCE
PROGRAM
In this section I analyze how takeup under the HARP program varies with local
unemployment rates16. The goal of this exercise is to understand who benefits from
credit supply policies. While the results from Sections 3.2 and 2.4 suggest that
unemployed borrowers derive greater value from refinancing than their employed
counterparts, they offer no insight into how the benefits of credit supply policies are
distributed. Ex ante it is not unreasonable to suspect that programs such as HARP do
very little to ease credit constraints facing the unemployed, and hence
disproportionately benefit better credit risks. However, if takeup under the program is
greater for borrowers in high-unemployment areas, a reasonable conclusion is that
policies which increase mortgage credit supply disproportionately benefit the
unemployed. If true, this result could be the product of a last-in, first-out style of lending
on the part of mortgage originators in which high-credit-risk borrowers are both the first
to be locked out of the market as lending conditions tighten and the last to re-enter as
16The analysis in this section represents a substantial part of a separate ongoing project with my co-author
Sandesh Dhungana, currently entitled, “Unemployment and the Value of Refinancing Credit: Evidence
from the Home Affordable Refinance Program.” I thank him for his contributions towards this project and
the results from this section.
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credit conditions improve. In the context of the model from Section 3.2, an estimate of
how takeup under the HARP program varies with unemployment rates will be a
product both of how preferences for credit vary with unemployment and how the effect
of the program on credit constraints vary with unemployment. To a first approximation,
if the HARP program essentially removed all credit constraints, then the latter effect
should be based solely on how the tightness of credit constraints varied with
unemployment rates prior to the start of the program. Nevertheless, we can interpret
heterogeneous changes in the marginal propensity to refinance as indicative of
heterogeneous benefits from program implementation, which, in combination with the
results from Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will provide evidence in favor of the policies I analyze
in Chapter 4
I estimate a difference-in-differences specification using the full HARP dataset in
order to measure the extent of takeup under the HARP program. My research design
employs two hard cutoffs that determine credit access, as discussed in Section 1.2.4. The
first is a cutoff for HARP eligibility based on the loan origination date, while the second
the implementation date of HARP 2.0, after which many more borrowers were able to
refinance under the program. The control group is a set of borrowers who, by virtue of
their later origination dates, were ineligible for the HARP program, and I compare how
the sensitivity of refinancing to unemployment differed between eligible and ineligible
borrowers before and after the implementation of HARP 2.0. Although prior studies
such as Agarwal et al (2015) [12] and Zhu (2012) [192] study the effects of both the original
HARP program and HARP 2.0, for several reasons I focus exclusively on HARP 2.0.
First, the original HARP program was widely viewed as unsuccessful: relatively few
borrowers were able to refinance under the program, and lenders were given
substantially more latitude to reject applicants based on credit risk17. Second, unlike
17Conversations with industry participants suggest that lenders never actually “rejected” candidates
based on credit risk under the original HARP program, but by failing to advertise the program and making
the process complicated and difficult they achieved largely the same outcome.
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Agarwal et al (2015), [12] who use as a control group a sample of loans that were
ineligible for HARP by virtue of not being guaranteed by the GSEs, the time-based
eligibility criteria I use is almost entirely co-linear with the implementation of the
original HARP program18. As such, I would essentially have no pre-period for ineligible
borrowers with which to compare refinancing rates following the implementation of the
original HARP program.
The pre- and post-HARP samples are also roughly balanced on most credit risk
characteristics. Table A29 in Appendix G shows the average characteristics of eligible
and ineligible loans originated within a 6-month window19 of the eligibility cutoff with
t-statistics for the differences. Note that in what follows, I use the term “eligible” to
indicate “originated prior to April 2009”. This cutoff date was chosen in part based on
the results from Table A30 in Appendix G, which shows, for each month within a
six-month window of the HARP eligibility cutoff, the probability that a loan originated
in that month has refinanced within a certain length of time. The probability that a given
loan has refinanced within 2, 3, or 4 years clearly declines leading into the HARP cutoff
date, but the nadir is actually reached in May 2009, which is part of the reason I label
loans originated in May as ineligible20. As shown in Table A29, on most credit
characteristics, there are statistically significant but economically negligible differences
between the eligible and ineligible cohorts, with two key exceptions. First, ineligible
borrowers tended to receive lower interest rates than eligible borrowers. This difference
is a function of the eligibility criteria, which is based only on origination vintage:
because mortgage rates declined over the sample period, loans that were originated later
18There are advantages and disadvantages to using a time-based versus channel-based eligibility defini-
tion. On most credit risk metrics, GSE loans are likely more similar to other GSE loans than to non-agency
loans. However, prepayment rates are sensitive to loan age and other cohort effects that I must control for
when comparing different origination vintages.
19Throughout this analysis, I treat loans originated within 3- and 6-month windows of the eligibility
cutoff as the “baseline” sample.
20The other eligibility criteria either apply to all loans in the HARP dataset (e.g. guaranteed by the GSEs)
or are dynamic variables (e.g. not delinquent, over 80% current LTV) and hence not meaningful at the
origination date.
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(and were thus ineligible) tended to receive lower rates. Second, ineligible borrowers are
far more likely to be first-time home buyers or to take out home purchase loans. These
related discrepancies are due to the exclusion of HARP refinances from the GSE dataset.
As a result, new mortgages from borrowers who refinanced under HARP, which would
all be originated after the start of the HARP program and would thus be ineligible, are
absent from the sample of ineligible loans, leading to a lower percentage of refinance
loans and proportionately more purchase loans. Barring this selection issue, all other
differences in credit characteristics are essentially negligible. To the extent that there are
differences the eligible cohort tends to be of marginally worse credit quality, which
would tend to bias estimates of the effect of the HARP program downward without
proper controls. I control both for these observable characteristics and for cohort effects
in all specifications , and do not believe sample selection should be a serious concern.
3.4.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Program Takeup
In this section I employ a differences-in-differences model to estimate takeup under
the HARP program. Table 3.3 shows a non-parametric difference-in-differences estimate
of how takeup under the HARP program varies with local unemployment rates. For
each quartile of unemployment rates, I compare mean CPR for eligible and ineligible
borrowers in the year before and after the introduction of HARP 2.0. Although these
estimates do not control for other important determinants of refinancing, especially loan
age, the main results are all clearly visible. Refinancing rates tend to be highest for
borrowers in the lowest unemployment rate quartile (Q1), while within each quartile
refinancing rates are higher both for eligible borrowers and after the introduction of
HARP 2.0. The difference-in-differences for mean refinancing rates, which I treat as an
estimate of program takeup, increases monotonically in unemployment rates, with CPR
roughly twice as high for borrowers in the top unemployment category (above 10%
unemployment) relative to the bottom category (below 7.5% unemployment).
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Table 3.3: Unconditional Difference-in-Differences
Q1 Unemp. Pre-HARP Post-HARP Difference Diff.-in-Diff.
Ineligible 14.79% 28.28% 13.49% -
Eligible 21.39% 37.22% 15.83% 2.34%
Q2 Unemp. Pre-HARP Post-HARP Difference Diff.-in-Diff.
Ineligible 11.84% 26.96% 15.12% -
Eligible 18.13% 36.32% 18.19% 3.07%
Q3 Unemp. Pre-HARP Post-HARP Difference Diff.-in-Diff.
Ineligible 12.08% 24.84% 12.76% -
Eligible 17.45% 34.35% 16.91% 4.15%
Q4 Unemp. Pre-HARP Post-HARP Difference Diff.-in-Diff.
Ineligible 10.54% 24.79% 14.25% -
Eligible 15.05% 34.01% 18.96% 4.71%
Notes: Average CPR for subsets of mortgage loans in HARP dataset. “Eligible” and “Ineligi-
ble” refer to loans originated in 6-month window before and after April 2009, “Pre-HARP” and
“Post-HARP” refer to monthly observations before and after January 2012. “Difference” denotes
difference in CPR between loans observed during pre- and post-HARP period, “Diff.-in-Diff.” de-
notes difference in differences between eligible and ineligible loans. “Q1 Unemp.” through “Q2
Unemp.” refer to quartiles of the unemployment rate distribution, in order of increasing unem-
ployment rates.
The next step in my analysis is to add additional controls to this baseline
non-parametric estimate. Before turning to how takeup varies with unemployment
rates, I first estimate the effect of the program itself using the following specification:
RefiObsi,t = α + Xi,tδ + β11[t ≥ TImp] + β21[Eligi,t] + β3Unempi,t
+ β41[Eligi,t]× 1[t ≥ TImp] + ei,t
where Refii,t is an indicator for prepayment, Xi,t are controls, TImp is the time of program
implementation, and Unempi,t is the local unemployment rate. In this model, β1
captures any group-invariant intertemporal variation in propensity to refinance and β2
measures cohort-specific differences in refinancing, while β4, the coefficient of interest,
measures the effect of program implementation on refinancing rates for the eligible
cohort.
Before presenting the results from this specification, a discussion of several
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endogeneity concerns with this empirical approach is warranted. First and most
importantly, there may actually be some residual dependence of credit access on
unemployment following the implementation of the HARP program, biasing any
estimates of program efficacy. All evidence suggests that the policies implemented with
HARP 2.0 removed the incentive for lenders to deny applicants on the basis of income or
employment status. However, I control for the possibility that there are certain lenders
who did not participate in or fully comply with the HARP program, leading to reduced
credit access for borrowers whose original mortgage was from these lenders21, by
including lender fixed-effects. Second, as discussed in Section 2.4, there may also be
endogeneity between the refinance decision, house prices, and unemployment rates that
would bias estimates of the latter two on the former. In certain specifications, I
instrument for house prices and unemployment rates using the same WRLURI [106] and
Bartik (1991) [25] and instruments, respectively, as in Section 2.422. A final endogeneity
concern is with the assumptions required for identification of a difference-in-differences
model, in particular that there is no manipulation of the criteria for program eligibility
and that trends for eligible and ineligible borrowers were similar prior to the
implementation of HARP 2.0. While there is somewhat of a decline in loan origination
just after the June 2009 cutoff, as discussed in Section 3.3 it is highly unlikely that
borrowers took out loans in advance of the cutoff in order to remain eligible, and in any
event there are no such declines at the chosen cutoff of three months prior to
implementation. Moreover in my baseline specification I ignore other eligibility criteria
that may be more manipulable, such as delinquency status or current LTV23, under the
assumption that origination date is plausibly exogenous and still a sufficiently strong
instrument for credit access. While I cannot test the parallel trends assumption directly,
21As discussed in Amromin and Kearns (2014), [17] most borrowers refinanced under HARP via their
original lender.
22The construction of these instruments is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.
23In certain robustness tests I also include an eligibility criteria based on current LTV, and the results are
very similar.
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in Section 3.4.2 I present evidence regarding the timing of the effect I measure.
Table 3.4 sets out the regression estimates from the difference-in-differences
specification. I estimate the specification above on three different samples of loans
originated within 3, 6, and 12 months of the eligibility cutoff. In what follows I treat the
estimates using the 3-month window as the baseline specification, since borrowers in the
eligible and ineligible cohorts should be most-similar on dimensions such as loan age,
house price appreciation and changes in mortgage rates that are important determinants
of the refinance decision. Across all specifications, the estimates indicate that the effect of
the eligibility and post-HARP 2.0 implementation interaction term (corresponding to β4)
is positive and highly significant. The baseline estimates suggest that an eligible
mortgage has a 0.76% greater probability of prepaying in any month following the
implementation of HARP 2.0, translating to an economically-significant 8.7% increase in
CPR. By way of comparison, the difference-in-differences estimates from Agarwal et al
(2015) [12] suggest that HARP-eligible borrowers refinanced under the program at a rate
of roughly 6.2% CPR24, so the estimates accord well with theirs25. The estimates from the
3- and 6-month window specifications correspond to increased refinancing speeds due
to HARP takeup of between 26.9% and 31.7% on a base of roughly 27.5% CPR.
Regarding the other control variables, I estimate relatively small effects for program
eligibility (β1) and essentially no effect for HARP 2.0 implementation (β2). The latter
result indicates on that credit did not loosen significantly for all borrowers in 2012 and
beyond, as the HARP 2.0 dummy effectively represents a time fixed-effect on credit
supply in this specification. The former result, and the finding that the effect of the
original HARP program on prepayment was positive, may represent persistent
24The headline figure quoted in their paper is 1.6% per quarter.
25There are two potential sources of discrepancy. First, I estimate the effect of HARP 2.0 alone, while
the results from Agarwal et al (2015) [12] include the effects of both the original HARP program and HARP
2.0 jointly; to the extent that HARP 2.0 was more effective, my estimates should be correspondingly larger.
Second, I use an imperfect instrument for eligibility based on origination date, while their administrative
data allows them to infer HARP eligibility directly. This may lead to some attenuation in the estimates,
although these results indicate that the first effect clearly outweighs the second.
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Table 3.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of HARP Program Effect
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible 0.0012*** 0.0015*** 0.0019***
(4.47E-5) (4.34E-5) (5.42E-5)
Post-HARP 0.0050*** 0.0092*** 0.0111***
(3.65E-5) (3.99E-5) (3.63E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0002* 0.0000 0.0016***
(8.03E-5) (9.74E-5) (1.32E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0076*** 0.0064*** 0.0038***
(5.76E-5) (6.77E-5) (7.93E-5)
FICO 5.31E-5*** 5.41E-5*** 5.34E-5***
(6.75E-7) (6.08E-7) (5.31E-7)
DTI -1.66E-4*** -1.70E-4*** -1.64E-4***
(4.57E-6) (5.52E-6) (6.89E-6)
LTV 1.16E-3*** 1.25E-3*** 1.31E-3***
(6.67E-5) (7.94E-5) (9.87E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 3.41E-3*** 5.57E-3*** 6.82E-3***
(9.77E-5) (1.06E-4) (1.31E-4)
Unemp. -1.16E-4*** -1.19E-4*** -1.38E-4***
(1.18E-5) (1.20E-5) (1.34E-5)
WALA 3.29E-4*** 3.60E-4*** 2.83E-4***
(5.74E-6) (7.81E-6) (7.96E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.23E-2*** -1.04E-2*** -1.07E-2***
(3.57E-5) (4.31E-5) (6.48E-5)
Equity 1.69E-7*** 1.88E-7*** 2.08E-7***
(1.00E-8) (1.13E-8) (1.36E-8)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 83,824,948 121,448,185 177,172,126
R2 0.0623 0.0590 0.0556
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose,
Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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unobserved time- or cohort-level fixed effects, but more likely is a function of the fact
that the difference-in-differences specification uses HARP 2.0 only, hence any estimate of
the effect of eligibility is picking up some effect of the original HARP program. My
estimates for other control variables are very similar to those presented in Sections 2.4
and 3.2, as I find that borrowers are more likely to prepay if they have higher FICO
scores, lower DTI ratios, higher initial interest rate spreads, more home equity, or if
mortgage rates have declined by more since they took out their initial mortgage loan. I
estimate two alternative specifications as a robustness test. First, I estimate the same
specification using a cutoff for eligibility one month prior to implementation rather than
three months prior, or before June 2009 rather than before April. Because not all
mortgages are delivered to the GSEs within a month of origination26, some loans
classified as “eligible" by this criterion will actually be ineligible. Second, I estimate an
analogous specification using instruments for unemployment rates and home price
appreciation. The results of these two specifications, shown respectively in Tables A32
and A33 in Appendix G accord well with the baseline results, as the estimates both of
takeup under the HARP program and of the other control variables are comparable
quantitatively and qualitatively to the results in Table 3.4.
3.4.2 Heterogeneity in Program Takeup
While the results from Table 3.4 indicate that the extent of takeup under the HARP
program is economically significant and of a similar magnitude to prior estimates, the
ultimate question is how takeup under HARP varies with unemployment. To address
this question, I estimate a difference-in-differences model that allows for heterogeneity
in the treatment effect by local unemployment rates. Following Chetty et al (2009), [54] I
26Stanton et al (2014) [181] suggest that the process typically takes 30-45 days.
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estimate the following model with heterogeneous treatment effects:
Re f iObsi,t = α + Xi,tδ + β11[t ≥ TImp] + β21[Eligi,t] + β3Unempi,t
+ β41[t ≥ TImp]× 1[Eligi,t] + β51[t ≥ TImp]×Unempi,t
+ β61[Eligi,t]Unempi,t + β71[t ≥ TImp]× 1[Eligi,t]×Unempi,t + ei,t
where all variables are defined as above. In addition to estimates of the effect of local
unemployment rates on program takeup (β7), which is the main coefficient of interest, I
also allow the effect of unemployment rates to vary based on time (β5) and by cohort
(β6) in order to control for differential trends in the dependence of credit supply on
unemployment for various origination vintages and across time.
Table 3.5 shows the estimates of the difference-in-differences specification with
heterogeneous treatment effects, as with the results from Table 3.4 estimated on samples
originated within 3, 6, and 12 months of June 2009. As shown in the table, the key
coefficient (β7) on the interaction between eligibility, unemployment rate and the HARP
2.0 period is positive and highly statistically significant across all specifications. The
baseline results indicate that a 1% increase in local unemployment rates27 increases
refinancing by .35% CPR. Normalizing by the baseline estimate for program takeup (β4)
suggests that for every 1% increase in local unemployment rates, HARP program takeup
increases by roughly 7%. While the estimates using 6- and 12-month sample windows
are broadly similar, they do suggest less heterogeneity in program takeup by
unemployment rate. Nevertheless, interpreting the results using a longer sample
window as a lower-bound, these results still indicate that program takeup varied by an
economically meaningful 3% with each 1% change in local unemployment rates. To
frame my estimate of the effect of unemployment on takeup quantitatively, the baseline
results suggest that a 1% increase in unemployment rates for HARP-elgible borrowers
27In all results from this section, unemployment is measured on a 0-100 scale so that the regression coef-
ficient can be interpreted directly as a the effect of a 1% change in the unemployment rate.
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneity in Program Effect by Unemployment Rate
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible 0.0011*** -0.0001 -0.0005
(3.49E-4) (3.17E-4) (2.81E-4)
Post-HARP 0.0051*** 0.0092*** 0.0110***
(3.46E-5) (3.75E-5) (3.54E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0025*** -0.0028*** -0.0011***
(3.93E-4) (4.63E-4) (5.73E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0049*** 0.0054*** 0.0032***
(2.73E-4) (3.06E-4) (3.51E-4)
Eligible x Unemp. 9.722E-6 1.708E-4*** 2.588E-4***
(3.47E-5) (3.20E-5) (2.98E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Unemp. 2.745E-4*** 3.317E-4*** 3.074E-4***
(3.80E-5) (4.53E-5) (5.54E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Unemp. 3.521E-4*** 1.636E-4*** 1.202E-4***
(3.03E-5) (3.53E-5) (4.16E-5)
FICO 5.31E-5*** 5.41E-5*** 5.34E-5***
(6.73E-7) (6.05E-7) (5.31E-7)
DTI -1.66E-4*** -1.69E-4*** -1.64E-4***
(4.55E-6) (5.51E-6) (6.89E-6)
LTV 1.16E-3*** 1.25E-3*** 1.31E-3***
(6.67E-5) (7.94E-5) (9.88E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 3.41E-3*** 5.56E-3*** 6.81E-3***
(9.61E-5) (1.06E-4) (1.31E-4)
Unemp. -2.24E-4*** -2.99E-4*** -3.42E-4***
(1.54E-5) (1.74E-5) (1.83E-5)
WALA 3.33E-4*** 3.63E-4*** 2.85E-4***
(5.92E-6) (8.02E-6) (8.29E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.22E-2*** -1.04E-2*** -1.06E-2***
(3.38E-5) (4.57E-5) (5.98E-5)
Equity 1.69E-7*** 1.88E-7*** 2.08E-7***
(1.00E-8) (1.13E-8) (1.36E-8)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 83,824,948 121,448,185 177,172,126
R2 0.0623 0.0590 0.0556
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose,
Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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during the period following HARP 2.0 implementation is roughly equivalent to an
additional $1,600 in home equity or a 2.3 bp decline in mortgage interest rates. More
likely however these results under-estimate the actual effect of employment status on
the marginal propensity to refinance under HARP. As discussed in Section 1.5.4, in this
specification I treat local unemployment rates as a proxy for borrower-level
unemployment, as this is the best available estimate, but the results from Gyourko and
Tracy (2014) [107] suggest that using sub-aggregate rates as a proxy will lead to
downward attenuation bias (towards zero) in the estimated effect of individual
unemployment. As such, while I believe that these results are a strong indication that
unemployed borrowers are more likely to takeup under HARP than similar employed
borrowers, quantitatively these results may provide an under-estimate of the true effect.
All estimates of the other control variables and interaction terms are consistent both
across specifications and also with the results from Table 3.4. The estimates for what I
refer to as “second-order" interaction terms (β5 and β6) suggest that the negative effect of
unemployment was attenuated for borrowers after 2012 (the HARP 2.0 interaction) and
for borrowers from older origination vintages (the eligibility interaction)28. These results,
which may be indicative of generally loosening credit standards post-2012, highlight the
importance of controlling for these second-order interactions in my main specifications.
Nevertheless, the results from Table 3.5 provide reasonable evidence that the marginal
propensity to refinance under HARP did vary positively with local unemployment rates.
The results from Table 3.5 are the primary contribution of this analysis, and so in the
remainder of this section I focus on the robustness of these results to various alternative
specifications. I focus on three different sets of robustness tests. First, I consider the same
standard set of diagnostics employed for the difference-in-differences specification in
Table 3.4 by using a one-month cutoff for eligibility or by instrumenting for house price
appreciation and unemployment rates. Second, I test for non-linearity in the relationship
28Note also that in the baseline specification, the combined effect of all unemployment terms is still neg-
ative.
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between unemployment rates and takeup under the HARP program by analyzing
response to the program within quartiles of unemployment rates. Third, I add an
additional eligibility criteria based on the same LTV-derived measure. Finally I test for
parallel pre-trends in prepayment rates across eligible and ineligible cohorts by
estimating a unique eligibility-unemployment interaction term for each month around
the implementation of HARP 2.0. I plot these difference-in-difference fixed effects
estimates in order to show graphically that differences in takeup by unemployment rate
arose at around the time that HARP 2.0 was implemented and were not a continuation
of long-run trends.
Tables A34 and A35 in Appendix G show the estimates from the first set of robustness
tests. As with the difference-in-differences specification, I verify that the
response-heterogeneity results from Table 3.5 are robust to using a one-month cutoff for
eligibility or instrumenting for house prices and unemployment rates. These estimates
largely confirm the baseline results, with parameter estimates for both the key variable
of interest, the eligibility-post-implementation-unemployment interaction, and the other
control variables that are quantitatively comparable. Indeed the estimates of
heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to refinance under HARP are similar but
somewhat stronger than the baseline estimates from Table 3.5 when I use a less strict
measure of program eligibility in Table A34 or instruments in Table A35, with the results
using a three-month sample window indicating that a 1% increase in unemployment
rates leads to respectively a 13.6% or 7.3% increase in takeup. The second set of
robustness tests checks for non-linearity in the relationship between unemployment
rates and program takeup. I estimate a model similar to the baseline model from Table
3.5 but allowing flexibly for non-linearity by interacting the difference-in-differences
term with indicators for each unemployment rate quartile rather than with a linear rate
term. The results from three separate specifications, a baseline specification and two
alternative specifications using a one-month HARP eligibility cutoff and instruments for
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unemployment rates and house prices, are shown in A36 in Appendix G29. Across all
three specifications, the estimates using the primary three month window sample
indicate that HARP program takeup increases essentially monotonically in local
unemployment rates. In each case, the greatest difference is between the lowest
unemployment-rate quartile30 and the other moderate-to-high unemployment-rate
quartiles. Nonetheless, with the exception of the specification using instruments shown
in Panel C, where program takeup is highest among borrowers in the penultimate
quartile of the unemployment rate distribution, I do find that program takeup increases
with each quartile. The baseline estimates shown in Panel A indicate that takeup for
borrowers in the highest quartile (Q4, above 10% unemployment) are 40-50% more likely
to refinance under HARP than borrowers in the lowest quartile (omitted group, below
6.5% unemployment). Appliying the baseline estimates from Table 3.5 of a 7% increase
in takeup for each 1% increase in unemployment rates to the difference in means for
these two quartiles (6% for Q1 and 11% for Q4) gives a back-of-the-envelope estimate of
a 35% difference in program takeup. This estimate is relatively similar to observed
difference, with the remaining 5-15% discrepancy likely due to the concavity of the
relationship between marginal propensities to refinance and unemployment rates.
Intuitively, because in the quartile-based specification I estimate a non-linear, concave
relationship between unemployment rates and program takeup, drawing a hypothetical
best-fit line through the four quartile point estimates would tend to over-estimate
takeup for the lowest quartile and under-estimate both takeup for the highest quartile
and the effect of unemployment rates overall. Nevertheless I feel that the baseline
estimates using quartiles as well as the two alternative specifications provide reasonable
support for that conclusion that the marginal propensity to refinance under HARP is
increasing in unemployment rates.
29For brevity I display only the estimated program effect; estimates for the control variables are very
comparable to those from the baseline model in Table 3.5.
30Q1, the omitted group, has an implied estimate of zero
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For the third set of robustness tests I re-estimate the baseline difference-in-differences
specification with heterogeneous response rates using a definition of eligibility based on
a combination of current LTV and origination date. Specifically, I re-estimate the results
from Tables 3.5, A34, and A35 but interacting the origination-date-based eligibility
indicator with an indicator for current LTV ratios above 75%. As mentioned previously,
in addition to origination date, one of the criteria for HARP eligibility is that the
borrower’s current LTV ratio be above 80%, and I proxy for this criterion with a 75%
LTV cutoff. Table 3.6 shows the results of the models with LTV-based eligibility controls
corresponding to the estimates shown in Table 3.5. As can be seen in the table, I continue
to estimate that HARP takeup rates increase with unemployment, and the baseline
sample estimates suggests that a 1% increase in local unemployment rates increases
refinancing by .4% CPR, nearly the same as the estimates from Table 3.5. However, with
high-LTV eligibility controls I find that the effect of eligibility itself (β2) is much stronger
compared to comparable results with the baseline eligibility definition, while the effect
of the difference-in-differences interaction term between HARP 2.0 implementation and
the eligibility (β4) is insignificant with the baseline sample window and slightly negative
for longer sample windows. Taken literally, this result would imply that the HARP
program had a negative or zero impact on refinancing activity. This counterintuitive
result likely stems from the effect of the original HARP program; prior to the
implementation of HARP 2.0, high current LTV ratios31 could disqualify a borrower
from the HARP program. When I control for a difference-in-differences interaction
between implementation of the original HARP program and LTV-based eligibility in
Table A37 in Appendix G, I estimate that the effect of the interaction is negative for the
original HARP program and positive for HARP 2.0. This result suggests that high-LTV
borrowers gained increased access to credit through the HARP 2.0 program but, on
balance, not from the original HARP program, which tended to exclude those with the
31Above 105% from program inception, increased to above 125% post-December 2009.
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worst equity positions. Absent this discrepancy regarding the effect of the LTV-based
eligibility criterion, the other estimates accord well with my prior results from Table 3.5.
I also estimate the model with LTV-based eligibility controls from Table 3.6 using either a
one-month cutoff for program eligibility or instruments for house prices and
unemployment rates. The results from these specifications, shown in Tables A38 and
A39 of Appendix G, largely confirm the analogous specifications shown in A34 and A35
of Appendix G, although again with the same discrepancy regarding the estimated
HARP 2.0 difference-in-differences term (β4). Nevertheless I interpret these results as
largely confirming the main result from Table 3.5 that takeup under HARP 2.0 increases
in unemployment rates.
As a final robustness test, I verify that the effect of unemployment on refinancing
activity for the HARP-eligible cohort increased only following the introduction of HARP
2.0. This test roughly corresponds with a test of the parallel trends assumption implicit
in my difference-in-differences with heterogeneous treatment effects design. In order to
identify the effect of unemployment on program eligibility, I rely on the assumption that
the effect of unemployment on refinancing for the eligible cohort was constant prior to
the implementation of HARP 2.0. To test this assumption, I estimate the following
event-study variation on the main specification:
Re f iObsi,t = α + Xi,tδ + β11[t ≥ TImp] + β21[Eligi,t] + β3Unempi,t
+ β41[t ≥ TImp]× 1[Eligi,t] + β51[t ≥ TImp]×Unempi,t
+ β61[Eligi,t]Unempi,t + Σ
τ=TImp+S
τ=TImp−S β7,τ1[t = τ]× 1[Eligi,t]×Unempi,t + ei,t
where the coefficients β7,−S to β7,S are fixed-effects estimates of the effect of the
unemployment-eligibility interaction in a window of length 2S around the
implementation date TImp. Figure 3.3 plots these estimated coefficients for a model
corresponding to the baseline specification shown in Table 3.5. My estimates suggest
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneity in Program Effect by Unemployment with LTV Controls
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible x High LTV 0.0059*** 0.0063*** 0.0061***
(7.88E-5) (1.00E-4) (1.32E-4)
Post-HARP 0.0059*** 0.0100*** 0.0117***
(4.63E-5) (4.92E-5) (4.48E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0013***
(2.44E-4) (3.28E-4) (4.45E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x High LTV 0.0005 -0.0010* -0.0046***
(4.86E-4) (5.13E-4) (5.84E-4)
Eligible x High LTV x Unemp. -7.216E-4*** -7.911E-4*** -7.404E-4***
(1.79E-5) (2.13E-5) (2.45E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Unemp. 3.538E-4*** 2.667E-4*** 1.397E-4***
(2.34E-5) (3.29E-5) (4.44E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x High LTV x Unemp. 3.391E-4*** 4.349E-4*** 6.503E-4***
(5.05E-5) (5.31E-5) (6.05E-5)
FICO 5.34E-5*** 5.46E-5*** 5.44E-5***
(6.51E-7) (5.93E-7) (5.28E-7)
DTI -1.64E-4*** -1.67E-4*** -1.61E-4***
(4.50E-6) (5.44E-6) (6.82E-6)
LTV 1.22E-3*** 1.32E-3*** 1.37E-3***
(6.86E-5) (8.20E-5) (1.02E-4)
Int. Rt. Spread 3.36E-3*** 5.18E-3*** 6.45E-3***
(8.92E-5) (9.89E-5) (1.32E-4)
Unemp. 1.01E-5 6.31E-5*** 5.25E-5***
(1.18E-5) (1.16E-5) (1.16E-5)
WALA 3.41E-4*** 3.73E-4*** 2.96E-4***
(6.04E-6) (8.11E-6) (8.35E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.23E-2*** -1.06E-2*** -1.09E-2***
(3.69E-5) (4.32E-5) (6.31E-5)
Equity 1.69E-7*** 1.89E-7*** 2.08E-7***
(1.01E-8) (1.14E-8) (1.37E-8)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 83,824,948 121,448,185 177,172,126
R2 0.0625 0.0591 0.0556
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose,
Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Estimated Eligible-Unemployment Interaction by Month
Notes: Estimated fixed-effects for eligibility-unemployment interaction. Dependent variable is in-
dicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Additional controls include HARP el-
igibility and post-HARP 2.0 implementation indicators, interactions between eligibility and HARP
2.0 and post-HARP 2.0 and unemployment rates, FICO, DTI, LTV, unemployment rate, WALA,
change in mortgage rates, equity, loan interest rate and interest rate spread, and indicators for
first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose, Fannie Mae loans, and
origination channel. Estimation sample is set of 83,824,948 monthly observations from loans orig-
inated within 3 months of April 2009.
that the effect of unemployment on refinancing activity is roughly constant prior to the
introduction of HARP 2.0, with little evidence of pre-existing trends. Although there is a
jump in prepayment between four and two months prior to the implementation of
HARP 2.0, corresponding to September through November of 2011, this is likely the
result of a sharp drop in mortgage interest rates by nearly 60 bp between July 2011 and
December 2011, and in any event the refinancing wave that resulted appears to burn out
prior to the introduction of HARP 2.0. On implementation, the estimated interaction
effect rises by roughly 1% CPR, where it remains in subsequent months, leading me to
estimate a positive overall impact for the eligibility-post-implementation-unemployment
term. I interpret these patterns as suggestive evidence in favor of the parallel trends
assumption, as they seem to confirm that differences in takeup by unemployment rates
only emerged following the introduction of HARP 2.0.
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The results from this section provide some evidence that the HARP program
disproportionately benefited unemployed borrowers. In this section I first measured the
effects of HARP 2.0 itself by estimating the differential increase in refinancing for eligible
borrowers following program implementation. This estimate, which I treat as a measure
of program takeup, suggested that HARP 2.0 increased prepayment rates by between 34
and 39% relative to baseline speeds. Next, by interacting this difference-in-differences
term with local unemployment rates, I showed that takeup rates increased with area
unemployment rates, with a 1% increase in unemployment rates translating to a 7%
increase in takeup relative to the baseline. Through a variety of robustness tests, I
showed that these results were monotonic across the unemployment rate distribution,
although with the largest differences between areas with elevated unemployment rates
and areas with full employment, were not sensitive to changes to the specification, and
were driven entirely by the advent of HARP 2.0 and not be pre-existing trends. I
interpret these results as evidence that the HARP program allowed unemployed
borrowers who were previously unable to refinance due to credit constraints to obtain
credit. The greater marginal propensity to refinance under HARP for borrowers who are
likely to be unemployed suggests that the program disproportionately benefited such
borrowers. Importantly however, I cannot say whether these differences in takeup are
due to unemployed borrowers deriving greater value from refinancing, as suggested by
the results from Sections 3.2 and 3.3, or due to the HARP program loosening credit
constraints by more for unemployed borrowers. In Chapter 4, I address this question
directly via a structural model. Nevertheless, the results from this section do
complement those from Sections 3.2 and 3.3 by suggesting that policies aimed at easing
credit supply provide disproportionate benefits to the unemployed.
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3.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter provides new evidence on how the benefits of credit supply policies vary
with employment status. The results from Section 3.2 suggest that the credit constraints
facing borrowers with high levels of home equity wealth are relatively insensitive to
unemployment rates, and that among such borrowers, the probability of refinancing is
increasing in unemployment rates. These findings suggest that demand for refinancing
credit is greater for unemployed borrowers, but that for all except the most creditworthy
borrowers the supply effect of reduced access to credit overwhelms the demand effect.
In this sense my findings are in line with prior researce [190] documenting that borrowing
constraints interfere with consumption-smoothing behavior operating through the
refinancing channel. [51] The results from Section 3.3 confirm this intuition, as borrowers
who are eligible for HARP refinances and hence essentially unconstrained are more
likely to refinance when unemployment rates are high. I estimate that a 1% increase in
local unemployment rates leads to a 3.4% to 4.4% increase in refinance CPR and find that
the effect of unemployment on the vaue of refinancing is monotonic across the
unemployment rate distribution. Finally in Section 3.4 I show that takeup under the
HARP program was greatest in high-unemployment areas, indicating that the benefits of
policies that ease credit constraints accrue disproportionately to the unemployed. My
estimate indicate that a 1% increase in local unemployment rates leads to a 3% to 7%
increase in HARP program takeup, with takeup once again monotonically increasing in
unemployment.
While these results are useful for policy analysis in particular, several key limitations
inherent in my research design make it difficult to extrapolate these results to widely
divergent settings. First, the empirical design employed in Section 3.2 can identify, at
best, the sign of the relationship between unemployment and refinancing rates, and not
the quantitative magnitude. While the results from Section 3.3 are somewhat more
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applicable externally, even under the most charitable assumptions that credit constraints
are totally negligible for HARP-eligible borrowers the model measures only the
sensitivity of refinancing to unemployment rates and cannot be used to analyze welfare.
Moreover these results look only at a small set of eligible borrowers during a relatively
unique period just after the implementation of HARP 2.0, and as such these results may
not be generalizable. Second, the estimates from Section 3.4 provide no indication on
why takeup is higher among the unemployed. While the results from Sections 3.2 and
3.3 suggest that part of the estimated effect is due to greater demand for refinancing
credit among unemployed borrowers, as much if not more of the effect could just as well
come from the fact that the HARP program reduced credit constraints more for
unemployed borrower than it did for employed borrowers. In Chapter 4 I attempt to
address these concerns by estimating the sensitivity of borrower valuations for
refinancing credit directly via a structural model in order to make quantitative claims
regarding borrower welfare. I then use the estimated model, which explicitly models
credit constraints, to simulate the effects of a HARP-type policy by holding borrower
valuations fixed and varying credit supply conditions.
The results in this chapter nonetheless contribute to the existing literature in two key
ways. First, to my knowledge this chapter provides the first evidence on how takeup
rates under the HARP program varied with borrower characteristics. My estimates can
shed light on policy questions regarding ways to improve the efficicacy of HARP and
other similar programs, as well as our understanding of the benefits and distributional
effects of credit supply programs. Second, the estimates in this chapter inform the
existing macroeconomic literature on models of idiosyncratic labor income risk by
providing evidence that unemployment spells do in fact increase the value of
refinancing credit. While several prior studies have shown similar suggestive evidence
using other types of consumer credit, I employ two novel empirical techniques that
allows me to analyze the effect of unemployment on demand for mortgage credit, the
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largest and perhaps most macroeconomically-important consumer credit market, absent
the confounding effects of credit constraints. These estimates also inform the design of
the model I present in Chapter 4, which both allows preferences for refinancing credit to
vary with employment status in a microfounded way and allows observed refinances to
be a product both of borrower demand and access to refinancing credit.
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Chapter 4




In this chapter I analyze the effects of an alternative pricing policy for the GSEs
guarantee fees. As discussed in Section 1.2.3 and shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, over the
most recent business cycle the GSEs have pursued a highly procyclical policy with
respect to their guarantee fees, with low fees charged during credit market booms and
high fees charged during periods of tight credit. These periods also correspond,
respectively, to periods of low and high unemployment, and to the extent that guarantee
fees pass through to credit constraints, GSE policy resulted in looser credit constraints
during periods of full employment and tighter constraints during periods of widespread
unemployment. My analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that this is not an optimal
policy, as I find that guarantee fees do pass through to credit constraints in a reasonable
and predictable fashion and that the deleterious effects of these constraints fall
disproportionately on the unemployed. Even setting aside considerations of fairness and
borrower welfare, the substantial literature surveyed in Section 1.3.3 suggests that FRM
refinancing frictions of just the sort that the GSEs have exacerbated are a meaningful
contributor in prolonging recessions and inhibiting monetary transmission to
consumption. As an alternative to the realized GSE guarantee fee policy, in this chapter I
simulate a policy of high guarantee fees during periods of labor and credit market
booms and low fees during recessions and nascent recoveries.
Chapters 2 and 3 of my dissertation provide some indication both of why such a
pricing policy could be reasonably expected to be successful and what is required to
analyze the effects of such a policy. The results from Chapter 2 indicate that originators
pass a substantial fraction of changes in guarantee fees on to mortgage interest rates,
with credit conditions tightening as a result. Moreover Chapter 3 suggests that credit
supply policies disproportionately benefit the unemployed, in part due to the fact that
demand for refinancing credit is strongest among the unemployed. In combination,
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these results suggest that high guarantee fees will be most costly and low guarantee fees
most beneficial during periods of elevated unemployment. However, for two reasons
one cannot simply apply the estimates from Chapters 2 and 3 in order to simulate the
effects of a countercyclical guarantee fee policy. First, the results from Chapter 2 are
based on observations drawn from a period in which the GSEs were the dominant
funding channel for mortgage origination. We might expect that at times in which
private-label securitization and other funding channels are more attractive credit
conditions will be less sensitive to GSE policy, as intuitively any small change in
guarantee fees will have no effect on credit conditions if originators never securitize via
the GSEs. Second, the results from Chapter 3, even in the best-case scenario, provide
evidence solely on the relationship between unemployment and demand for refinancing
credit and do not allow for quantitative welfare calculations. While one might suspect
that the results in Chapter 3 suggest a consumption-smoothing model of borrower
behavior in which the marginal value of liquidity is higher during unemployment
spells, [123] but borrowers are constrained in their consumption choices [13, 190] and
refinance to ease those constraints, [51] such a model is a prerequisite to any welfare
calcuation and reduced-form evidence alone is not sufficient.
This chapter designs and estimates a model of the agency mortgage market capable of
addressing these concerns and making quantitative statements about the effects of GSE
policy on borrower welfare. Simulating such policies requires estimates of borrower
valuations for relaxed credit constraints, and in particular how these valuations depend
on employment status, as well as regime-invariant estimates of the effect of guarantee
fees on credit constraints. The model I develop in this chapter includes both of these
features. I estimate a structural model of dynamic borrower behavior in the face of
endogenous credit constraints. Borrower preferences for cash-on-hand, and hence for
refinancing, depend on individual-specific employment status, but borrowers are
constrained in their ability to refinance by the willingness of lenders to extend credit.
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Lenders can choose to fund loans via either GSE securitization or alternative channels,
and as a result their decisions to approve applicants and the interest rates they offer in
equilibrium will depend non-linearly on guarantee fees. I estimate the model’s
parameters using extensive data on borrower and lender decisions and use the
estimated model to simulate the effects of a countercylical guarantee fee policy, which I
then compare to the outcomes both from the observed policy and from other proposed
GSE policies.
My results suggest that relative to the status quo, borrowers would benefit on average
from a countercyclical guarantee fee policy. My structural estimates imply that borrower
preferences for cash-on-hand are between 130% and 220% greater for unemployed
borrowers, and that as a result an alternative countercyclical policy raising 6.3% greater
revenue for the GSEs over the full business cycle with only a 3.9% increase in costs
would nonetheless increase net borrower welfare by 2.3% over the same time period.
The benefits to borrowers derive from two key sources: first, a 4.1% reduction in
home-equity borrowing during the boom period prior to 2009, leading to a 1.1% decline
in cumulative default post-2009, and second, a 5% increase in refinancing volume and
19% increase in mortgage equity withdrawal during and immediately after the start of
the recession. I find that the effects of this simulated policy change on refinancing
activity and borrower welfare following the start of the recession are comparable in
magnitude to the effects of a simulated HARP program, while the reduction in
home-equity withdrawal prior to the recession is nearly what could be achieved through
stricter down-payment requirements and with significantly greater reductions in default.
These results suggest that such a dynamic GSE pricing policy addresses multiple policy
concerns by restraining borrowing during boom times [137] and providing credit access
during recessions, [138] benefiting borrowers by both by reducing their tendency to
over-leverage and allowing them to refinance as a consumption-smoothing tool.
This chapter contributes to the existing economic literature in three important ways.
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First, I extend the literature on dynamic choice and household refinancing behavior1 to
incorporate endogenous credit constraints, discrete and continuous choices, and
persistent time-variant liquidity preference. While I would describe neither my model
nor my empirical strategy as a methodological contribution2, the combination of
techniques employed is novel and may prove useful in other settings. Second, this
chapter adds to the policy literature on U.S. housing finance reform by proposing a
novel GSE pricing policy. Despite the recognized importance of guarantee fees to the
current policy debate [57] and the extensive range of housing finance policy proposals,
some of which do recommend a countercylical policy stance, [110, 180] this paper is the
first to suggest a guarantee fee policy that varies with the business cycle. Finally, I build
on the results from Chapter 3 by directly estimating how borrower preferences for
cash-on-hand co-move with employment status. These estimates contribute directly to
the literature on household liquidity preference underlying many computable general
equilibrium models3, as to my knowledge no prior paper has estimated the sensitivity of
household liquidity preference to income structurally using micro-level data.
My analysis in this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2 I enrich the model from
Section 1.4 in order to better capture key stylized facts regarding the agency mortgage
refinancing market, some of which are motivated directly by either the results from
Chapters 2 and 3 of from the previous research surveyed in Section 1.3.1. Section 4.3
outlines my empirical approach to estimating the parameters of the model described in
Section 4.2 directly from the micro-data described in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2. Crucially,
my estimation strategy does not impose the assumptions from Section 1.4 that are
necessary to ensure the validity of those analytical results, although I find that both of
key results do in fact hold for the parameter values that I estimate. Finally, in Section 4.4
1For examples of papers in this tradition, see Bajari et al (2013), [22] Laufer [145] or Chen et al (2013). [53]
2Laufer [145] and Chen et al (2013) [53] incorporate continuous choice variables, while Connault (2014) [58]
surveys the substantial existing literature on dynamic latent variables. My empirical methodology draws
from a number of sources, which will be discussed in Section 4.3.
3Examples include Krusell and Smith (1998), [141] Gourinchas and Parker (2002), [99] and Lustig and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2005). [152]
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I present the results of several simulation exercises that project the effects of alternative
guarantee fee policies out-of-sample. I compare the effects of these policies to several
potential alternatives, including a streamlined refinance program similar to HARP and a
restriction on maximum LTV ratios. Section 4.5 concludes with a discussion of the
relevance of the results of these simulations for GSE policy.
4.2 A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF AGENCY REFINANCING
Building on the insights developed in Chapter 2 and 3, in this section I describe the
full model that I take to the data. In particular, I enrich the simple model presented in
Section 1.4 with additional structure that will enable me to make quantitative
comparisons of the welfare effects of alternative guarantee fee policies. Recall from
Section 1.4 that the goal of my estimation procedure is to recover estimates of VC, the
value of continuation, VR, the value of refinancing, and lender profits π. In order to do
so, I make three additions to the model. First, on the borrower side I posit that VC is
actually the result of another decision of whether to continue and make a mortgage
payment or default. Second, I also develop π in a similar fashion by allowing the lender
to choose between securitizing and holding the mortgage. Third, I relate the borrower’s
value function to their flow payoffs using a Bellman equation.
In each period t, households i choose actions (ai,t, ci,t) to maximize their value Vi,t.
Discrete action ai,t ∈ {0, 1, 2} corresponds to their choice of whether to default, continue,
or refinance, respectively, and if the household chooses to refinance, they must also
choose an LTV ratio ci,t ∈ [0, c̄] for their application, where c̄ is an exogenous upper
bound that I assume is dictated by GSE policy4. The action-specific value of the
borrower’s realized action is given by:
V(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t) = u(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t) + δEXi,t+1,Zi,t+1 [V(Xi,t+1, Zi,t+1)|ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t]
4I discuss how I chose a value for c̄ based on published GSE documentation in Section 4.3.
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where Zi,t is a binary variable denoting the borrower’s employment status, Xi,t is a
collection of all other state variables, both aggregate (e.g. interest rates) and
borrower-specific (e.g. home equity), u is a flow payoff which depends on the chosen
action, and δ is the per-period discount factor. Building on the insights from Sections 3.2
and 3.3, I allow flow payoffs to vary systematically with employment status, and in
particular for the marginal value of cash to differ by employment status. If the
household chooses to continue or refinance, their state variables (Xi,t, Zi,t) update
accordingly and they continue into the next period. If instead the household defaults, I
assume that the game ends, as the evidence from Hedberg and Krainer (2012) [112]
suggests that following a default borrowers are not able to re-enter the market for a
considerable length of time5.
Unlike in standard dynamic optimization models, in this case the unconditional value
function, V(Xi,t, Zi,t), is not the maximum over action-specific values V(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t)
due to the presence of credit constraints. In cases where the borrower is inhibited by
credit constraints, the borrower’s realized action will differ from her optimal choice.
These credit constraints are endogenously determined via a stage game played between
borrowers and lenders in each month t. This stage game takes the form of a static game
of complete information. The extensive form of the stage game is shown in Figure 4.1,
and as noted above it enriches the model from Section 1.4 with an additional choice on
the part of lenders of whether to hold or securitize an originated loan and an additional
choice on the part of borrowers of whether to continue or default. Note that I assume, as
suggested by the evidence from Woodward and Hall (2012), [188] that borrowers can
submit at most one refinancing application each month, so in each period this game is
played exactly once per borrower.
The static game of complete information shown in Figure 4.1 is played as follows. At
the start of the game, the borrower commits to a mixed-strategy offer rejection policy
5While they may be able to borrow again in the distant future, the expected discounted present value of
this option can be reasonably approximated as zero.
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Figure 4.1: Extensive Form of Structural Model
Notes: Timing of actions in stage game of structural model. Red nodes denote borrower deci-
sions, blue nodes denote lender decisions. Information sets indicate nodes econometrician cannot
distinguish between.
PREJ , which is a function of the state variables, the offered interest rate ri,j,t, and the LTV
ci,t. The lender plays a pure strategy response in both their decision to approve or deny
the loan and their optimal interest rate choice. After the lender chooses an optimal
interest rate offer, a cost shock realizes and the initial offer is revised6. Lenders face
uncertainty generated by the borrower’s probabilistic rejection policy7, while borrowers
face uncertainty regarding both the final (revised) interest rate offer and the lender’s
approval decision, which is based on the realization of a profitability shock that
borrowers cannot observe ex-ante. Decisions are made sequentially in the order they
appear in Figure 4.1, and different sets of preference shocks realize at each decision node.
I solve the game via backwards induction. Starting from the bottom-right node,
lender j chooses the disposition of the loan (di,j,t) in order to maximize static profit
πd(ci,t, ri,j,t, Xi,t, Zi,t, Sj,t) + µdi,j,t, where Sj,t are credit-supply variables such as prevailing
interest rates, guarantee fees, and market competitiveness and µdi,j,t is a choice-specific
profitability shock. Under the assumption that µdi,j,t is Standard Gumbel distributed and
6Note that revisions to initial interest rate offers are common empirically.
7Offer rejection is quite common in the data, hence it is important to model this choice. However, with-
out an ex-ante unobservable shock to interest rates, there would be no role for this choice, as borrowers
would never reject offers in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game with no uncertainty.
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IID across agents and time, the expected ex-ante profitability of an originated loan is:
EPD(ci,t, ri,j,t, Xi,t, Zi,t, Sj,t) = log(eπ
0(ci,t,ri,j,t,Xi,t,Zi,t,Sj,t) + eπ
1(ci,t,ri,j,t,Xi,t,Zi,t,Sj,t)) + γ
where γ is Euler’s constant and Sj,t are credit-supply variables such as prevailing
interest rates and guarantee fees. The probability that the loan is securitized is then:






This final choice on the part of lenders allows the effect of guarantee fees to vary
systematically with market conditions in the model. At times when securitization is
relatively more attractive the effect of changes in guarantee fees on expected profit will
be larger, and vice-versa.
I assume that lenders receive refinance applications passively8, face fixed costs τL for
making funding offers, and anticipate correctly that the borrower will accept the offer
with probability PREJ , which depends on borrower characteristics, the terms of the loan
(including the interest rate and LTV), and credit market conditions9. At the time they
make their approval decision, lenders receive a separate choice-specific profitability
shock νi,j,t, assumed IID Standard Logistic, and choose both whether to fund the loan
( fi,j,t) and the interest rate to offer (ri,j,t). After making their approval decision, they then
receive a separate shock ei,j,t to their offered interest rate, which can be thought of as a
revision to their initial “good-faith estimate”. Under the assumption that ei,j,t is






EPD(ci,t, r + e, Xi,t, Zi,t, Sj,t)PREJ(ci,t, r + e, Xi,t, Zi,t, Sj,t)dΦ(e)− τL + νi,j,t]
Denote the integral term by EPF(ci,t, ri,j,t, Xi,t, Zi,t, Sj,t) and the optimal interest-rate offer
8In other words, that they do not advertise, either directly or via their prices.
9Note that this equilibrium borrower strategy is common knowledge.
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by r∗i,j,t. Borrowers cannot observe νi,j,t and thus expect ex-ante that the probability the
loan is funded is:







Borrowers receive a choice-specific utility shock εai,t based on their discrete actions.
This shock is assumed to be IID Standard Gumbel as well, and I further assume that two





i,t) realizes in the head node, and borrowers decide simultaneously whether or
not to submit an application, continue, or default. Later, if the borrower’s application is
denied or she rejects a credit offer, a new set of IID shocks (ε0i,t,′, ε
1
i,t,′) realizes for the
subsequent default-continue choice. Under this assumption, the ex-ante expected value
of the default-continue choice is then:
EVNR(Xi,t, Zi,t) = log(eV(0,0,Xi,t,Zi,t) + eV(1,0,Xi,t,Zi,t)) + γ
After choosing to submit a refinancing application, the borrower receives a
multiplicative IID shock ηi,t to the value of refinancing. Hence the borrower chooses LTV
ratio ci,t to solve:
max
c∈[0,c̄]
PFUND(c, Xi,t, Zi,t, Si,j,t)
∫ ∞
e=−∞
[V(2, c, Xi,t, Zi,t)(1− PREJ(c, r∗i,j,t + e, Xi,t, Zi,t, Si,j,t))ηi,t
+ PREJ(c, r∗i,j,t + e, Xi,t, Zi,t, Si,j,t)EVNR(Xi,t, Zi,t)]dΦ(e)
+ (1− PFUND(c, Xi,t, Zi,t, Si,j,t))EVNR(Xi,t, Zi,t)
Denote the optimal LTV choice c∗(ηi,t) and the function to be maximized
EVR(ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t, Si,j,t). Then under the assumption that ηi,t is distributed Standard
Normal, and assuming that borrowers must pay fixed costs τB to submit a refinancing
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application, the probability that the borrower submits a refinance application is:








h),Xi,t,Zi,t,Si,j,t)dΦ(h)−τB + eV(0,0,Xi,t,Zi,t) + eV(1,0,Xi,t,Zi,t)
We can then write the likelihood of any particular observation using these choice
probabilities, as shown in Appendix H.
At this stage it may be useful for the purposes of expositing the model to describe
how certain model elements are required in order to explain the variation obsered in the
data. First, borrowers are assumed to reject high-interest-rate offers, and lenders are
assumed to face fixed costs in making loan offers, in order to generate meaningful
constraints on lender pricing. Without either the risk that a loan offer is rejected or fixed
costs, lenders would always prefer to offer some credit contract at very high prices.
Hence these two elements help explain the empirical fact that loan applications are
frequently denied and funding offers are frequently rejected. Second, the timing of the
shock to the borrower’s interest rate e and shock to liquidity preference η are set both so
that borrowers face uncertainty in their decision to apply for credit and so that the
model is able to fit the observed choices of r and c using these shocks. Without these
assumptions regarding timing, borrowers would never choose to apply for loan offers
and either be denied or reject the offer as they would be able to predict ex ante the denial
or rejection and choose not to apply instead. Endowing the model with this particular
structure enables me to generate model-implied probabilities for each action and
likelihoods for each continuous choice variable that I can match to the data. In the next
section, I describe both how to do so and how to estimate the model directly using
observed discrete and continuous choices.
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4.3 EMPIRICAL PROCEDURE
I estimate the model sequentially in three distinct stages corresponding to, in order,
credit supply, borrower value functions, and borrower utility. This estimation procedure
is designed to address four key econometric problems that complicate estimation. First,
as shown in Figure 4.1, I do not observe refinancing applications, only completed
refinances, and thus cannot distinguish between the three potential paths taken to reach
the default-continue node. As a result, in many cases I must integrate over the
distribution of potential refinancing applications the borrower may have submitted.
Second, I observe interest rates only for completed refinancing transactions and not for
offers, and hence must treat this as a latent variable. Third, I also do not observe
individual employment status, only local-level signals such as the unemployment rate
and average length of unemployment, and thus must treat this variable as a latent as
well. Fourth and most importantly, as described in Section 1.5 I observe cross-sectional
data on refinancing applications (“supply”) and panel data on borrower choice
(“demand”) in two separate datasets, and hence as in Ho (2009) [115] must estimate the
model in stages10. In what follows, I describe the three stages of estimation.
4.3.1 Stage 1 Estimation
In order to estimate the first-stage of the model I begin by relating credit supply
parametrically to the data. I parametrize π1, the profit from securitizing a loan, as a
function of the price of the mortgage and parameters φ1, and π0, the profit from holding
a loan, as a function of applicant credit risk characteristics, interest rate spreads, and
parameters φ0. The price of an originated mortgage is itself estimated via a regression of
MBS prices on pool characteristics and secondary market conditions, the parameters of
10While it is theoretically possible to estimate the model jointly, the computational demands of the model
make this approach technically infeasible.
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which are shown in Table A40 of Appendix I, and this provides one mechanism for how
guarantee fees affect lender profits and credit supply. This model is estimated on a
sample consisting of all FNMA and FHLMC 30-year fixed-rate mortgage MBS with a
pool size of at least $1 million issued between February 2004 and March 2013, as
described in Section 1.5.3. I also parametrize the borrower’s offer rejection function PREJ
as a logistic function of the loan characteristics, interest rate offer, market-level fixed
effects and parameters β. The market-level variables are intended to measure local
market competitiveness; if borrowers are less willing to reject high interest rate offers in
more concentrated markets, the model will capture this tendency, potentially providing
a mechanism for the monopolistically-competitive lender behavior discussed in as in
Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013) [178] and estimated in Section 2.3. Finally, I parametrize
the lender’s interest-rate offer r∗ as a function of borrower credit risk characteristics,
market interest rates, and parameters α. The set of first-stage parameters to be estimated
is thus (φ0, φ1, τL, β, α).
The setup for the first-stage credit supply function is determined in part by the
econometric issues described above. First, due to the separation between “demand” and
“supply” data and sequential nature of the estimation procedure, I cannot tie the
probability of offer rejection PREJ to the value of refinancing. Instead, I must estimate
PREJ directly from the data and assume both that the observed offer rejection policy is an
equilibrium response and that for the purposes of conducting counterfactual simulations
the observed policy is, conditional on observables, invariant to guarantee fee regimes11.
In this sense PREJ is a lender belief that ends up being true in expectation, as borrowers
do in fact reject offers frequently. While this is in some way a simplification of the model
from Section 1.4, in that PREJ is a reduced-form proxy for borrower expectations about
11 While this may seem like a strong assumption, the probability of rejection is related only to credit
supply and not to fees themselves, fees are allowed to affect credit supply in a nonlinear fashion that varies
across fee regimes, and I observe intertemporal variation in guarantee fees. Hence it is not unreasonable to
suppose that my estimates capture borrower offer rejection behavior in a policy-invariant manner.
164
the future and for local-market competitiveness12, it would be computationally
infeasible to estimate this policy any other way. Second, I estimate a linear model of
interest rates as a function of credit risk characteristics so that estimates of the elasticity
of interest rates with respect to LTV can be easily imported to Stage 2 for the purposes of
solving the borrower’s LTV choice problem13.
Likewise the first-stage estimation procedure for credit supply is also designed to
overcome the challenge of missing data on interest rate offers. Without such data, I must
construct interest rate offer r∗ as the solution to the lender’s profit maximization
problem, and in estimating α on a set of originated mortgages must correct for sample
selection due to the exclusion of denied applicants and rejected offers. To do so, I first
estimate (φ0, φ1, τL, β) via maximum likelihood. The maximum-likelihood routine fits
the likelihood of four outcomes (application denied, offer rejected, loan originated and
securitized, or loan originated and held) as a function of the probabilities PSEC, PREJ and
PFUND written above. I estimate this discrete-outcome model using the full HMDA
dataset described in 1.5.2, which consists of a sample of 17,109,796 applications for
conforming refinance mortgages submitted by borrowers from California between 2000
and 2012. Within the likelihood maximization routine, at each guess of the structural
parameters I iterate on the interest-rate first order condition to recover r∗, and I
approximate the integral over structural error e using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
Following Jiménez et al (2012, 2014), [125, 126] I then use the estimated parameters to
construct a selection-correction term and regress the interest rates on originated
mortgages on borrower credit characteristics and funding rates to recover α. The dataset
used to estimate this Heckman [111]-type model is a version of the full GSE header file
described in Section 1.5.1, but restricted to the 3,611,896 refinance originations from
California between 2000 and 2012. The full details of this procedure are contained in
12Both of which are proxied via covariates included in PREJ .
13In order to conduct policy-invariant counterfactuals, this linear interest rate model is used solely for
estimation and not for simulations.
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Appendix H.
4.3.2 Stage 2 Estimation
In the second stage, I jointly estimate borrower’s action-specific value functions and
the dynamics of latent state variable Zi,t, which captures employment status, using a
modified form of the filtered maximum likelihood expectations-maximization (EM)
routine discussed in Diebold et al (1999). [66] Following Barwick and Pathak (2011) [26]
and Bazdresch et al (2014), [29] I posit that the value function V(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t) is a
flexible polynomial function of the borrower’s action and state. This approach is taken in
order to avoid discretizing the continuous state space, and I estimate the value function
separately from flow payoffs in order to avoid solving the Bellman equation in a
high-dimensional state space. As in Diebold et al (1999) [66] I further posit that latent
employment status Zi,t transitions according to a Markov process with time-variant
transition densities that are themselves a function of local-area unemployment rates and
mean unemployment duration. In what follows, I describe in order the method for
estimating the value function and how this estimation procedure fits into the larger EM
routine.
My approach to estimating the value function is a modification of the technique of
mapping the value function to the observed choice probabilities from Hotz and Miller
(1993), [117] adapted in my case to account for credit constraints and a continuous state
space. Because the state space is continuous, I cannot estimate choice probabilities fully
non-parametrically as in Hotz and Miller (1993), [117] and even if I was able to do so the
correspondence they demonstrate between the value function and choice probabilities is
invalid in cases, such as mine, where borrowers sometimes makes sub-optimal choices
due to credit constraints. As an alternative I parametrize value V as a polynomial
function14 of the state with parameters θa,z that vary depending on the observed choice
14Specifically, a cubic spline with 10 gridpoints in each of house prices, unpaid balance, income, and
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and latent state15. This specification allows the mapping from the state to the value
function to vary flexibly depending on employment status, and importantly, I make no
prior restrictions on how this mapping varies by employment status. As a consequence,
how the marginal value of cash-on-hand varies with employment status, a crucial object
of interest for the counterfactuals, is not imposed but rather inferred directly from the
data. With this setup and given the first-stage estimates (φ̂0, φ̂1, τ̂L, β̂, α̂), I can construct
the likelihood of each of the three observable outcomes (default, continue and refinance)
as a function of the probabilities PAPP, PFUND, PREJ , and the value functions. As in the
first stage, in cases where refinancing (and hence desired LTV) is not observed, I
construct latent LTV preference by iterating on the borrower’s first-order condition, with
any integration over latent LTV choice or interest rate offers approximated via
Gauss-Hermite quadrature. I assume a maximum LTV ratio c̄ of 100% and constrain the
borrower’s latent LTV choice to lie below this value. GSE documentation from my
sample period suggests that except in certain special circumstances the maximum
allowable LTV ratio for conforming loans was 95%, although I observe loans with LTV
ratios up to 105% in my sample and thus set the maximum limit slightly higher16. In
cases where refinancing is observed, I fit the observed continuous LTV choice by adding
an additional term based on the likelihood of the continuous preference shock ηi,t
required to rationalize the borrower’s choice. The full likelihood function and details on
its construction are discussed in Appendix H.
monthly payment, plus interactions between indicators for certain borrower types (e.g. income quartile)
and macroeconomic variables (e.g. interest rates) and proxies for the consumption value of the home.
15As in Hotz and Miller (1993) [117] I normalize the value of one of the options, in this case default, to zero.
16Specifically, at certain times during my sample period GSE rules allowed first-time homebuyers to take
out loans with LTV ratios above 95%, HARP borrowers could receive loans with potentially unlimited LTV
ratios, and more recently the maximum limit has been extended to 97% for most mortgages. The maximum
LTV ratio for first-time homebuyers is not relevant for my purposes, and my sample should not contain
HARP refinances or recent originations, hence none of these situations explains the presence of 105% LTV
mortgages in my sample and the applicable limit is likely 95% for first mortgages. However GSE standards
also set slightly higher maximum LTV ratios for borrowers with secondary financing, enabling them to
qualify even with combined LTV ratios as high as 100% during my sample period. Since my model does
not feature secondary financing, it seems appropriate to model borrower choices as if they took out a single
conforming loan with the limit set at the 100% limit for combined LTV. Please refer to Chapter 23.4 of
Freddie Mac’s Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide for additional details.
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The action- and latent-state-specific likelihood described above is used as an input to
a larger estimation routine that allows me to predict the borrower’s latent state and the
transition dynamics of that state. As noted in Section 1.5.4, Gyourko and Tracy (2014) [107]
note that estimates of the effect of unemployment on refinancing will be strongly biased
towards zero if market-level average (unemployment rates) are used as a proxy. To
correct for this bias, I posit that Zi,t transitions dynamically according to a function Π of
observed unemployment rates, mean unemployment durations, and parameters ρz.
Using these two variables allow me to distinguish between situations in which
unemployment is elevated due to strong persistence of the unemployment state and
situations in which unemployment is elevated due to high flows into unemployment.
Under this assumption, it is possible to write the full likelihood as a function of the
latent state probability P̂(Zi,t), the action- and latent-state-specific likelihood, the joint
state probability P̂(Zi,t, Zi,t−1), and the latent transition density Π(Zi,t|Zi,t−1, Xi,t, ρ).
Following Diebold et al (1999), [66] I estimate the full set of parameters, (θ, τB, ρ), via
filtered MLE using an EM algorithm. In the E(xpectations) step, I filter out the latent
state probability and joint state probability using a forward-backward recursion and the
estimates from the prior M step. In the subsequent M(aximization) step, I compute the
full likelihood and gradient and update the model parameters, and the EM procedure
iterates to convergence. The model is fit to the matched dataset described in Section
1.5.4, which consists of 6,911,395 monthly loan-level panel records for 200,000 FRM
borrowers from California from 2000 to 2012, and my estimation procedure relies
heavily on two key advantages this dataset affords relative to the basic GSE dataset.
First, that I can observe the borrower’s choice of LTV when refinancing, and hence target
the likelihood of this choice, and second, that I can observe unemployment rates at much
finer levels of geographic detail. Additional details are provided in Appendix H.
At this point a discussion of how the second-stage model is identified is warranted. In
a Hotz-Miller-type [117] setup, the value function is identified solely from empirical
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choice probabilities, and thus the parameters θ and τB are as well given the functional
form restrictions I place on V as a function of parameters. One key difference relative to
their model is that the choice to continue is a mixture over cases in which continuation is
optimal and cases in which refinance optimal but the borrower is credit-constrained, and
likewise for default. As such, the patterns in the data that allow me to identify in
particular the covariance between employment status and the value of refinancing are
those shown in Section 3.2: specifically, that borrowers in high-unemployment areas are
no more likely to be credit constrained if they are good credit risks, and that for such
borrowers refinancing is increasing in area unemployment rates. Two other key
differences relative to the Hotz-Miller [117] framework are that my model features a
continuous LTV choice and persistent unobservable employment status. While it is
beyond the scope of this paper to offer a formal proof that the model is identified, I rely
on the identification results demonstrated for single-agent discrete-continuous dynamic
choice models in Blevins (2010) [40] and for dynamic choices with unobserved state
variables in Connault (2014), [58] both of which should apply in my setting, as proof that
neither of these two additions to the Hotz-Miller [117] setup, respectively, hinder
identification. Note also that unlike as in Chapters 2 and 3 I do not instrument for either
house price growth or unemployment rates, as the model allows directly for exactly the
sort of latent heterogeneity in the value of the refinancing that these instruments are
designed to address.
A final important identification concern in estimating models with latent state
variables is the label-switching problem, or the invariance of the likelihood to a
permutation of the labels. To give a concrete example, if refinancing is rarely observed
relative to continuation then a priori it is equally likely that borrowers in state Zi,t = 0
always refinance but the probability that Zi,t = 0 is very small and that borrowers in
state Zi,t = 0 never refinance but the probability that Zi,t = 0 is very large. As discussed
in Stephens (2000), [182] addressing this concern requires some sort of prior information
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to break the tie vis a vis the likelihood between these two scenarios. Continuing the
example above, I can either introduce a prior on whether Zi,t = 0 corresponds to always
or never refinancing or on whether Zi,t = 0 is rare or common. Most models target the
former with what are called artificial identifiability constraints, or inequality constraints
on certain parameter values. I instead target the latter, the latent state probability, for
three reasons. First, as noted in Stephens (2000), [182] artificial identifiability constraints
don’t always work. Second, since a key question is whether the marginal value of
cash-on-hand is higher for unemployed borrowers, I would prefer not to impose this
result via constraints on the parameters. Third, I have reliable data on market-level
aggregate probabilities (unemployment rates) that provide a much more suitable prior.
Thus, following Chung et al (2004), [55] I introduce prior information on the latent state
probability by constraining the place-level unemployment rate implied by P̂(Zi,t = 1) to
be within a standard deviation of the observed place-level unemployment rate17. The
full details of how this prior information is incorporated are discussed in Appendix H.
4.3.3 Stage 3 Estimation
In the third and final stage of estimation, I use the parameters estimated from the first
two stages to recover non-parametrically the borrower’s flow payoffs and use these
payoffs to estimate a linear-in-parameters model of utility. Given the assumed error
structure, the ex-ante expected value of being in state (Xi,t, Zi,t) is given by:






17Chung et al (2004) [55] literally assign one of the observations to the zero state, which is sensible for
inferring as they do from a univariate time series. My probabilistic procedure can be considered as a panel-
data analog.
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Hence I can re-write the Bellman equation as:
u(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t) = V(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t)− δEXi,t+1,Zi,t+1 [Eεi,t+1 [V(Xi,t+1, Zi,t+1)]]
Borrowers expect Zi,t to transition according to Π(Zi,t|Zi,t−1, Xi,t, ρ̂), and I assume that
borrowers have autoregressive expectations regarding the aggregate state. Specifically, I
estimate place-level vector autoregression (VAR) models for ten aggregate state
variables18 to use as borrower expectations, where the state Xi,t transitions according to
a transformation of the past idiosyncratic state and the aggregate state. Using these
assumed expectations, I construct the value function using the estimated parameters
(θ̂, τ̂B), take simulated draws from the estimated VAR to construct a distribution of
expected future states, and calculate utility û(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t) for each choice
combination19. In order to invert the Bellman equation I must assume a value for the
discount factor β, as the results from Bajari et al (2013) [22] show that the discount factor
is not identified unless one observes the full borrower history until the loan is paid off,
and most loans in my sample are still active at the time the sample ends in 2013. To
recover an estimate of borrower utility I assume a discount rate of .995, or just over 6%
per year20. Finally I regress û(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t) on a transformation of ci,t and Xi,t in order
to estimate marginal utilities and how they vary by employment status. These
parametric utility models are also estimated on the matched dataset described in Section
1.5.4, and at this stage I leverage the third advantage this more detailed dataset confers
relative to the unmatched GSE dataset by including characteristics of the home not
contained in the GSE dataset, such as size and number of bedrooms, in the hedonic
utility model. The full details of this estimation procedure are described in Appendix H.
18House prices, unemployment rates, mean unemployment duration, and seven yield-curve variables.
19I calculate the utility of the refinancing option at the LTV choice corresponding to the mean value of η
for each observed borrower-month, even if the borrower did not refinance.




This subsection overviews the parameters estimated according to the empirical
procedure described in Section 4.3. The first-stage estimates of the parameters governing
lender profits and the borrower’s offer rejection probability are shown in Tables A40,
A41, A42, and A43 of Appendix I. Table A40 displays the estimates of the sensitivity of
MBS prices to certain MBS characteristics. These estimates, obtained via a hedonic
regression on a large sample of MBS, are used as an input in estimating the other
first-stage parameters. The estimated fit of the model is quite good, with an R2 above
90%, and we can be reasonably confident that the model predicts MBS prices
well-enough for our estimation purposes. Table A41 shows the estimated lender profit
parameters. The first group of parameters, φ0, measures the sensitivity of the profit from
holding a loan to various loan characteristics, while φ1 does the same for the profit from
securitizing a loan, and τL is a fixed cost of underwriting. These estimated parameters
largely accord with economic intuition. Holding mortgage loans is more profitable when
the LTV ratio or unemployment rate is lower and the borrower is an owner-occupant
with high income, presumably because the loan is at lower risk of default. Profits follow
an inverted-U shape with respect to FICO; at very low credit scores, the high default
probability reduces profitability, while at very high credit scores the increased
prepayment risk also modestly reduces profitability21. Moreover, lenders prefer to hold
mortgages with high spreads over average mortgage rates, and prefer to securitize when
the price commanded by a mortgage is high22. Finally, lenders face substantial fixed
costs of origination, including both monetary and other economic costs, equivalent to
the value of holding a mortgage with a 2% higher interest rate.
Table A42 sets out the estimated parameters governing the borrower’s probability of
21Note that the omitted category is the top category, loans with a FICO score between 740 and 850, so all
parameter estimates should be compared to a value of zero for the top category.
22Note that because π0 and π1 measure economic profits and are expressed in terms of utils, the coeffi-
cient on price is not 1, as it would be if these profits were measured in dollar terms. It is thus difficult to
compare the parameter estimates from φ0 and φ1.
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rejecting an interest-rate offer. The estimates indicate that borrowers are more willing to
accept an offer if they have high income, apply for a higher-LTV loan, have a low FICO
score, are in a high-unemployment area, or receive a low-rate or low-spread offer. The
coefficients on FICO score and unemployment suggest that less creditworthy borrowers
are more desperate, or have lower bargaining power due to their inability to obtain
alternative offers, while the coefficients on LTV and interest rates simply state that
borrowers prefer offers for large loans at low prices. I interpret the coefficient on income
as suggestive of reduced price-elasticity for higher-income borrowers. Table A43 shows
the estimated interest-rate offer model used in the second stage of estimation. The
estimates indicate that lenders make higher interest-rate offers to borrowers applying for
higher LTV loans, borrowers with lower incomes of lower FICO scores, and
non-owner-occupants living in high-unemployment areas. All of these estimates are
consistent with lenders charging higher interest rates to borrowers with greater risk of
default, or alternatively with prepayment risk being only a second-order driver of
pricing. In addition to the signs of the coefficient estimates conforming with intuition,
the sign on the selection correction term23 is negative, suggesting that the selected
sample of borrowers who accepted interest-rate offers and were securitized received
lower interest rates. This estimate makes sense from both the borrower side, in that Table
A42 suggests borrowers tend to accept offers with lower interest rate spreads, and from
the lender side, in that Table A41 suggests lenders prefer to hold loans with higher
interest rate spreads.
The estimated fit of the first-stage model to the data, as shown in Tables A43 and A45
of Appendix I, is quite accurate. The R2 in Table A43 suggests that the model explains
roughly 84% of the variation in interest rate spreads. While this may seem low, variation
in spreads over a benchmark rate24 are much more difficult to predict than the interest
rate itself, as one can achieve fairly high accuracy on the second measure by simply
23The coefficient on which is normalized to 1.
24In this case, the 10-year swap rate.
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predicting that everyone receives the average mortgage rate. Table A45 shows that the
model predicts shares for the four outcome probabilities corresponding very closely to
the observed shares. Panel A of Table A45 indicates that the predicted and observed
shares are effectively identical in the full sample, and within any borrower subtype only
differ substantively for the share of securitized loans made to high-DTI-ratio borrowers.
Similarly Panel B indicates that the predicted and observed shares are fairly close in
most years, although the model over-predicts the likelihood of securitizing a loan
relative to holding a loan in 2000 and 2004-2007 and under-predicts in 2012. The 2004 to
2007 period corresponds to a boom in private-label mortgage securitization, largely
driven by subprime lending but also involving substantial numbers of conforming
loans. Because the profit from holding a loan in portfolio is not modeled separately from
the profit from private-label securitization, the credit supply model will tend to
under-predict shares from the holding option whenever profits from private-label
securitization are high. This likely explains why the model over-predicts the share of
loans securitized by the GSEs in these years, although given that the private-label
market effectively disintegrated in 2008, I do not believe that this unmodeled feature of
the market compromises the simulations I will present in Section 4.4, in which much of
the action takes place post-2008. Panel C of Table A45 shows similar metrics by FICO
score, and these results indicate that the model predicts outcomes quite accurately for
higher-FICO borrowers but not very accurately for borrowers with FICO scores below
700. This may be because my data contains relatively few low-FICO borrowers25, hence
the model is essentially calibrated to predict outcomes for higher-FICO borrowers.
Overall, however, the first-stage estimates largely conform to expectations and explain
the variation in the data quite well.
The second-stage estimates of the parameters governing borrower’s value functions
and the probability of transitioning between employment and unemployment are shown
25Table A4 in Appendix C shows that the average FICO score in the data is above 700 in every year, and
is well-above 700 in the last half of the sample.
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in Tables A44 and A46 of Appendix I. Table A44 shows the estimated
employment-to-unemployment transition parameters, with the probability of
transitioning from employed to unemployed increasing in ρ0 and the probability of
transitioning from unemployed to employed increasing in ρ1. As we should expect, the
estimates suggest that for each income quartile, the probability of remaining
unemployed or transitioning to unemployment increases significantly in the local
unemployment rate and mean unemployment duration, although this effect is
attenuated when either the unemployment rate or mean unemployment duration is
either very high or rising rapidly. In lieu of the actual parameters on the borrower’s
value function, of which there are 3,701 and which cannot be presented in any
intelligible format, I present instead the fit of the model to the data in Table A46, as the
goal of the second-stage estimates is largely to predict borrower actions accurately
throughout the state space. In the sample overall the predicted and observed choice
probabilities are very similar, although the model somewhat under-predicts the
probability of default, likely because so few defaults are actually observed in the data.
The model predicts the probability of refinance accurately within each FICO score
category, although it tends to under-predict refinance probabilities in the earlier half of
the sample and over-predict them in the later half of the sample. Combined with similar
systematic differences in the likelihood of securitization across years shown in Panel B of
Table A45, these findings suggest that the model’s treatment of the lenders choice
between securitization and portfolio retention and the effects on this choice on borrower
credit constraints is missing a key factor that varies systematically between the earlier
and latter half of the sample. An obvious canditate for such a factor would be the
presence of private-label securitization, which is unmodeled26 and which provided an
important source of credit prior to 2008 but vanished almost entirely thereafter.
Nevertheless, the in-sample fit of the model is accurate enough to use the model in order
26Or more accurately, it is lumped into the held-on-portfolio, along with several other sale-based options.
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to derive third-stage estimates of borrower preferences.
The third-stage estimates of the parameters governing borrower per-period utility are
shown in Table 4.1. The parameters correspond to the marginal action-specific utility
with respect to the variable in question, while Z = 0 and Z = 1 correspond respectively
to the employed and unemployed states. The signs of the estimates indicate that
borrowers dislike making high mortgage payments but enjoy receiving cash via
home-equity conversion, that borrowers enjoy living in larger houses, and that
borrowers generally enjoy making their payments as opposed to defaulting27 when they
have middle-range FICO scores28. Moreover the magnitudes of the coefficients vary
between the employed and unemployed state in a predictable fashion: for each action,
the unemployed have a higher marginal value of cash but care less about the other
benefits of not defaulting such as continuing to live in a large house or improving one’s
credit score. These estimates, consistent with the evidence from Sections 3.2 and 3.3,
suggest that the unemployed derive greater benefit from refinancing for
consumption-smoothing purposes, as the marginal value of cash is relatively greater for
the unemployed, but are more single-minded in that their utility is less sensitive to
non-pecuniary aspects of servicing their mortgage. In principle the difference in the
marginal value of cash across employment statuses could be measured in three different
ways, corresponding the first three parameter estimates, each of which is measured in
dollars. These estimates do not always agree with one another; while the measured
marginal value of cash is roughly equivalent across states for the value of mortgage
payments, the estimate marginal utility of extracted cash is between 4 and 6 times greater
than the marginal utility of mortgage payments. This finding in and of itself is not
unusual, as many strucural demand models find that preferences for cash streams from
different sources are different. Bajari et al (2013) [22] for example find that the marginal
27The utility of the default action is normalized to zero, so all marginal utilities should be judged relative
to defaulting.
28Except for borrowers in the unemployment state who are refinancing.
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utilities from income, monthly payments and prepayment penalties are quite different
despite all being measured in dollars, and indeed that higher prepayment penalties
increase the utility of prepaying. However, using the marginal utility of the mortgage
payment as a baseline figure, I estimate that unemployed borrowers derive between
130% and 220% more utility from each dollar than do employed borrowers, which is
quite a sensible range. While these figures may seem large, in the case where borrowers
have log utility they imply that unemployment spells reduce household income by
between 56% and 69%, which seems a reasonable range for middle-class homeowners.
Note also that this finding implies that the assumption from Section 1.4 regarding the
relationship between unemployment and liquidity preference is true at the estimated
parameter values. Importantly, this result is not imposed on the data by assumption, but
rather estimated using the label-switching constraints described in Section ?? based on
the patterns in the data described in Section 3.2. Finally, the estimated fit of the models,
especially for flow payoffs from refinancing, is quite good, and the models explain
roughly 72% of the variation in flow payoffs from continuation and 98% of the variation
in flow payoffs from refinancing. Due to the procedure used to generate the utilities
included as the dependent variable in these models, the dependent variable includes
both the mean utility value and the Standard Gumbel econometric error typically
included in such models. As such, 1 minus the R2 places an upper-bound on the fraction
of the variation explained by these Standard Gumbel preference shocks, implying that
most of the variation is explained by the observed data and structural parameters.
The evidence presented in this subsection shows that the estimated structural model
is consistent with a world in which unemployed borrowers derive greater benefits from
refinancing for consumption-smoothing purposes than do employed borrowers, but also
face greater credit constraints. In this sense the model is also consistent with the evidence
presented in Section 3.2, as we should expect given that both models are identified from
the same variation in the data. In the next section, I use the model estimated in this
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Table 4.1: Estimated Borrower Utility Model
Continue (Z = 0) Continue (Z = 1) Refinance (Z = 0) Refinance (Z = 1)
Current Payment ($K) -4.3229*** -13.8238*** - -
(0.2347) (0.6884) - -
Refinance Payment ($K) - - -4.2127*** -9.6370***
- - (0.0842) (0.1302)
Cash Extracted ($ M) - - 0.0260*** 0.0415***
- - (0.0025) (0.0042)
FICO 660-700 8.1005*** 2.1246*** 5.4469*** -0.4528***
(0.1401) (0.0354) (0.1263) (0.0109)
FICO 700-740 2.6735*** 0.4032*** 1.8826*** -0.2793***
(0.1169) (0.0303) (0.1065) (0.0077)
Sq. Feet 17.6413*** 13.9842*** 4.4750*** 1.7728***
(0.6053) (0.2557) (0.4834) (0.0391)
County FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,711,854 6,711,854 6,711,854 6,711,854
R2 0.7282 0.7178 0.9822 0.9744
Notes: Dependent variable is estimated action-specific utility, sample is all loans in matched
dataset. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls include interactions between indica-
tors for origination year and county with purchase price, and indicators for whether the property
is a condominium, has a pool, or has a carport. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-
level respectively.
section to simulate several policies aimed at either increasing or decreasing the supply of
credit and analyze how this model predicts such policies will affect borrowers.
4.4 COUNTERFACTUAL POLICY SIMULATIONS
In this section I describe how I use the estimated model from Section 4.3 to simulate
four different scenarios. The first is a “baseline” simulation to which the other three are
compared. In the second scenario, I set an alternative countercyclical guarantee fee
policy, raising the average fee to 45 bp between October 2003 and December 2008 and
lowering it to 5 bp thereafter.29 A graph of the average charged guarantee fee in the
baseline and alternative simulations is shown in Figure A8 in Appendix J. For the
purposes of comparing the results of the alternative guarantee fee policy to other
potential refinancing-specific policies, I simulate two other scenarios corresponding to
29These dates were chosen because October 2003 ending a long stretch of loosening credit conditions as
reported by the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Survey, making it a reasonable candidate for a time
to try to tighten credit; and January 2009 marked the nadir of the recession, as well as roughly matching the
implementation of the first HARP program, which began in March.
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policies that were either proposed or implemented. In one, I simulate a HARP-type
policy by allowing borrowers to refinance without constraints after June 2009. In the
second, I simulate the effects of a tighter loan-to-value ratio cap by requiring that
borrowers take out loans worth no more than 80% of their home price.
4.4.1 Simulation Results
In order to simulate the model, I step through the observed months in which
borrowers make choices, simulating their choices and tracking key variables. I update
the borrower’s state (e.g. their equity position) depending on their past simulated
actions, so that past decisions affect future decisions and benefits. In this sense, the
simulation procedure makes two key assumptions. First, as a partial equilibrium model,
it assumes that the paths of the exogenous state variables, such as house prices and
interest rates, do not change across the various scenarios. Moreover lender conduct is
held fixed, so while interest rates and funding offers adjust to the change in guarantee
fees, the underlying lender policy functions are unchanged. Second, it assumes that
borrowers do not anticipate the policy change and alter their behavior ex-ante. This
assumption precludes, for example, a borrower levering up in anticipation of easier
credit conditions starting in January 2009. I track a series of key variables used to judge
the efficacy of the three policy interventions, including the rates of refinancing and
default, the volume of refinancing and home-equity withdrawal, the expected utility and
value of borrower’s choices, and the GSE’s market share, expected outlays, and
revenues. The full details of the simulation procedure are explained in Appendix J.
The results of the simulated policies are shown in Table 4.2. Comparing the first and
last columns, we see that the alternative guarantee fee policy had its intended effect.
During the period of elevated fees, from October 2003 to December 2008, both
refinancing volume and cash-out were lower than in the baseline, by 3% for the former
and 4.1% for the latter. During the period of low fees, from January 2009 to December
179
Table 4.2: Simulation Results
Refi. Vol. ($B) Baseline HARP 80% Cap Alternative G-Fee
10/03-12/08 2,923.73 2,923.73 2,902.49 2,835.30
1/09-12/12 4,092.86 4,349.02 3,996.07 4,298.24
Total 7,016.60 7,272.75 6,898.56 7,133.54
Cash Extracted ($B) Baseline HARP 80% Cap Alternative G-Fee
10/03-12/08 1,289.92 1,289.92 1,230.91 1,236.72
1/09-12/12 188.16 206.36 165.96 223.84
Total 1,478.08 1,496.28 1,396.87 1,460.56
Cum. Default Prob.(%) Baseline HARP 80% Cap Alternative G-Fee
10/03-12/08 1.20% 1.20% 1.21% 1.23%
1/09-12/12 8.70% 8.48% 8.85% 8.61%
Total 9.90% 9.68% 10.06% 9.84%
GSE Rev. ($B) Baseline HARP 80% Cap Alternative G-Fee
10/03-12/08 39,755.86 39,755.86 38,631.45 81,774.20
1/09-12/12 46,300.61 78,518.64 43,229.28 9,704.14
Total 86,056.47 118,274.50 81,860.73 91,478.34
GSE Cost ($B) Baseline HARP 80% Cap Alternative G-Fee
10/03-12/08 58,454.90 58,454.90 54,966.93 57,235.84
1/09-12/12 164,819.34 284,902.81 152,624.59 174,653.86
Total 223,274.24 343,357.71 207,591.52 231,889.69
GSE Shr. (%) Baseline HARP 80% Cap Alternative G-Fee
10/03-12/08 34.05% 34.05% 33.85% 33.18%
1/09-12/12 57.70% 83.51% 56.66% 59.19%
Average 45.87% 58.78% 45.25% 46.18%
Cum. Default Balance ($B) Baseline HARP 80% Cap Alternative G-Fee
10/03-12/08 53.40 53.40 52.92 55.63
1/09-12/12 412.43 396.61 411.08 405.85
Total 465.83 450.00 464.00 461.49
Expected Value Baseline HARP 80% Cap Alternative G-Fee
10/03-12/08 88.17 88.17 87.89 86.33
1/09-12/12 78.26 82.99 78.07 83.86
Total 166.42 171.15 165.97 170.19
Notes: Results of simulation exercises. “Baseline” denotes simulations with observed guarantee
fee path, “HARP” with credit constraints removed after 2009, “80% Cap” with LTV limited to 80%
throughout, and “Alternative G-Fee” with the guarantee fee set to 45 from 10/03-12/08 and 5
from 1/09-12/12. Dollar figures denote cumulative values over the period. Value is an average
per-person cumulative figure.
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2012, the opposite pattern holds. Refinancing volume is 5% greater with the alternative
guarantee fee policy relative to the baseline simulation, and net equity withdrawal is
19% greater. The net result of the policy change is an overall reduction home-equity
withdrawal over the full 2003 to 2012 sample period of 1.2%, and refinancing volume
over the full simulation period is only 1.7% greater than in the baseline scenario. The
alternative policy is also revenue-improving; comparing the same columns, we see that
in the alternative scenario total GSE fee revenues over the full sample period were 6.3%
greater than in the baseline scenario, while outlays are essentially unchanged between
the two scenarios. The timing of these revenues is also shifted, with considerably lower
revenue during the low-fee period and higher revenue during the high-fee period. The
impact of higher or lower guarantee fees on GSE revenue is partially offset in both the
high- and low-fee periods by changes in the GSE’s market shares. During the high-fee
period, the GSE’s share of new refinances is 2.5% lower than in the baseline, while in the
low-fee period it is 2.6% greater. Cumulative default rates and defaulted volumes are
modestly lower in the alternative scenario relative to the baseline over the full sample
period, with 3% higher default rates prior to 2009 and 1.1% lower default rates
thereafter, while the change relative to the baseline in defaulted volumes are slightly
larger in magnitude, indicating that under the alternative guarantee fee policy relatively
more high-balance loans default. While the alternative policy reduces default rates, GSE
costs actually increase over the full sample period, largely because the GSEs market
share is higher during the post-2009 period in which default costs were large. As such,
although the alternative policy is revenue-improving in that it results in greater overall
fee income over the business cycle, and the 6.3% increase in revenue is greater than the
3.9% increase in costs, the effect on GSE profit is actually negative, as the GSEs are
observed in the baseline to suffer significant losses over the period in which GSE market
share expands under the alternative simulation. While this result may indicate that the
method I use to evaluate the effects of the alternative policy on the GSE’s profit and loss
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is incomplete, I interpret my results as consistent with the alternative policy not
amounting to a significant subsidy to borrowers.
Moreover, due to the change in the timing of refinancing and mortgage equity
withdrawal, borrowers actually achieve about 2.3% greater expected value under the
alternative scenario, with roughly 2.1% lower expected value prior to the recession and
7.1% higher expected value after the recession. This increase in value results both from
reducing ex-ante overborrowing, and hence, as the results from Mian and Sufi (2009) [158]
suggest, ex-post default, and from increasing the availability of refinancing credit
ex-post. Moreover by reducing guarantee fees starting in 2009, the alternative policy not
only significantly stimulates cash-out refinancing, which the results from Greenspan and
Kennedy (2008) [101] and Zhou and Carroll (2012) [191] indicate is often used to support
consumption spending30, but allows borrowers to obtain credit at lower overall interest
rates, further raising borrower welfare. The estimates from Table 4.1 also indicate that
during the low-fee period post-2009 borrowers on average derived greater benefit from
both extracted cash and the savings on lower interest payments, as more borrowers are
estimated to be in the unemployed state where the marginal value of cash-on-hand is
greater. Hence by shifting credit supply from a period in which unemployment rates
and thus the value of refinancing credit is low to periods in which unemployment rates
and the value of credit is high, the alternative policy improves welfare while having only
modest effects on total refinancing volumes.
In order to form a basis of comparison, I simulate the effects of two other alternative
policies and compare the results. The first scenario, intended to replicate the effects of
the HARP program, sets the probability that a loan application is denied to zero starting
in January 2009. This essentially allows borrowers to refinance via the GSEs at any time
of their choosing31. The results of this simulation are shown in the second column of
30While my model of borrower utility is agnostic regarding the disposal of extracted cash, implicitly I
assume that it is consumed.
31Specifically, I set the probability PFUND that the lender grants them credit to 1, although as with the
actual HARP program they may still reject high-interest rate offers or choose not to participate. Moreover,
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Table 4.2. The simulated HARP policy results in a 6.3% increase in the volume of
refinancing and a 9.7% increase in extracted home equity after implementation. I also
find that the HARP program substantially increases expected value, with a net increase
of 2.8%, or slightly larger than the effects of the alternative fee-pricing policy, over the
full sample period, and a slightly smaller 6% increase in welfare during the post-2009
period. The simulated HARP policy also significantly reduces default rates by 2.6%
during the implementation period by providing high-LTV borrowers an alternative
default. The slightly larger 3.8% reduction in defaulted volumes and
less-than-proportional increase in mortgage equity withdrawal relative to the increase in
refinancing volume likely reflects the fact that only borrowers with high-LTV ratios, who
also tend to have large balances, are granted eligibility under HARP, hence the program
stimulates refinancing only for borrowers with little scope to lever up and deters default
disproportionately for high-balance loans. As such the difference in the effect on
borrower welfare between the simulated HARP policy and alternative fee policy stems
from three sources. First, the HARP policy allows certain constrained borrowers to
refinance but has no effect on interest rates, leading to lower interest payment savings
and relatively more rejected funding offers than would result if guarantee fees were
reduced. Second, the HARP policy increases the availability of credit disproportionately
for borrowers close to the point at which default becomes optimal. As a consequence,
while in the HARP scenario default rates are reduced relatively more than under the
alternative fee policy, HARP disproportionately reduces default among borrowers for
whom the welfare cost of defaulting is low. Third, as mentioned above the alternative
guarantee fee policy results in a significantly greater increase in cash-out refinancing
during the post-2009 period, providing greater overall stimulus. As a result, while
refinancing volume expands by more following the recession under the HARP policy
interest rate offers are held fixed throughout. I use HARP’s true eligibility standards by restricting eligibility
to only those whose loans were GSE-securitized and originated prior to June 2009 with current LTV ratios
above 75%. Additional details of the implementation of this simulation can be found in Appendix J.
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than under the low-fee policy, the alternative fee policy has a greater positive effect on
borrower welfare. Moreover my results indicate that the HARP policy also has
significant effects on GSE revenues, costs, and market shares. Following implementation,
GSE market shares, revenues and costs expand dramatically under the HARP scenario
as the GSEs effectively become the refinace lender of last resort. However, unlike under
the alternative fee policy costs actually expand by more (72.9%) under the HARP
scenario than do revenues (69.6%), leading to significantly greater net GSE losses. As
result, my simulations indicate that a targeted refinance program such as HARP would
provide only modestly higher benefits to households over the full business cycle relative
to a countercyclical guarantee fee policy while entailing much greater GSE outlays.
The second alternative scenario I simulate lowers the exogenous maximum LTV ratio
from 100% to 80% for the entire sample period. As shown in the third column of Table
4.2, restraining the maximum LTV ratio in this fashion results in a reduction in both
refinancing volume and equity withdrawal, and unlike in Bajari et al (2013), [22]
Laufer [145] and Chen et al (2013), [53] I find that borrower welfare is .3% lower with the
80% LTV cap than under the baseline. My simulation results indicate that the alternative
guarantee fee policy is nearly as effective as the LTV cap at reducing home-equity
withdrawal prior to the recession, with the former generating a 4.1% reduction relative
to the baseline and the latter a 4.6% reduction, and that the tighter LTV cap actually
leads to an overall increase in the probability of default by 1.6% over the full sample
period as borrowers with low home equity find themselves unable to refinance. While
default rates are higher with the tighter LTV cap than under the baseline, total defaulted
volumes and hence GSE credit losses are actually lower over both sub-periods, as
borrowers in this scenario tend to have lower loan balances, so each default results in
lower credit losses, and the GSE’s market share is lower than in the baseline. As a result
GSE revenues also decline relative to the baseline with an 80% LTV cap, although the
through-the-cycle decline in GSE revenues of 4.9% is more than made up by reductions
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in losses of 7%, resulting in lower GSE losses overall. As such, although I find that an
80% LTV limit reduces GSE exposure to losses, by degrading the value of the refinancing
option it results in a 1.7% decline in refinancing volume and 5.5% decline in
cash-out-refinancing that is not fully offset by a reduction in default rates, leading to an
overall decline in borrower welfare.
My estimates from Table 4.2 of the effects of an alternative guarantee fee policy or a
HARP-type refinancing stimulus accord reasonably well with the estimated effects of
each from Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. My estimates from Chapter 2 suggest that a 10
bp increase in guarantee fees reduces the probability of refinancing by 5.7% to 6%
relative to the baseline32. Applying this estimated elasticity to the product of the change
in guarantee fees relative to the baseline under my simulated counterfactual and the
estimated GSE market share33, which I treat as a proxy for the degree of pass-through,
yields an estimated change in refinancing volume of 4%-4.3% for the high-fee period and
8.2% to 8.8% for the low-fee period, roughly in line with my structural estimates of 3%
and 5% respectively. Moreover applying my estimate from Chapter 2 of the fraction of
deterred refinances that lead to default to the change in refinancing volume generated by
the alternative guarantee fee policy implies an in default volumes of 3.1% to 3.8% during
the high-fee period and a reduction in default volumes of 1% to 1.2% during the low-fee
period, very much in line with my structural estimates of 4.2% and 1.6% respectively34.
By contrast my estimates from Chapter 3 of the effects of the HARP policy are
considerably larger than my structural estimates would suggest, implying an increase in
32I obtain these figures by dividing the estimated coefficients from Models 2 and 4 from Table A17 in Ap-
pendix E, .0015 and .0016 respectively, by the average probability of refinancing, 2.65% over the applicable
period, and converting all figures to CPR.
33The average baseline guarantee fee is 23.5 bp in the pre-recession period and 29.5 bp thereafter, relative
to 45 and 5 bp respectively in the counterfactual, and market shares of respectively 33.2% and 59.2%.
34My estimates from Chapter 2 suggest that between 1.9% and 2.4% of deterred refinances result in de-
fault. I apply to the percentage changes in refinancing volume relative to the baseline in the countercyclical
guarantee fee simulation (a 3% reduction during the high-fee period and a 5% increase during the low-fee
period) to predict the change in the volume of mortgage refinances, multiply this volume by the estimated
elasticities of 1.9% and 2.4%, and divide by the predicted volumes of defaults in the counterfactual scenario
to arrive at these figures.
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refinancing probabilities between 26.9% and 31.7% rather than the simulated increase of
6.3%. However, the sample I use to simulate the effects of the HARP program does not
consist entirely of HARP-eligible borrowers, and indeed many borrowers in the matched
dataset have loans originated after June 2009 or current LTV ratios below the 75% cutoff
I use for eligibility. If I apply the estimated effect of the HARP program from Chapter 2
to the fraction of borrowers in the matched dataset who have loans originated prior to
June 2009 with current LTV ratios above 75%35 I obtain an estimated increase in
refinancing volume of betwen 5.8% and 6.9%, very much in line with my structural
estimates. While this back-of-the-envelope calculation does not adjust for the potential
effects of burnout36 or differences in sample composition37 it nonetheless offers some
confidence in the quantitative magnitude of my structural estimates of the effect of the
HARP program. While for policy analysis I place greater weight on the results of my
counterfactual simulations, as they account structurally for fundamental issues of
regime invariance, it is reassuring that the align well quantitatively with the
reduced-form evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
4.4.2 Simulation Caveats
While the results of the the simulation study from Section 4.4.1 are indicative of the
potential effects of various alternative GSE policies, both the quantitative and qualitative
results are subject to several important caveats regarding their direct applicability to
actual housing finance policy. First, the as a partial equilibrium model the simulation
35Such borrowers represent 21.7% of the the post-June 2009 monhtly observations in the matched dataset.
36Because borrowers can only refinance once under HARP, the long-term impact of the program on refi-
nancing volume is considerably less than the short-term impact, as eligible borrowers will refinance soon
after implementation but will thereafter be ineligible, causing my estimates of short-term takeup in Chapter
3 to be large relative the long-term structural estimates.
37The sample used to estimate takeup in Chapter 3 consists of borrowers with loans originated between
mid-2008 and mid-2010, and in many respects these borrowers had quite different credit risk characteristics
from the full sample of loans originated between 2000 and 2012 in the matched dataset. In particular the
average LTV ratio in the sample used in Chapter 3 is about 68, while the average for loans in the matched
dataset used for estimation in Chapter 4 is 63, hence relatively fewer loans in the matched dataset will be
treated as HARP eligible.
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does not provide for feedback effects between policy, refinancing activity, and other
exogenous variables such as house prices and unemployment rates. Moreover, within
the simulation it is assumed that the GSE’s policy response is unanticipated, potentially
complicating the application of these policies in the real world. Second, the simulation
model makes little or no adjustment for competitive conditions in lending markets, and
indeed provides no estimate of the welfare of lenders and MBS investors, implying that
the true welfare impact of each policy should be closer to zero than the estimated
impact. In this section, I discuss both of these issues in detail.
The first caveat with the results from Section 4.4.1 concerns the partial equilibrium
nature of my analysis. In my baseline simulations, I assume that house prices,
employment, and interest rates do not respond to changes in refinancing activity of
mortgage equity withdrawal driven by supply-side policy interventions. In reality, there
is substantial evidence that increases in credit supply have a positive effect on house
prices [4, 78] and employment [166] and vice-versa. To the extent that this additional
second-order channel goes unaccounted for in my simulations, I will tend to understate
the effects of policies that affect credit supply in both the positive and negative
directions. As such, we might expect a HARP-type policy to have more stimulative
effects and a tighter LTV ratio cap to have more inhibatory effects than what I measure
in Table 4.2, and likewise for raising or lowering guarantee fees. However, because the
measured effects of each of these policies on refinancing activity is relatively modest, I
would expect these second-order effects through general equilibrium channels to be
modest in magnitude. Moreover, throughout my simulations I assume that all policy
interventions are fully unanticipated. If these policy measures were announced in
advance, we might expect a gradual adjustment to the new equilibrium and thus little
long-term impact on borrower or lender behavior. However, in reality the actual housing
finance policies that were implemented during this time period, summarized in Figure
1.4 in Section 1.2.3, were by and large unanticipated and were announced only just prior
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to their implementation. As such, I do not believe that the assumption of no prior
anticipation is unreasonable. Of greater concern for my simulation of a countercyclical
guarantee fee policy is the issue that such an ongoing shift in the GSE’s policy stance
might prompt a permanent equilibrium response; for example, borrowers might
anticipate receiving lower refinance interest rates during recessions and therefore delay
refinancing until a time at which guarantee fees decline. While it is beyond the scope of
my analysis to model such dynamic incentives, it is worth noting that my simulation
results may for this reason overstate the effect of a permanent shift in GSE policy, and
actual policy changes would have to deal with a variety of practical considerations that I
cannot address.
The second caveat with the results from Section 4.4.1 deals with the exclusion of
structural effects on lending market. As discussed in Section 2.3.1 the structure of the
mortgage market, and in particular the degree of market concentration, exert a
significant influence on lender conduct and thus on mortgage interest rates and
refinancing activity. In my simulations I assume that lender conduct is
well-characterized by the model and that the parameters governing such conduct are
held fixed across various policy scenarios. However, competition among lenders is not
explicitly microfounded in the model; as discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.2 I assume that
lenders compete against themselves in setting interest rates, constrained only by the
ability of borrowers to reject high-interest-rate loan offers. The propensity of borrowers
to reject loan offers is taken directly from the data, and while I include county-level fixed
effects in order to proxy for the degree of market competition under the assumption that
borrowers in more competitive markets will be more willing on the margin to reject an
offer and apply to a different lender, as a consequence competition among lenders is
modeled in a reduced-form fashion. Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013) [178] show that
competition in mortgage lending varies substantially over time, and to the extent that
changes in housing finance policy have a noticeable effect on market structure my
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simulations will fail to capture the resulting effects on lender behavior and borrower
welfare. To give a concrete example, as shown in Table 2.5 in Section 2.3.1 non-bank
mortgage lenders tend to respond more to changes in guarantee fees, as they tend to be
less able to hold originated loans in portfolio and are hence more reliant on GSE
securitization. We might expect that changes in guarantee fees would thus have a
greater impact on non-bank mortgage originators than on banks, and as these lenders
tend to be smaller than banks on average, changes in guarantee fees may have important
effects on the size distribution of mortgage lending. Due to the data limitations
discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.2 I am unable to address this concern directly, but I
expect the effect of small changes in guarantee fees on mortgage market structure to be
modest. Of more direct concern is the fact that my welfare calculations take no account
of producer welfare, measured as the sum of originator and MBS investor profits. FRM
refinancing involves a direct transfer from the MBS holder to the mortgage borrower,
hence a measure of the welfare impact of policy changes on borrowers that operate
through the refinancing channel will tend to over-state the effects both positive and
negative on total welfare. Moreover any changes in guarantee fees that are not fully
passed-through to borrowers will result in lower originator profits overall, and I do not
account for this effect in my welfare calculations. Because MBS investors tend to be
wealthier overall, it is likely that a transfer from investors to borrowers results in a net
gain in welfare, although it is worth bearing in mind that my estimate of the effect of
policy interventions on welfare measures only the impact on borrowers.
The results of the simulations presented in Section 4.4.1 suggest a clear role for
countercyclical guarantee GSE fee policies. A revenue-enhancing alternative policy can
achieve greater welfare for borrowers through two mechanisms. First, by shifting the
timing of changes in refinancing credit supply, a countercyclical fee policy can result in
greater overall borrower welfare despite lower total refinancing volume by making
credit more available at times when it is especially valuable. Second, by reducing
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over-borrowing during expansionary periods, a countercyclical guarantee fee policy
reduces default rates and leaves borrowers better positioned to refinance when interest
rates decline and unemployment rates rise. The result is that the deleveraging associated
with recessions is mitigated by the alternative policy. The simulations suggest that a
countercyclical GSE fee policy would be roughly as effective as the HARP program at
improving borrower welfare through the former mechanism, and substantially more
effective than a tighter LTV ratio cap at improving borrower welfare through the latter
mechanism. Indeed, these simulations indicate that a countercylical guarantee fee policy
would manage to combine the benefits of both policies while increasing total GSE
revenue. Moreover the key limitation of my counterfactual analysis, that it features no
general equilibrium effects, likely implies that my estimates of the effect of a
countercyclical fee policy represent a lower bound on the true effects. In equilibrium, a
significant shift in credit supply and refinancing activity achieved through changes in
guarantee fees would also likely lead to changes in house prices [4, 78] and
employment [166] that would amplify the true costs and benefits. Moreover my structural
model is able by design to simulate the effects other potential alternative policies,
particularly policies that alter secondary market conditions such as changes in GSE
lending standards, large-scale asset purchase programs intended to increase the prices of
mortgage securities, or even the elimination of the GSEs themselves38. While it is
beyond the scope of this analysis to simulate the effects of such policies, the framework
developed in this chapter may prove useful for future policy evaluations.
38Each of these policies have clear analogues in my model. One could simulate changes to GSE credit
standards, for example refusing to accept loans from borrowers with FICO scores below a certain threshold,
simply by removing the GSE securitization option for originators extending loans to such borrowers, and
the effect of eliminating the GSEs entirely would be analogous for all borrowers. MBS prices factor directly
into originator securitization profits, hence it is straightforward to simulate the effects of increasing them
by some fixed amount.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter analyzes the effects of the GSE’s guarantee fee policies on credit
provision and borrower welfare across the business cycle. In Section 4.2 I extend the
dynamic choice literature by designing a novel partial equilibrium model of the agency
refinancing market featuring dynamic borrower behavior and endogenous credit
constraints, which I then estimate in Section 4.3. By incorporating latent liquidity
preference, I show that borrowers derive 130% to 220% greater utility from
cash-on-hand, and hence from refinancing, when they are likely to be
income-constrained. In Section 4.4 I then analyze via simulation the effects of an
alternative countercyclical fee policy that reduces credit supply during market
expansions and increases credit supply during recessions. I show that although the
policy improves GSE revenue by 6.3% and results in a 1.2% lower total volume of home
equity withdrawal, borrower welfare is still 2.3% higher under the alternative than
under the baseline. The increase in borrower welfare derives from two sources. First, by
reducing credit supply during the expansionary period, the alternative policy reduces
ex-ante overborrowing and thus future default. Second, by improving credit supply
during the recession, the program stimulates borrowing at exactly the time when it is
most valuable, leading to a 5% increase in refinancing volume during and after the
recession. By comparing this policy with other proposed alternative, I find that
countercylical guarantee fee pricing would combine the benefits of a policy of tighter
LTV limits and an affordable refinance policy, having benefits roughly equivalent to the
former in reducing over-leveraging and the latter in stimulating refinancing after the
recession.
These findings complement the results from Chapters 2 and 3 in two key ways. First,
the model of credit supply I develop endogenizes and microfounds the pass-through
rate from guarantee fees to interest rates and credit approval decisions that I estimate in
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Chapter 2. These structural estimates allow for out-of-sample predictions about the
effects of changes in guarantee fees under counterfactual GSE policy regimes. Second,
the borrower preference parameters I estimate provide a model for behavior behind the
suggestive evidence I present in Chapter 3 regarding the interaction between
unemployment, credit constraints, and refinancing. These preference parameters allow
for a quantitative analysis of the welfare implications of alternative GSE policies.
To my knowledge the question of how best to set GSE guarantee fees across the
business cycle has not been considered previously in either the economics or policy
literature. The collapse of the private-label market in 2008 and subsequent ascendance of
the GSEs revealed how important their role remains in backstopping the refinancing
market during period of credit market turmoil. With housing finance reform currently
being debated in congress, the question of how the GSEs should vary their policies with
the business cycle has never been more relevant. The alternative countercylical
guarantee fee policy analyzed in this paper functions as a means to achieve
macroprudential controls on credit growth during credit expansions while still
functioning as a “refinancing lender of last resort”. Moreover because of their low
impact on non-mortgage interest rates or other economic sectors aside from housing and
mortgage finance, guarantee fees are in some ways an ideal “second instrument” for
regulating credit macroprudentially. Policy makers may wish to consider
revenue-neutral policies of the sort analyzed in this chapter that complement the
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Appendix
APPENDIX A: STYLIZED MODEL PROOFS
This section shows that the model from Section 1.4 has a unique equilibrium and
proves the two propositions outlined in that section. Note that in what follows, all time-
and agent subscripts are suppressed for clarity. These proofs rely on five key
assumptions:
Assumption 1: Distributions















Assumption 4: Lender Preferences
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where expected value and expected profit are given by:





(1− R(c, r, η, VC))π(c, r, p, k) f (η, VC|c)dηdVC
EV(c, p, η, VC, τL) =
∫ ∞
−∞
[D(c, p, k, τL) + (1− D(c, p, k, τL))R(c, r, η, VC)]VC
+ (1− D(c, p, k, τL))(1− R(c, r, η, VC))VR(c, r, η) g(k)dk
The first assumption is purely technical. Crucially, the distribution F must still be
exchangeable when conditioned on the observed c∗, although members of the
exponential family satisfy this requirement. Assumptions 2 and 3 are also technical, and
are required to ensure, respectively, that the LTV and interest rate choice problems are
well-behaved and that the optimal choice is increasing in the borrowers or lender’s type.
This amounts to assuming that the solution r∗ to the lender’s interest-rate-choice
problem satisfies certain requirements that lead to concavity and positive cross-partials
in c and η for expected value. These assumptions also allow me to ignore issues of
incentive compatibility. The fourth assumption places some minimal structure on lender
payoffs; 4a and 4b state that interest rates are weakly more profitable than guarantee fees
are costly, while 4c states that without a compensating increase in interest rates, the
lender’s benefit from lower rejection rates at higher LTV ratios does not outweigh the
cost of lower profit. The former must be true, as profit on a securitized loan depends on
r− p while profit on an un-securitized loan depends only r; hence the cross-partial is
zero for a securitized loan and positive for an un-securitized loan. The latter is a
reasonable assumption, and if false, would imply that lenders prefer high-LTV
applicants, all else equal. The final assumption places similarly reasonable structure on
borrower payoffs.
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Proof of Unique Equilibrium:
1. Let h(c, r, η, VC) = VR(c, r, η)−VC. Because h is monotonically decreasing in r by
Assumption 5b, I can write the condition VC ≥ Vr(c, r, η) as equivalently
h(c, r, η, VC) ≤ 0 or r ≥ h−1r (c, η, Vc). Hence there is a unique interest rate
h−1r (c, η, Vc) above which offers are rejected, so for each type (η, Vc) the borrower’s
rejection policy R is uniquely determined.
2. Because by Assumption 2a the expected profit function is concave, there exists a
unique r∗(c, p, k) that maximizes EP(c, r, p, k). By Assumption 3a, r∗(c, p, k) is
increasing monotonically in k. Since r∗(c, p, k) is unique for each type k, then
EP(c, r∗(c, p, k), p, k) is also uniquely determined, hence the lender’s denial policy
D is also unique for each type k.
3. Because by Assumption 2b the expected value function is concave, there exists a
unique c∗(p, η, VC, τL) that maximizes EV(c, p, η, VC, τL). By assumption 3b,
c∗(p, η, VC, τL) is increasing monotonically in η. Since c∗(p, η, VC, τL) is unique for
each type (η, VC), then EV(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), p, η, VC, τL) is also uniquely
determined, hence the borrower’s application policy A is also unique for each type
(η, VC).
4. Since the policies R, D, A, r∗ and c∗ are all unique for each set of borrower and
lender types (k, η, VC), the game features a unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1:




























, therefore Sgn( dr
∗
dp ) = Sgn(
∂2EP(c,r∗,p,k)
∂r∗∂p ). Note that I can write
expected profit at r∗ by conditioning on the event that the offer is accepted:






π(c, r∗, p, k) fVC(V
C|c, η)dVC] fη(η|c)dη
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then using the exchangeability from Assumption 1,







[π(c, r∗, p, k) fVC(V












∂π(c, r∗, p, k)
∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 0 by Asm. 4a
fVC(V








∂2π(c, r∗, p, k)
∂r∗∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0 by Asm. 4b
fVC(V
C|c, η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0, Density
dVC] fη(η|c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0, Density
dη
because VR(c, r, η) is not a function of p, hence ∂V
R(c,r∗,η)
∂p = 0. The entire integrand of the
inner integral term is positive, so the integral itself is positive, and therefore the
integrand of the outer integral term is also positive, so the integral itself is positive. Thus
dr∗
dp ≥ 0, which completes the first part of the proof. For the second part, notice that since
D(c, p, k, t) = 1[EP(c, r∗(c, p, k), p, k) ≤ τL] is a step function, it is sufficient to show that
dEP(c,r∗(c,p,k),p,k)
dp ≤ 0 ∀k. As before I can write:
dEP(c, r∗(c, p, k), p, k)
dp
=
∂EP(c, r∗, p, k)
∂p
+
∂EP(c, r∗, p, k)
∂r∗︸ ︷︷ ︸








∂π(c, r∗, p, k)
∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 0 by Asm. 4a
f (η, VC|c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0, Density
dVCdη
because the integral over f is exchangeable by Assumption 1 and the dependence of
bound VR(c, r∗, η) on p comes only through r∗ and is thus absent from the partial







Proof of Proposition 2:
I begin with the latter of the two claims. As above, since D(c, p, k, t) is a step function,
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it is sufficient to show that dEP(c
∗(p,η,VC,τL),r∗(c∗(p,η,VC,τL),p,k),p,k)
dη ≤ 0. Using the fact that
r∗(c, p, k) maximizes EP(c, r, p, k), I can write:
dEP(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), r∗(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), p, k), p, k)
dη
= (
∂EP(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), r∗, p, k)
∂c∗(p, η, VC, τL)
+
∂EP(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), r∗(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), p, k), p, k)
∂r∗(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), p, k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0 at Optimum
∂r∗(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), p, k)
∂c∗(p, η, VC, τL)
)
∂c∗(p, η, VC, τL)
∂η︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0 by Asm. 3b
where as discussed previously the positive cross-partial of EV(c, p, η, VC, τL) with
respect to c and η guarantees that ∂c
∗(p,η,VC,τL)
∂η > 0. Therefore since:
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∂c∗
fVC(V






∂π(c∗, r∗, p, k)
∂c∗
fVC(V
C|c, η)dVC] fη(η|c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0, Density
dη
where the entire inner integrand (bracketed) is weakly negative by Assumption 4c, then
∂EP(c∗,r∗,p,k)
∂c∗ is itself weakly negative, so
dEP(c∗(p,η,VC,τL),r∗(c∗(p,η,VC,τL),p,k),p,k)
dη ≤ 0, which
completes the proof. For the former of the two claims, note that:
dEV(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), p, η, VC, τL)
dη
=
∂EV(c∗(p, η, VC, τL), p, η, VC, τL)
∂c∗(p, η, VC, τL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0 at Optimum
∂c∗(p, η, VC, τL)
∂η
+
∂EV(c∗, p, η, VC, τL)
∂η
Thus I need only consider the partial derivative. Recall that under the maintained
assumptions, I can express the borrower’s interest rate offer rejection decision as a cutoff
rule in the interest rate r ≥ h−1r (c, η, VC). I can analogously express denial decision
EP(c, r∗(c, p, k), p, k) ≤ τL as M(c, p, k, τL) ≤ 0, where
M(c, p, k, τL) = EP(c, r∗(c, p, k), p, k)− τL. Having shown previously in the proof of
Proposition 1 that dEP(c,r
∗(c,p,k),p,k)
dp ≤ 0, therefore M is monotonically decreasing in k. As
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a consequence I can invert M in k and express the lender’s denial decision as
k ≥ M−1k (c, p, τL). I can also combine the borrower’s rejection decision rule with the
lender’s optimal interest rate offer to express the rejection decision as
r∗(c, p, k) ≥ h−1r (VC, c, η). I can express this rule as N(c, p, k, η, VC) ≥ 0, where
N(c, p, k, η, VC) = r∗(c, p, k)− h−1r (VC, c, η). Since as discussed previously Assumption 3
guarantees that r∗(c, p, k) is monotonically increasing in k, therefore N is monotonically
increasing in k as well. I can thus invert N in k and write the rejection decision as
k ≥ N−1k (c, p, η, V
C). We can see from EV(c, p, η, VC, τL) that there are effectively three
regions:
Region 1: At low levels of k, the lender offers an interest rate that the borrower accepts
Region 2: At moderate levels of k, the lender offers an interest rate that the borrower rejects
Region 3: At high levels of k, the lender denies the borrower’s application
where it is possible, for certain high values of η or low values of VC, that Region 2 has
zero mass (i.e. the borrower accepts all offers the lender is willing to make). Therefore
the borrower’s application results in a completed refinancing if k < Q, where
Q = min{M−1k (c, p, τL), N
−1
k (c, p, η, V
C)}. Hence I can rewrite the borrower’s expected
value as:
EV(c, p, η, VC, τL) =
∫ Q
−∞










∂VR(c, r∗(c, p, k), η)
∂η︸ ︷︷ ︸








While the first term must be positive because the integrand itself is positive, for the
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second term there are two cases to consider. In the first case, η and VC (and hence c∗) are
such that the rejection region has zero mass, or N−1k (c, p, η, V
C) ≥ M−1k (c, p, τL). In this
case, ∂Q∂η = 0 and V
R(c, r∗(c, p, k), η) ≥ VC, because the borrower prefers refinancing at
the lender’s equilibrium interest rate offer. As a result, the second term is weakly
positive, so the whole expression is weakly positive. In the second case, the rejection
region has positive mass, or N−1k (c, p, η, V
C) < M−1k (c, p, τL). In this case,
Q = N−1k (c, p, η, V
C), and thus at k = Q we have VR(c, r∗(c, p, k), η) = VC, since the
borrower is just indifferent at this point. In this case, the second term is zero, so the
whole expression is weakly positive. Thus we have ∂EV(c
∗,p,η,VC,τL)
∂η ≥ 0, which completes
the proof.
APPENDIX B: DETAILS ON DATASET ASSEMBLY
Primary Market Datasets
The first step in the primary-market analysis is to generate the GSE dataset. Both the
raw FHLMC Single-Family Loan-Level Dataset and FNMA Single-Family Loan
Performance Dataset contain a header file, including characteristics of the loan at
origination, and a separate dynamic file, including the choices of the borrower each
month. For all analysis with interest rates as the independent variable in Chapters 2 and
4, I use only the header dataset, as this includes credit risk characteristics and interest
rates at origination for 21,435,660 refinancing loans issued between 2000 and early 2013.
For all analysis with monthly choices (either refinance or default) as the independent
variable in Chapter 2, I use a subset of the full merged header-dynamic file GSE dataset
containing only loans originated after June 2009, as these loans were ineligible for HARP.
This sample consists of 6,973,525 loans observed whenever active between July 2009 and
June 2013, totaling 150,759,569 loan-month-level observations in all. Both of these
datasets are nationwide. For most of the analysis in Chapter 3, I use a subset of the full
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merged header-dynamic GSE dataset containing only loans originated within 12 months
of the deadline for HARP eligibility (June 2009). This entire sample consists of 4,664,219
distinct fixed-rate mortgage loans observed whenever active between June 2008 and
December 2012, totaling 177,174,761 loan-month-level observations in all. This dataset is
nationwide and covers a substantial fraction of all mortgage loans originated over the
period in question. I supplement these datasets by importing a number of aggregate and
sub-aggregate variables and using them to impute certain data elements. I obtain house
price indices from Zillow and applied them at the MSA-month- or state-month-level,
whichever is the finest level of detail available. The house price variable itself is a
combination of the observed price at origination, in turn imputed from the balance and
LTV at origination, and the percentage change in the local-area house price index.
Servicing decisions, monthly payments, home equity, and in some cases ending balances
are imputed from the GSE data via the appropriate formula, in the case of home equity
using the imputed house price.39 I also import MSA-month or state-month-level
unemployment rates from the Census Bureau, again using the finest-available level of
geographic detail, month-level average mortgage interest rates provided by Freddie
Mac, month-level average interest rates for a variety of instruments from Federal
Reserve Table H.15, and secondary market MBS yields and the Merrill Lynch Options
Volatility Index (MOVE), averaged up to the month-level, from Bloomberg.
I construct instruments for house price indices using the WRLURI index, described in
detail in Gyourko et al (2008). [106] I regress the house price index on time- and
geography-level dummies as well as the constituent variables making up the index,
which measure various supply restrictions (e.g. whether local approval is needed for
building decisions, or whether homebuilders have to pay to put in their own sewer
lines) to generate a predicted variable. When importing instruments at the MSA- or
39Ending balances are censored in the data for the first six months the loan is active. For FRMs, monthly
payments are a fixed nonlinear function of the initial balance, interest rate, and term, and can thus be
reconstructed manually.
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state-level as in Chapters 2 and 3, I use MSA- or state-level averages over all towns in the
WRLURI dataset constituting that MSA or state, and when importing instruments at the
town-level in Chapter 3 I use the town-level indices.I generate instruments for
unemployment rates in a similar fashion following the procedure from Bartik (1991). [25]
These unemployment instruments measure the change in employment that would be
predicted if the industry mix of employment remained fixed and each industry grew at
its corresponding national average rate. I use state-level employment figures from the
2000 census for 12 North American Industry Classification System categories to generate
base-year employment shares and apply national month-level employment growth
figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This generates a predicted employment
figure, which I then include in a first-stage regression for unemployment rates at the
finest observed level of geographic detail (either town, MSA, or state) in order to form a
prediction for unemployment rates. Finally, for the jumbo-conforming spread
regressions shown in Figure 6, I use daily average jumbo and conforming refinance
mortgage rates from Bloomberg, ultimately sourced fro Bankrate.com.
Secondary Market Datasets
To assemble the short-panel secondary market dataset, I first download all FHLMC’s
Historical Daily Loan Level Fixed-Rate Disclosures for every trading day in a two-week
window of the April 1st, 2012 and December 1st, 2012 guarantee fee increase
implementation dates. FNMA’s comparable tool, PoolTalk, does not list MBS by the
trading day they were issued but rather by the month; hence I download all FNMA
single-family FRM-backed MBS issued in either March, April, November or December of
2012. These disclosures contain all of the MBS coupon and risk characteristics used in the
analysis. I merge them with daily mid prices from Bloomberg by merging on the CUSIP.
The prices reported by Bloomberg are the “default” option, which blends transaction
prices, quoted prices, and model estimates in order to provide the best possible source
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for each query. Wherever possible, the price is the CBBT price, a weighted average of
2nd- and 3rd-best bid and ask prices from actual completed transactions (the mid price is
the midpoint of the bid and ask). If there are insufficient transactions, the price is the
BGN price, which is a similar weighted average of quotes from broker-dealers that do
not correspond to transactions. If there are insufficient quotes, Bloomberg supplies the
BVAL price, an estimated price from a proprietary option-adjusted spread model, the
standard pricing model in the industry. For the purposes of determining the exact
issuance date for FNMA securities, I assume that the first reported date with a trading
price is the issuance date. The resulting pattern of issuance dates for FNMA resembled
the pattern for FHLMC MBS, for which I observe the issuance date, suggesting that this
assumption is valid. This yields a dataset of 59,438 MBS-trading day observations over
the two 4-week windows. For the longer-panel secondary market dataset, I first
download all monthly FNMA single-family FRM-backed MBS files for the months July
2011 to June 2013. I merge them with weekly mid prices from Bloomberg by merging on
the CUSIP of all MBS for which prices are available.
I also construct a mortgage-backed securities dataset for the purposes of estimating
two primitives as inputs to the structural model in Chapter 4, specifically, an estimate of
the elasticity of the guarantee fee with respect to loan-to-value ratio and a pricing model
for mortgages sold on the secondary market. I downloaded data from Bloomberg on all
FNMA and FHLMC 30-year FRM-backed MBS with at least a $1 million origination
volume issued between February 2004 and March 2013. This dataset consists of 40,307
MBS with their coupon rate, weighted-average coupon, weighted-average credit score,
weighted-average LTV, origination balance, principal geography, and price, at
origination. I measure the guarantee fee as the difference between the weighted-average
coupon and the coupon rate. I estimate a regression model to obtain the elasticity of the
guarantee fee with respect to LTV, which I estimate as .5992 bp for each 1% increase in
LTV. I also estimate a pricing model for MBS via linear regression on the same data; this
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pricing model is shown in Table A40 of Appendix I.
HMDA Records
In order to assemble the HMDA dataset, I first remove observations missing key
variables or not corresponding to agency refinancing. I remove loans applications from
outside of California, FHA- or VA-backed loans, second-lien mortgages, home purchase
or home improvement loans, loans above the conforming loan limit, or loans originated
by subprime lenders. Subprime lenders are identified using the Deparment of Housing
and Urban Development’s subprime lender list; this list is only available through 2006,
so for years 2007-2012 I identify lenders as subprime if their fraction of high-interest
loans originated is greater than the median fraction (roughly 27%) for known subprime
originators. This sample construction is designed to make the HMDA dataset resemble
the agency refinancing market, in order to infer what credit conditions were like for that
market specifically. I next impute the values of certain borrower credit risk
characteristics, in particular LTV, FICO and DTI, using a technique similar to that in
Bayer et al (2013). [28] Using the set of all refinances observed in the GSE dataset, I
calculate the mean of these variables within a year, lender, Sectional Center Facility
(SCF) code, decile of income and decile of origination balance. I then apply that mean to
observations in the HMDA dataset.40 I then randomly assign observations to a month by
year and import aggregate data at the county-month level on mortgage interest rates and
unemployment rates, and at the month level on average charged guarantee fees and
various base interest rates (including 1-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10- and 30-year treasury rates and 10-
and 30-year swap rates). Finally, to complete the dataset assembly process I generate
indicators for one of four categories of action taken on the loan; either denied
application, rejected credit offer, originated loan held on balance sheet, or originated
40There is considerable variation in these mean values; across the 127,113 bins, the mean FICO varies
between 364 and 832, while the mean LTV and DTI vary between 1 and 100 and 65, respectively.
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loan sold to GSE. I include in the “denial” category applications where a pre-approval
request was denied as well as those where the file was closed for incompleteness (i.e. the
borrower did not provide all the requested information). I include as “offer rejected”
cases where the borrower withdrew their application prior to receiving an offer or
rejected a preapproval offer. The “held” category contains all other dispositions of
originated loans, including over-the-counter sales to a commercial bank or to a nonbank
financial company, private-label securitization, and securitization via Ginnie Mae and
Farmer Mac as well as actually retained portfolio loans. This categorization tends to
under-represent GSE securitization, as the loan is labeled as “held” if the loan is not
transferred to a GSE by the end of the reporting year. This process yields a dataset
containing 17,109,796 over 13 years from 2000 to 2012.
Matched GSE-Deeds Sample
The first step in assembling the matched dataset is to generate the deeds dataset.
Starting with the universe of all loans secured by residential real estate originated
between 2000 and 2012, I first restrict the sample to only loans made in California and
remove all home-equity loans, lines of credit, and second-lien loans (leaving only
first-lien mortgages). I also remove all observations for any properties with observations
that are missing key data elements, or that have a very high number of observed
transactions.41 I then generate a sequence of transactions on the same property. I classify
a loan as a refinance if the borrower’s last name is the same as the previous loan for that
property and the previous loan was made more than two months prior.42 All other loans
I classify as sales. I then reformat each series of loans on the same property into matched
pairs, with one origination loan and one termination. I classify terminations as either
refinance, sale, default (in cases where the name of the borrower is a bank or other
41These are a relatively small fraction of the sample and appear to be data entry errors
42In cases where the previous loan was made 2 or fewer months prior, I classify the loan as a second
mortgage and exclude it from the sample.
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financial company) or none (continuation). I then remove all pairs in which the
termination is via sale or the origination would not appear in the GSE dataset;
specifically, I drop all ARM originations or originations with a balance over the
conforming loan limit.43 These steps are taken so that the sample of loan originations is
the same in both the deeds and GSE dataset.44 I then merge these pairs of observations
with assessor records at the property-level. This generates a sample of 1,484,481
origination-termination pairs, which I refer to henceforth as the deeds dataset.
The second step is to assemble the GSE dataset. Each record in the raw dataset
contains a header file, including characteristics of the loan at origination, and a separate
dynamic file, including the choices of the borrower each month. Using the dynamic file,
I classify each loan by termination reason; either a prepayment (including sales and
refinances), default, or if still active at the end of 2012, continuation. I merge these
termination records onto the header file in order to generate matched
origination-termination pairs. I then remove all observations from outside of California
or missing key variables. This leaves a sample of 5,003,826 origination-termination pairs,
which I refer to in what follows as the GSE dataset.
The third step is to merge these two dataset. I first structure them in a common
format by changing certain codes. This includes recasting the ZIP Code in the deeds
dataset as a SCF Code, a 3-digit version of a ZIP Code, placing lender names in a
common format, and recoding small lenders not listed in the GSE dataset as “Other” in
the deeds dataset. I then perform a many-to-many merge, classifying each
origination-termination pair in both datasets into a bin depending on the origination
loan purpose (purchase or refinance), occupancy status (owner-occupied or investment
property), lender (one of a possible 32, or all other), termination code (continue, default
or refinance), and SCF code. Within each bin, for each possible pair of deeds dataset and
GSE dataset observations, I generate a distance metric based on the sum of three
43I use the conforming loan limit for that year and city, as provided by the FHFA.
44I discuss the role of excluding sales shortly.
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discrepancies: their origination balances as a percentage of the balance recorded in the
deeds record, their origination dates, and their termination dates.45 The purpose of
allowing for some discrepancy in these figures is that differences in record-keeping
standards can generate minor differences; for example, closing costs may be recorded as
part of the balance in one record but not the other, or origination dates can record the
date the contract was signed in one case and the first payment date in another. Then
within each bin I implement a deeds-optimal Gale-Shapley algorithm to generate a
stable matching, where preferences are symmetric and equal to the negative of the
distance in each case (so that all observations “prefer” a closer match). This procedure
involves iteratively forming potential matches between “nearby” observation pairs,
which are then broken if an unmatched observation is closer; see Gale and Shapley
(1962) [88] for more detail on implementation. I then remove all unmatched observations
or matched pairs in which the distance is greater than .1 (corresponding to either a 10%
difference in loan balances or two months total discrepancy in timing). This generates a
set of 481,984 matched pairs containing the necessary information: risk characteristics
and monthly decisions from the GSE dataset, and property characteristics and the
refinancing balance from the deeds dataset.
In order to enhance the external validity of this study and enable the results to be
reasonably applied to the universe of GSE FRMs, I resample the set of matched paired
observations to make it resemble aggregate figures. This procedure avoids the
over-sampling of “unique” circumstances, such as loans made in rural areas, that would
otherwise result from matching these two datasets. I generate sampling probabilities
based on characteristics at both origination and refinance. Using the master GSE dataset,
I generate observed probabilities of bins defined by an origination year, SCF, termination
code, termination year, loan purpose, and occupancy status. I appy these probabilities to
observations in the matched dataset corresponding to the same bin. Using the FHLMC
45Each 1-month difference in origination or termination date was specified to be equivalent in distance
to a 8.33% difference in origination balance.
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Refinance Report, I also generate sampling probabilities for observations terminating in
refinance. Each quarter, I estimate via Method of Moments the mean and variance of a
normal distribution of cash-out as a percentage of refinancing balance. I target three
average quarterly moments; average cash-out as a percentage of refinancing balance,
percentage reducing balance, and percentage increasing balance.46 Using this
distribution, I generate a likelihood for the observed cash-out percentage of each
refinance observed in the matched dataset, and adjust the sampling probability
accordingly.47 I then draw 200,000 observations, with replacement, according to these
sampling probabilities. As shown in Figure 1.5 in Section 1.5.4 and Figures A2, A3, A4,
and A5 in Appendix C, the matched dataset corresponds fairly well with aggregate
figures.
To finish constructing the matched dataset, in the final step I import a number of
aggregate and sub-aggregate variables and impute certain data elements. Certain
variable definitions warrant discussion in greater detail. House price indices are
obtained from Zillow and applied at the place-level48, as are local-area unemployment
rates from the Census Bureau.49 House prices themselves are a combination of the
observed price at origination (itself imputed from the origination balance and LTV) and
the percentage change in the local-area house price index. Servicing decisions, monthly
payments, home equity, and in some cases ending balances are imputed from the GSE
data via the appropriate formula.50 Other aggregate variables, such as mortgage rates
46In the FHLMC definition, “reducing balance” means cash-out less than zero, while “increasing balance”
means cash-out greater than 5% of the refinancing balance, so the sum of the two is not 100%.
47I also adjust the sampling probabilities of non-refinanced observations by a corresponding factor in
order to preserve their relative weight.
48Zillow provides home price indices at the ZIP Code-level, which I observe, but the records are less
complete than those at the city level.
49Places (either an incorporated place or a census-designated place (CDP)) are roughly the size of towns,
and most large cities contain many. For example, I can separately observe homeowners from Beverly Hills,
Compton, Culver City, Hollywood, Huntington Park, Inglewood, Montebello, Monterey Park, Santa Mon-
ica, and a variety of other places colloquially considered to be part of Los Angeles. There are over 900
places represented in the matched dataset, and they represent smaller populations that are much more
demographically homogeneous than either cities or counties.
50Ending balances are censored in the data for the first six months the loan is active. For FRMs, monthly
payments are a fixed nonlinear function of the initial balance, interest rate, and term.
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and mean unemployment duration, are imported at slightly higher levels of aggregation.
I construct several aggregate-level datasets for the purposes of imputing certain
borrower-level covariates and for defining borrower expectations. I have data on house
price indices from Zillow, defined at the city, county and MSA level for all of California.
I also have analogous data on unemployment rates at the same levels from the BLS. I
import this data at the finest-available level of geographic detail. If a borrower’s
observed city does not match to a city with aggregate data, I attempt to match at the
county-month, and so forth. Similarly if data is not available at the city-level for a
particular month in which I have borrower-level observations, I use county-level data.
Certain individual-level covariates, such as home equity, are defined as a function of the
aggregate home price index and borrower-level data on purchase price at origination
and ending balance. I also have mortgage rate data at the MSA level from HSH
Associates and national-level interest rates from the Federal Reserve, and import these
data in a similar fashion. For counties outside of MSAs, I use the average for the state of
California from HSH Associates. Finally, I construct measures of mean unemployment
duration by county using data from the Current Population Survey. I take averages
within a county-month of continuous weeks unemployed for currently unemployed
persons, weighted by CPS-defined statistical sampling weights. I then smooth the
resulting county-month-level panel series, placing additional weight on any
observations for March, the month for which an additional economic supplementary
survey is conducted by the CPS and for which more observations are available. A
handful of rural counties in California have insufficient data to estimate a reasonable
county-level average51, and for these counties I use the average for the state of California
as a whole. These ten variables (House Price Indices, Mean Unemployment Duration,
Unemployment Rate, Mortgage Rates, 30-Year Rates, 10-Year Rates, 7-Year Rates, 5-Year
Rates, 3-Year Rates and 1-Year Rates) defined at the county-level form the panel dataset
51Specifically, Amador, Butte, Del Norte, Kings, Lassen, Madera, Mariposa, Sutter, Tehama, and Yuba
counties.
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for the vector autoregression models I estimate to specify borrower preferences.
APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL DATASET SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table A1: GSE Dataset Summary Statistics
Panel A: Complete Origination Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Orig. Balance 187,578 103,301 4,000 1,470,000
Int. Rate 5.91 1.11 1.875 13.5
FICO 730.71 55.51 300 850
LTV 72.35 15.99 1 105
DTI 35.00 12.61 0 65
Rate-Term Refi. 0.24 0.43 0 1
Cash-Out Refi. 0.19 0.39 0 1
Investor 0.10 0.30 0 1
TPO 0.56 0.50 0 1
N 35,701,979
Panel B: Refinance Originations
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Orig. Balance 193381.8 105030.4 4,000 1,403,000
Int. Rate 5.79 1.04 1.875 12.63
FICO 728.60 56.61 300 850
LTV 67.96 15.74 1 105
DTI 34.35 12.76 0 65
Rate-Term Refi. 0.40 0.49 0 1
Cash-Out Refi. 0.32 0.47 0 1
Investor 0.08 0.27 0 1
TPO 0.56 0.50 0 1
N 21,435,660
Panel C: HARP-Ineligible Refinance Originations
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Orig. Balance 240749.8 134517.7 8,000 1,470,000
Int. Rate 4.45 0.63 2.5 8.625
FICO 762.04 39.73 439 850
LTV 70.70 15.94 1 105
DTI 32.69 10.18 0 65
Rate-Term Refi. 0.26 0.44 0 1
Cash-Out Refi. 0.14 0.34 0 1
Investor 0.08 0.27 0 1
TPO 0.55 0.50 0 1
N 6,973,525
Notes: Average characteristics of mortgages at origination in GSE dataset. Panel A is all mortgages
from Q1 2000-Q2 2013, Panel B is all refinance mortgages from Q1 2000-Q2 2013, and Panel C is all
mortgages from Q3 2009-Q2 2013.
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Figure A1: Originations by Month in GSE Dataset
Notes: Monthly Origination Volume in GSE dataset.
Table A2: Count of Mortgage Originations by Month in HARP Dataset
Pre-HARP Post-HARP
Month # Originations Month # Originations
2008-06 136,928 2009-06 296,716
2008-07 105,094 2009-07 207,276
2008-08 114,085 2009-08 174,923
2008-09 119,994 2009-09 168,540
2008-10 113,360 2009-10 167,701
2008-11 135,936 2009-11 165,077
2008-12 214,947 2009-12 151,407
2009-01 329,514 2010-01 120,959
2009-02 362,719 2010-02 110,024
2009-03 342,493 2010-03 137,321
2009-04 358,264 2010-04 132,821
2009-05 358,234 2010-05 139,886
Total 2,691,568 Total 1,972,651
Notes: Number of unique mortgages originated by month in dataset.
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Table A3: Secondary Market Dataset Summary Statistics
Panel A: April 2012 Fee Increase Implementation
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Pool Size 2.54E+07 1.09E+08 25,564 3.25E+09
Coupon 3.74 0.51 2.5 7.0
# Loans 119.77 418.02 1 10570
Avg. Loan Size 203,900 89,400 25,600 785,000
Orig. WAC 4.22 0.50 2.96 8.37
Orig. WAM 324.6 69.2 107 361
Avg. FICO 751.34 26.17 621.38 808.06
Avg. LTV 75.36 12.27 38.84 104.37
% Refi. 80.34 23.60 0 100
% Occ. 80.84 24.85 0 100
FNMA 0.52 0.50 0 1
G-Fee 0.49 0.11 0.25 1.37
N - - - 2,696
Panel B: December 2012 Fee Increase Implementation
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Pool Size 2.09E+07 9.20E+07 31,403 4.08E+09
Coupon 3.30 0.52 2.5 5.5
# Loans 98.67 350.30 1 14559
Avg. Loan Size 198,615 82,101 31,450 757,250
Orig. WAC 3.88 0.52 2.78 6.24
Orig. WAM 329.6 61.6 117 361
Avg. FICO 747.92 26.06 622.00 816.70
Avg. LTV 81.41 20.70 37.14 218.41
% Refi. 80.61 24.27 0 100
% Occ. 80.94 23.16 0 100
FNMA 0.53 0.50 0 1
G-Fee 0.59 0.15 0.25 1.47
N - - - 3,646
Panel C: Full FNMA Issuance Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Pool Size 2.16E+07 8.55E+07 22,734 4.66E+09
Coupon 3.44 0.63 1.5 7.0
# Loans 102.75 350.68 1 16451
Avg. Loan Size 197,175 87,945 22,795 877,098
Orig. WAC 3.97 0.62 2.25 8.37
Orig. WAM 297.9 82.9 38 480
Avg. FICO 750.57 25.69 595 820
Avg. LTV 76.64 18.14 21 226
% Refi. 77.94 26.56 0 100
% Occ. 80.89 24.13 0 100
FNMA 1.00 0.00 1 1
G-Fee 0.53 0.14 0.25 1.68
N - - - 58,106
Notes: Panels A and B show average characteristics of all FHLMC and FNMA MBS issued in 2-
week window around April 1st, 2012 and December 1st, 2012, respectively. Panel C shows average
characteristics of all FNMA MBS issued in 2-year period from July 2011 to June 2013.
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Table A4: Average Loan Applicant Risk Characteristics by Year
Year Income ($) FICO LTV Interest Rate Guarantee Fee (bp)
2000 74,434 710 74 8.13 19.3
2001 82,297 712 70 7.15 19.3
2002 84,863 717 66 6.65 19.3
2003 86,920 725 62 5.94 21.0
2004 80,443 716 60 5.79 20.8
2005 82,184 718 55 5.87 21.0
2006 95,755 721 54 6.60 21.8
2007 105,199 725 57 6.61 26.6
2008 115,772 740 66 6.60 28.0
2009 130,066 764 62 5.41 23.8
2010 135,181 766 64 4.99 25.7
2011 135,346 766 65 4.66 28.8
2012 124,791 770 65 3.90 39.9
Notes: Average characteristics of applications in HMDA dataset by year.
Table A5: Loan Application Outcomes by Year
Year Denied (%) Rejected (%) Held (%) Securitized (%) Total
2000 33.88 23.67 33.56 8.89 546,472
2001 21.63 21.52 36.43 20.41 1,557,992
2002 18.44 21.56 34.84 25.15 2,019,569
2003 16.63 21.37 32.20 29.80 3,046,025
2004 22.55 24.93 36.14 16.38 1,870,789
2005 24.14 25.44 37.70 12.71 1,559,074
2006 25.59 26.75 37.67 10.00 1,290,774
2007 32.68 23.49 30.85 12.98 983,978
2008 34.76 23.60 20.00 21.64 625,338
2009 22.10 18.67 25.30 33.93 867,548
2010 21.65 15.62 30.03 32.70 889,065
2011 22.20 15.55 28.78 33.47 814,439
2012 19.23 14.06 21.99 44.71 1,038,733
Total 22.40 21.69 32.52 23.39 17,109,796
Notes: Percent of applications by disposition in HMDA dataset by year.
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Table A6: Merged Dataset Average Borrower Risk Characteristics by Origination Year
Year Price ($) Income ($) UPB ($) Interest Rate Payment ($) LTV FICO DTI
2000 290,916 45,853 188,691 7.54 1,315 72 706 38.04
2001 308,341 48,591 195,151 6.88 1,283 69 717 36.31
2002 344,132 51,288 210,012 6.36 1,308 66 719 35.77
2003 363,884 49,396 213,324 5.79 1,250 63 723 35.74
2004 385,459 49,557 227,657 5.80 1,334 63 713 37.44
2005 459,430 50,997 243,616 5.77 1,422 57 721 38.12
2006 500,898 55,456 257,428 6.34 1,600 55 728 39.11
2007 537,583 60,771 287,353 6.22 1,762 57 733 39.53
2008 568,698 67,212 319,766 5.80 1,872 62 750 38.65
2009 638,570 72,373 340,083 4.98 1,821 60 766 34.80
2010 611,083 71,885 348,652 4.82 1,834 62 766 34.69
2011 580,626 66,360 332,245 4.53 1,687 63 767 34.54
2012 565,859 62,543 316,632 4.06 1,522 61 771 33.05
Notes: Average characteristics of loans in matched dataset at origination.
Figure A2: Comparison of Loan Purpose Distribution by Origination Year
Notes: % of observations originated as refinances by origination year in GSE, deeds, and matched
datasets.
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Figure A3: Comparison of % of Refinances Increasing Loan Balance
Notes: Unweighted % of observed refinances in matched dataset increasing loan balance by
greater than 5% (in accordance with FHLMC definition of “increasing balance”) by quarter com-
pared with aggregate figure reported in FHLMC Refinance Report.
Figure A4: Comparison of Median Appreciation of Refinanced Homes
Notes: Unweighted median appreciation of observed refinances in matched dataset by quarter
compared with aggregate figure reported in FHLMC Refinance Report.
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Figure A5: Comparison of Cash Out as % of Refinanced Balances
Notes: Total withdrawn equity over total refinancing volume observed in matched dataset by
quarter compared with aggregate figure reported in FHLMC Refinance Report.
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APPENDIX D: ALTERNATE SECONDARY-MARKET MODEL
SPECIFICATIONS
Table A7: Average Characteristics of MBS
Month Avg. Size Avg. FICO Avg. LTV % Refi. % TPO % Occ.
2011-09 201,357 749.1 74.1 67.4 32.2 81.9
2011-10 210,224 753.3 74.0 71.4 35.9 83.0
2011-11 201,654 754.4 72.9 74.6 35.6 83.7
2011-12 191,543 750.6 71.7 74.1 35.6 82.0
2012-01 192,247 752.5 73.7 78.0 33.2 81.7
2012-02 194,737 753.4 73.0 79.9 31.5 81.2
2012-03 195,475 752.8 73.8 80.7 33.2 81.1
2012-04 196,139 753.7 73.9 78.4 32.0 80.8
2012-05 190,296 749.6 75.3 76.2 31.5 81.1
2012-06 194,988 746.9 79.4 76.2 32.0 80.9
2012-07 198,178 749.6 79.2 75.3 32.3 80.7
2012-08 201,895 751.8 77.7 75.1 35.6 82.3
2012-09 199,556 749.5 78.7 75.4 32.6 81.7
2012-10 197,837 750.8 78.3 79.7 35.6 82.6
2012-11 200,935 751.7 77.6 80.1 34.1 80.7
2012-12 194,196 751.5 77.2 81.0 36.2 80.0
2013-01 198,091 749.7 77.6 81.2 35.3 80.8
2013-02 199,673 748.2 77.5 83.4 38.0 79.8
2013-03 192,707 745.0 79.0 86.6 34.7 80.0
Notes: Average characteristics of FNMA MBS by month of issuance.
234
Table A8: Guarantee Fee Increase Event Study with All Controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Issued Post-April 2012 0.0532*** 0.0838*** - - 0.0748***
(0.0042) (0.0138) - - (0.0020)
Issued Post-December 2012 - - 0.0379*** 0.0450*** 0.0430***
- - (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0019)
Q3 LTV 0.0014*** 0.0036*** 0.0009 -0.0001 0.0021***
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0001)
Q2 LTV -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0016* -0.0006 -0.0014***
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0002)
Q1 LTV -0.0012*** -0.0020*** -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0001)
Q3 FICO -0.0002 -0.0009*** 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Q2 FICO 0.0000 0.0009*** 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Q1 FICO 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Q3 Int. Rt. 0.0145 0.1210*** 0.0808*** 0.0539 0.1018***
(0.0238) (0.0294) (0.0277) (0.0366) (0.0069)
Q2 Int. Rt. 0.1251*** 0.0129 0.0190 0.0438 0.1612***
(0.0256) (0.0311) (0.0324) (0.0412) (0.0091)
Q1 Int. Rt. -0.0656*** -0.0347* -0.0601*** -0.0703*** -0.1900***
(0.0151) (0.0182) (0.0154) (0.0203) (0.0077)
Orig. WAM -0.0002*** -0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0006*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
% Refi. -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
% Occ. 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Implementation Date April 2012 April 2012 December 2012 December 2012 Both
Sample Window 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 1 Week 6 Months
Fixed Effects State State State State State, Orig. Year
N 2,696 1,554 3,646 2,338 58,106
R2 0.1975 0.2045 0.1488 0.1615 0.1459
Notes: Dependent variable is difference between MBS coupon and WAC. Standard errors in paren-
theses. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A9: Guarantee Fee Increase Event Study with All Controls
Est. FE SE
Oct. 2011 -0.027*** (0.0040)
Nov. 2011 -0.038*** (0.0039)
Dec. 2011 -0.020*** (0.0038)
Jan. 2012 -0.024*** (0.0039)
Feb. 2012 -0.012** (0.0050)
Mar. 2012 -0.015*** (0.0053)
Apr. 2012 0.013** (0.0057)
May 2012 0.031*** (0.0057)
Jun. 2012 0.067*** (0.0057)
Jul. 2012 0.060*** (0.0058)
Aug. 2012 0.043*** (0.0058)
Sep. 2012 0.055*** (0.0060)
Oct. 2012 0.086*** (0.0061)
Nov. 2012 0.073*** (0.0061)
Dec. 2012 0.096*** (0.0064)
Jan. 2013 0.087*** (0.0062)
Feb. 2013 0.079*** (0.0059)
Mar. 2013 0.121*** (0.0060)
Apr. 2013 0.159*** (0.0058)
Implementation Date Both
Sample Window 6 Months
Fixed Effects State, Orig. Year
N 58,106
R2 0.1679
Notes: Dependent variable is difference between MBS coupon and WAC. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Additional controls include quartiles of LTV, FICO and interest rate, weighted-average
maturity, and % refinance and owner-occupied. Bold months denote policy intervention dates.
***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A10: 2SLS MBS Coupon Event Study
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Predicted G-Fee -1.2294*** -1.2138*** -0.9264*** -0.9900*** -1.0112***
(0.0850) (0.2058) (0.1399) (0.1336) (0.0206)
Implementation Date April 2012 April 2012 December 2012 December 2012 Both
Sample Window 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 1 Week 6 Months
Fixed Effects State State State State State/Orig. Year
N 2,696 1,554 3,646 2,338 58,106
R2 0.9447 0.9518 0.9258 0.9326 0.9528
Notes: Dependent variable is MBS coupon. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls
include quartiles of LTV, FICO and interest rate, weighted-average maturity, and % refinance and
owner-occupied. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
Table A11: MBS Coupon Event Study with All Controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Issued Post-April 2012 -0.0614*** -0.0637*** - - -0.0759***
(0.0042) (0.0108) - - (0.0022)
Issued Post-December 2012 - - -0.0276*** -0.0443*** -0.0432***
- - (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0020)
Q3 LTV -0.0027*** -0.0045*** -0.0015** -0.0004 -0.0023***
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0001)
Q2 LTV -0.0001 0.0003 0.0025** 0.0014 0.0014***
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0002)
Q1 LTV 0.0018*** 0.0028*** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0009***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0001)
Q3 FICO 0.0002 0.0012*** -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Q2 FICO -0.0002 -0.0011*** -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Q1 FICO -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Q3 Int. Rt. 0.4249*** 0.3296*** 0.2888*** 0.3511*** 0.2596***
(0.0274) (0.0336) (0.0299) (0.0393) (0.0073)
Q2 Int. Rt. 0.2894*** 0.4162*** 0.4836*** 0.4497*** 0.1157***
(0.0295) (0.0356) (0.0350) (0.0443) (0.0097)
Q1 Int. Rt. 0.1839*** 0.1250*** 0.1800*** 0.1692*** 0.5545***
(0.0174) (0.0208) (0.0166) (0.0218) (0.0082)
Orig. WAM 0.0003*** 0.0002** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** 0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
% Refi. 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
% Occ. -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0004** -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Implementation Date April 2012 April 2012 December 2012 December 2012 Both
Sample Window 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 1 Week 6 Months
Fixed Effects State State State State State/Orig. Year
N 2,696 1,554 3,646 2,338 58,106
R2 0.9447 0.9518 0.9258 0.9326 0.9528
Notes: Dependent variable is MBS coupon. Standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates
significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A12: 2SLS MBS Price Event Study
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Predicted G-Fee -4.5063*** -6.2330*** -14.9385*** -8.2187*** -2.9213***
(0.3034) (0.5456) (0.7409) (1.0492) (0.0912)
Implementation Date April 2012 April 2012 December 2012 December 2012 Both
Sample Window 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 1 Week 6 Months
Fixed Effects State/Day State/Day State/Day State/Day State/Day/Orig. Year
N 20,512 6,582 23,777 7,922 499,321
R2 0.8718 0.8958 0.7453 0.7529 0.8029
Notes: Dependent variable is MBS price. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls in-
clude quartiles of LTV, FICO and interest rate, weighted-average maturity, days from issuance, and
% refinance, third-party and owner-occupied. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-
level respectively.
Table A13: MBS Price Event Study with All Controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Issued Post-April 2012 -0.2251*** -0.3272*** - - -0.2058***
(0.0152) (0.0286) - - (0.0045)
Issued Post-December 2012 - - -0.4447*** -0.3676*** -0.3515***
- - (0.0221) (0.0469) (0.0057)
Q3 LTV -0.0156*** -0.0324*** 0.0158*** 0.0240*** 0.0081***
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0004)
Q2 LTV -0.0002 0.0040** 0.0297*** 0.0221*** 0.0032***
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0004)
Q1 LTV 0.0114*** 0.0176*** -0.0029** -0.0023 0.0063***
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0003)
Q3 FICO 0.0030*** 0.0104*** -0.0027*** -0.0035*** 0.0002*
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0001)
Q2 FICO -0.0027*** -0.0061*** -0.0022*** -0.0019 0.0021***
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0002)
Q1 FICO -0.0036*** -0.0088*** -0.0008*** -0.0012*** -0.0042***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Q3 Int. Rt. 1.4293*** 1.0774*** 1.9460*** 1.4995*** 0.6006***
(0.0526) (0.0941) (0.0744) (0.1191) (0.0153)
Q2 Int. Rt. 1.4860*** 1.3035*** -0.5861*** -0.3439*** 0.2837***
(0.0564) (0.0970) (0.0825) (0.1332) (0.0198)
Q1 Int. Rt. 0.4819*** 1.1504*** 0.2018*** 0.2108*** 1.1820***
(0.0351) (0.0694) (0.0380) (0.0655) (0.0168)
Orig. WAM -0.0165*** -0.0179*** -0.0035*** -0.0013*** -0.0052***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
% Refi. -0.0005** -0.0005 0.0120*** 0.0134*** 0.0034***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001)
% Occ. -0.0115*** -0.0117*** -0.0135*** -0.0124*** -0.0053***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0001)
Days Since Issue 0.0041* -0.0271*** -0.0335*** -0.0390*** 0.0005***
(0.0024) (0.0078) (0.0032) (0.0116) (0.0000)
Implementation Date April 2012 April 2012 December 2012 December 2012 Both
Sample Window 2 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 1 Week 6 Months
Fixed Effects State/Day State/Day State/Day State/Day State/Day/Orig. Year
N 20,512 6,582 23,777 7,922 499,321
R2 0.8718 0.8958 0.7453 0.7529 0.8036
Notes: Dependent variable is MBS price. Standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates signif-
icance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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APPENDIX E: ALTERNATE PRIMARY-MARKET MODEL
SPECIFICATIONS
Table A14: Average Characteristics of Mortgages
Month Avg. Size Avg. FICO Avg. LTV Avg. DTI % Cash % TPO % Occ.
2011-09 289,952 766.5 66.3 31.6 9.7% 60.4% 8.3%
2011-10 263,521 767.2 66.1 31.4 9.3% 61.3% 8.7%
2011-11 261,753 767.0 65.7 31.4 16.3% 59.0% 8.7%
2011-12 252,414 765.6 65.7 31.5 28.6% 53.6% 9.9%
2012-01 256,033 766.7 66.0 31.3 29.5% 54.8% 9.5%
2012-02 258,782 767.3 66.0 31.2 28.8% 52.4% 9.8%
2012-03 252,374 766.6 66.1 31.4 30.6% 54.4% 10.0%
2012-04 250,676 764.8 66.2 31.7 33.8% 51.9% 9.9%
2012-05 253,363 763.7 66.7 31.8 33.4% 53.8% 10.5%
2012-06 262,992 766.4 66.6 31.2 30.4% 53.7% 9.8%
2012-07 266,983 767.4 66.4 30.9 28.7% 54.1% 9.3%
2012-08 267,388 767.5 66.7 30.8 27.5% 54.2% 8.9%
2012-09 260,917 765.9 67.0 31.0 28.3% 51.2% 9.4%
2012-10 263,267 766.0 67.4 30.9 26.4% 53.6% 9.6%
2012-11 271,436 766.0 67.2 30.6 28.6% 58.0% 11.3%
2012-12 262,148 765.7 67.0 30.9 27.3% 55.2% 10.1%
2013-01 255,615 764.7 67.0 31.0 27.8% 56.4% 10.5%
2013-02 244,350 761.7 67.3 31.6 29.6% 60.1% 11.7%
2013-03 238,822 759.5 67.6 31.7 29.0% 58.8% 11.2%
Notes: Average characteristics of originated refinance mortgages by month. Size denotes loan
balance, Cash/TPO/Occ. respectively the fraction of cash-out refinances, third-party originations,
and owner-occupants.
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Figure A6: Correlation Between Secondary-Swap Spread and MOVE Index
Notes: Correlation between spread of secondary market rate over option-implied interest rate
volatility index. Observations at week-level using 3-week centered moving averages.
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Table A15: Mortgage Interest Rate Event Study Robustness Tests
Post-Jan. 2012 .0917*** .0861*** .0751*** .0885***
(1.25E-3) (1.26E-3) (1.94E-3) (1.25E-3)
Post-Sept. 2012 .0834*** .0694*** .1522*** .0815***
(4.75E-4) (4.85E-4) (1.38E-3) (4.92E-4)
FICO -.0019*** -.0019*** -.0019*** -.0019***
(4.74E-6) (4.72E-6) (4.74E-6) (4.74E-6)
LTV .0031*** .0031*** .0031*** .0031***
(1.12E-5) (1.12E-5) (1.12E-5) (1.12E-5)
DTI .0012*** .0012*** .0012*** .0012***
(1.71E-5) (1.70E-5) (1.71E-5) (1.71E-5)
Cash-Out Refi. .0752*** -.0181*** .0750*** .0752***
(5.29E-4) (1.21E-3) (5.29E-4) (5.28E-4)
Post-January 2012 x Cash-Out - .0720*** - -
- (1.35E-3) - -
Post-Jan. 2012 x Cash-Out - .1564*** - -
- (1.20E-3) - -
Post-Jan. 2012 x HHI - - .0594*** -
- - (6.03E-3) -
Post-Sept. 2012 x HHI - - -.2715*** -
- - (5.15E-3) -
Post-Jan. 2012 x Non-Bank - - - .0246***
- - - (7.69E-4)
Post-Sept. 2012 x Non-Bank - - - .0092***
- - - (1.08E-3)
N 3,329,478 3,329,478 3,329,478 3,329,478
R2 0.2974 0.3024 0.2980 0.2980
Notes: Dependent variable is spread of primary mortgage rate over secondary mortgage rate,
sample is all loans originated between September 2011 and March 2013 in GSE dataset. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Additional controls include origination balance, interest rate volatility,
state house price indices and unemployment rates, and indicators for investor-owned, third-party
origination, and condominium properties. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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Table A16: Jumbo-Conforming Loan Spread Event Study
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Conforming Refi. Rate 0.6569*** 0.6382*** 0.5705***
(0.0152) (0.0314) (0.0165)
Post-Jan. 2012 -0.1069*** -0.1001*** -
(0.0052) (0.0058) -
Post-Sept. 2012 -0.1149*** - -0.1126***
(0.0127) - (0.0104)
Sample Window 6 Months 6 Months 6 Months
State FE? Yes Yes Yes
Population Weights? Yes Yes Yes
N 20,145 11,730 11,628
R2 0.9272 0.8945 0.7576
Notes: Dependent variable is jumbo mortgage refinance rate at State-Day Level. Jumbo and con-
forming mortgage rates measured as 5-day centered moving averages. Standard errors in paren-
theses. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A17: Refinancing Probability Event Study with Additional Controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post-Announcement -0.0017*** -0.0015*** -0.0024*** -0.0016***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
FICO 8.13E-05*** 6.67E-05*** 8.40E-05*** 8.09E-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Êquity 2.45E-07*** 2.15E-07*** 2.91E-07*** 2.76E-07***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Loan Age 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Initial LTV 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0018*** 0.0017***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
̂Unemp. Rate -0.0002*** 0.0047*** -0.0032*** 0.0038***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Initial Int. Rt. Spread 0.0156*** 0.0132*** 0.0114*** 0.0116***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -0.0293*** -0.0214*** -0.0212*** -0.0193***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Announcement Date Jan. 2012 Jan. 2012 Sept. 2012 Sept. 2012
Sample Window 3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
N 29,872,035 52,340,967 36,057,155 63,184,479
R2 0.0763 0.0666 0.0900 0.0857
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans originated after June
2009 in GSE dataset. Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Hats denote
instrumented variables. Additional controls include indicators for owner-occupied, third-party
origination, initial cash-out refinance, initial purchase loan, condominiums, manufactured hous-
ing, and planned-unit developments. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level re-
spectively.
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Table A18: Refinancing Probability Event Study at Implementation Date
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post-Implementation -0.0032*** -0.0042*** 0.0000 -0.0020***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
FICO 7.51E-05*** 8.10E-05*** 8.46E-05*** 7.23E-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Êquity 2.43E-07*** 2.62E-07*** 2.96E-07*** 2.67E-07***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Loan Age 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Initial LTV 0.0014*** 0.0016*** 0.0018*** 0.0017***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
̂Unemp. Rate 0.0050*** 0.0026*** 0.0085*** 0.0013***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Initial Int. Rt. Spread 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 0.0102*** 0.0103***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -0.0184*** -0.0214*** -0.0212*** -0.0152***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Implementation Date Apr. 2012 Apr. 2012 Dec. 2012 Dec. 2012
Sample Window 3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
N 32,080,570 56,274,415 38,586,254 66,539,436
R2 0.0738 0.0814 0.0926 0.0825
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans originated after June
2009 in GSE dataset. Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Hats denote
instrumented variables. Additional controls include indicators for owner-occupied, third-party
origination, initial cash-out refinance, initial purchase loan, condominiums, manufactured hous-
ing, and planned-unit developments. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level re-
spectively.
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Table A19: Refinancing Probability Event Study Without Instruments
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post-Announcement -0.0018*** -0.0031*** -0.0026*** -0.0033***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
FICO 7.87E-05*** 6.39E-05*** 8.07E-05*** 7.78E-05***
(6.49E-07) (5.06E-07) (6.67E-07) (5.48E-07)
Equity 2.73E-07*** 2.39E-07*** 3.25E-07*** 3.08E-07***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Loan Age 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Initial LTV 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0020*** 0.0019***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Unemp. Rate 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0013*** 0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Initial Int. Rt. Spread 0.0151*** 0.0125*** 0.0107*** 0.0109***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -0.0295*** -0.0194*** -0.0208*** -0.0191***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Announcement Date Jan. 2012 Jan. 2012 Sept. 2012 Sept. 2012
Sample Window 3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
N 29,872,035 52,340,967 36,057,155 63,184,479
R2 0.0845 0.0737 0.0998 0.0945
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans originated after June
2009 in GSE dataset. Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional
controls include indicators for owner-occupied, third-party origination, initial cash-out refinance,
initial purchase loan, condominiums, manufactured housing, and planned-unit developments.
***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A20: Default Probability Event Study Without Instruments
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post-Announcement 8.08E-05*** 1.20E-04*** 3.71E-06 3.59E-05***
(8.25E-06) (5.53E-06) (1.27E-05) (6.36E-06)
FICO -2.69E-06*** -2.48E-06*** -2.57E-06*** -2.81E-06***
(8.67E-08) (6.61E-08) (7.70E-08) (6.02E-08)
Home Price App. -2.76E-04 3.47E-05 -9.40E-04*** -7.56E-04***
(2.63E-04) (1.49E-04) (1.07E-04) (6.46E-05)
Loan Age 8.14E-06*** 9.01E-06*** 4.57E-06*** 5.99E-06***
(3.62E-07) (2.68E-07) (3.22E-07) (2.50E-07)
Initial LTV 4.77E-06*** 4.32E-06*** 4.09E-06*** 4.58E-06***
(1.73E-07) (1.35E-07) (1.57E-07) (1.21E-07)
Unemp. Rate -9.37E-05*** -7.67E-05*** -1.02E-04*** -4.39E-05***
(7.21E-06) (4.78E-06) (9.82E-06) (4.15E-06)
Initial Int. Rt. 5.49E-05*** 5.68E-05*** 8.19E-05*** 5.89E-05***
(8.88E-06) (6.79E-06) (8.07E-06) (6.12E-06)
∆ Mtg. Rt. 8.98E-05* 2.96E-04*** 3.80E-04*** 2.59E-04***
(5.33E-05) (1.22E-05) (3.34E-05) (1.46E-05)
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Announcement Date Jan. 2012 Jan. 2012 Sept. 2012 Sept. 2012
Sample Window 3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months
N 29,872,035 52,340,967 36,057,155 63,184,479
R2 0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for default, sample is all loans originated after June 2009 in
GSE dataset. Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls in-
clude initial DTI ratio, state-level home value indices, indicators for owner-occupied, third-party
origination, initial cash-out refinance, initial purchase loan, condominiums, manufactured hous-
ing, and planned-unit developments. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level re-
spectively.
246
APPENDIX F: ALTERNATE SUPPLY-DEMAND INTERACTION
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
Table A21: Baseline Credit Constraint Probit Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Income -2.34E-7*** -2.32E-7*** -2.31E-7*** -2.36E-7***
(4.90E-9) (4.87E-9) (4.84E-9) (4.92E-9)
Orig. Balance -6.57E-8*** -7.96E-8*** -1.41E-7*** -3.71E-8***
(3.73E-9) (3.75E-9) (3.79E-9) (3.76E-9)
Owner-Occ. 3.11E-2*** 3.12E-2*** 3.15E-2*** 2.93E-2***
(1.15E-3) (1.15E-3) (1.15E-3) (1.16E-3)
FICO -9.28E-4*** -1.88E-4*** -8.43E-4*** -9.74E-4***
(2.45E-5) (3.16E-5) (2.44E-5) (2.45E-5)
LTV -4.20E-3*** -4.14E-3*** -3.72E-3*** -7.64E-3***
(3.22E-5) (3.25E-5) (3.27E-5) (6.36E-5)
DTI 0.0205*** 0.0202*** 0.0048*** 0.0206***
(9.95E-5) (9.97E-5) (1.67E-4) (9.96E-5)
Mtg. Spread -0.0111*** -0.0095*** -0.0124*** -0.0072***
(7.68E-4) (7.69E-4) (7.68E-4) (7.69E-4)
G-Fee 0.0007*** 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 0.0013***
(9.35E-5) (9.38E-5) (9.58E-5) (9.38E-5)
̂Unemp. Rate 0.0015*** - - -
(3.45E-4) - - -
Ûnemp. x Bin 1 - 0.0234*** 0.0272*** 0.0112***
- (2.83E-3) (4.11E-4) (3.61E-4)
Ûnemp. x Bin 2 - 0.0022*** 0.0159*** 0.0027***
- (6.47E-4) (3.80E-4) (3.54E-4)
Ûnemp. x Bin 3 - 0.0189*** 0.0104*** -0.0029***
- (4.31E-4) (3.65E-4) (3.54E-4)
Ûnemp. x Bin 4 - 0.0073*** 0.0041*** -0.0061***
- (3.56E-4) (3.49E-4) (3.63E-4)
Ûnemp. x Bin 5 - -0.0060*** -0.0022*** -0.0086***
- (9.24E-4) (3.56E-4) (4.09E-4)
Year FE? No No No No
County FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bin Type None FICO DTI LTV
N 16,613,070 16,613,070 16,613,070 16,613,070
Pseudo-R2 0.0155 0.0158 0.0161 0.0160
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for either denial or offer rejection, sample is all loans in
HMDA dataset. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hats denote instrumented variables. In-
teraction terms use equally-sized quintiles of the corresponding variable (higher bins correspond
to lower credit risk). ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A22: Alternate Credit Constraint Probit Model Without Instruments
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Income -2.48E-7*** -2.45E-7*** -2.44E-7*** -2.49E-7***
(5.13E-9) (5.09E-9) (5.08E-9) (5.14E-9)
Orig. Balance -3.49E-7*** -3.24E-7*** -3.86E-7*** -3.09E-7***
(3.57E-9) (3.58E-9) (3.59E-9) (3.62E-9)
Owner-Occ. 2.87E-2*** 2.76E-2*** 2.82E-2*** 2.74E-2***
(1.15E-3) (1.15E-3) (1.15E-3) (1.15E-3)
FICO -3.37E-3*** -2.85E-3*** -2.88E-3*** -3.26E-3***
(2.08E-5) (2.99E-5) (2.11E-5) (2.08E-5)
LTV -2.14E-3*** -2.29E-3*** -1.76E-3*** -6.07E-3***
(3.04E-5) (3.07E-5) (3.06E-5) (5.43E-5)
DTI 0.0247*** 0.0243*** 0.0105*** 0.0244***
(9.81E-5) (9.83E-5) (1.56E-4) (9.81E-5)
Mtg. Spread -0.0364*** -0.0332*** -0.0357*** -0.0286***
(7.44E-4) (7.45E-4) (7.43E-4) (7.46E-4)
G-Fee 0.0047*** 0.0055*** 0.0046*** 0.0046***
(7.25E-5) (7.30E-5) (7.42E-5) (7.26E-5)
Unemp. Rate 0.0181*** - - -
(1.31E-4) - - -
Unemp. x Bin 1 - 0.0164*** 0.0374*** 0.0296***
- (8.82E-4) (2.03E-4) (1.63E-4)
Unemp. x Bin 2 - 0.0161*** 0.0219*** 0.0200***
- (1.48E-4) (1.69E-4) (1.51E-4)
Unemp. x Bin 3 - 0.0238*** 0.0177*** 0.0131***
- (1.61E-4) (1.56E-4) (1.54E-4)
Unemp. x Bin 4 - -0.0075*** 0.0134*** 0.0091***
- (5.46E-4) (1.48E-4) (1.63E-4)
Unemp. x Bin 5 - -0.0149*** 0.0091*** 0.0069***
- (2.88E-3) (1.72E-4) (2.30E-4)
Year FE? No No No No
County FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bin Type None FICO DTI LTV
N 16,613,070 16,613,070 16,613,070 16,613,070
Pseudo-R2 0.0162 0.0163 0.0164 0.0165
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for either denial or offer rejection, sample is all loans in
HMDA dataset. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Interaction terms use equally-sized quin-
tiles of the corresponding variable (higher bins correspond to lower credit risk). ***/**/* indicates
significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A23: Alternate Credit Constraint Probit Model with Denial
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Income -3.24E-7*** -3.23E-7*** -3.24E-7*** -3.25E-7***
(8.20E-9) (8.19E-9) (8.20E-9) (8.22E-9)
Orig. Balance -1.73E-7*** -1.80E-7*** -1.77E-7*** -1.72E-7***
(5.40E-9) (5.41E-9) (5.40E-9) (5.40E-9)
Owner-Occ. -3.03E-2*** -3.03E-2*** -3.03E-2*** -3.09E-2***
(1.32E-3) (1.32E-3) (1.32E-3) (1.32E-3)
FICO -1.66E-5 4.08E-4*** -2.38E-5 -1.70E-4***
(2.98E-5) (3.69E-5) (2.98E-5) (2.99E-5)
LTV 1.39E-3*** 1.32E-3*** 1.36E-3*** -6.98E-4***
(5.32E-5) (5.35E-5) (5.33E-5) (8.28E-5)
DTI -0.0035*** -0.0036*** -0.0062*** -0.0034***
(1.20E-4) (1.21E-4) (1.84E-4) (1.20E-4)
Mtg. Spread 0.0029*** 0.0024** 0.0029*** 0.0032***
(1.00E-3) (1.00E-3) (1.00E-3) (1.00E-3)
G-Fee -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000
(1.66E-4) (1.66E-4) (1.66E-4) (1.66E-4)
̂Unemp. Rate 0.0070*** - - -
(5.68E-4) - - -
Ûnemp. x Bin 1 - 0.0501*** 0.0109*** 0.0078***
- (3.00E-3) (6.11E-4) (5.70E-4)
Ûnemp. x Bin 2 - 0.0054*** 0.0078*** 0.0036***
- (8.20E-4) (5.88E-4) (5.82E-4)
Ûnemp. x Bin 3 - 0.0150*** 0.0090*** 0.0014**
- (6.08E-4) (5.77E-4) (5.92E-4)
Ûnemp. x Bin 4 - 0.0074*** 0.0071*** -0.0008
- (5.69E-4) (5.73E-4) (6.05E-4)
Ûnemp. x Bin 5 - 0.0052*** 0.0052*** -0.0037***
- (1.06E-3) (5.78E-4) (6.46E-4)
Year FE? No No No No
County FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bin Type None FICO DTI LTV
N 16,613,070 16,613,070 16,613,070 16,613,070
Pseudo-R2 0.0231 0.0232 0.0231 0.0232
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for application denial, sample is all loans in HMDA
dataset. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hats denote instrumented variables. Interaction
terms use equally-sized quintiles of the corresponding variable (higher bins correspond to lower
credit risk). ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A24: Baseline Refinancing Probit Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Initial LTV 2.53E-3*** 2.45E-3*** 2.50E-3*** 8.59E-3***
(2.72E-4) (2.75E-4) (2.73E-4) (1.81E-4)
FICO 1.24E-4*** -1.13E-3*** 1.25E-4*** 1.29E-4***
(2.53E-5) (5.16E-5) (2.52E-5) (2.57E-5)
DTI -5.56E-4*** -5.12E-4*** -5.95E-4*** -8.42E-4***
(1.01E-4) (1.01E-4) (1.01E-4) (1.01E-4)
Loan Age 1.44E-2*** 1.45E-2*** 1.26E-2*** 1.25E-2***
(2.97E-4) (2.98E-4) (3.01E-4) (2.91E-4)
Êquity 7.66E-8** 7.67E-8** 7.64E-8** 6.61E-8**
(3.05E-8) (3.07E-8) (3.05E-8) (2.58E-8)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -0.1448*** -0.1445*** -0.1394*** -0.1519***
(2.14E-3) (2.14E-3) (2.13E-3) (2.11E-3)
Investor -0.3177*** -0.3196*** -0.3182*** -0.2835***
(6.28E-3) (6.31E-3) (6.30E-3) (6.32E-3)
TPO 0.0678*** 0.0678*** 0.0682*** 0.0600***
(2.48E-3) (2.48E-3) (2.48E-3) (2.47E-3)
Purchase 0.0539*** 0.0546*** 0.0492*** 0.0868***
(4.28E-3) (4.29E-3) (4.28E-3) (4.34E-3)
Cash-Out Refi. 0.0258*** 0.0259*** 0.0269*** 0.0274***
(2.62E-3) (2.63E-3) (2.62E-3) (2.65E-3)
̂Unemp. Rate -0.0422*** - - -
(1.52E-3) - - -
Ûnemp. x Bin 1 - -0.0672*** -0.0388*** -0.0482***
- (2.08E-3) (1.56E-3) (1.59E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 2 - -0.0571*** -0.0346*** -0.0195***
- (1.67E-3) (1.57E-3) (1.59E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 3 - -0.0492*** -0.0492*** -0.0007
- (1.55E-3) (1.64E-3) (1.61E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 4 - -0.0359*** -0.0183*** 0.0077***
- (1.53E-3) (1.68E-3) (1.66E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 5 - -0.0308*** -0.0208*** 0.0154***
- (1.61E-3) (1.92E-3) (1.87E-3)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bin Type None FICO HP App. Equity
N 6,911,395 6,911,395 6,911,395 6,911,395
Pseudo-R2 0.0609 0.0617 0.0632 0.0689
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for refinancing, sample is all loans in matched dataset.
Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Hats denote instrumented variables.
Interaction terms use equally-sized quintiles of the corresponding variable (higher bins corre-
spond to lower credit risk). ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A25: Alternate Refinance Probit Model Without Instruments
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Initial LTV 2.54E-3*** 2.44E-3*** 2.29E-3*** 7.97E-3***
(2.94E-4) (2.96E-4) (2.78E-4) (1.73E-4)
FICO 1.21E-4*** -1.27E-3*** 1.38E-4*** 1.24E-4***
(2.52E-5) (5.08E-5) (2.56E-5) (2.58E-5)
DTI -5.55E-4*** -5.23E-4*** -4.43E-4*** -7.48E-4***
(1.01E-4) (1.01E-4) (1.02E-4) (1.01E-4)
Loan Age 1.20E-2*** 1.20E-2*** 9.91E-3*** 1.13E-2***
(2.94E-4) (2.95E-4) (2.94E-4) (2.86E-4)
Equity 7.73E-8** 7.70E-8** 7.25E-8** 6.00E-8**
(3.25E-8) (3.26E-8) (3.03E-8) (2.38E-8)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -0.1448*** -0.1449*** -0.1294*** -0.1491***
(2.14E-3) (2.14E-3) (2.14E-3) (2.11E-3)
Investor -0.3176*** -0.3198*** -0.3204*** -0.2860***
(6.32E-3) (6.35E-3) (6.35E-3) (6.31E-3)
TPO 0.0673*** 0.0672*** 0.0624*** 0.0606***
(2.47E-3) (2.48E-3) (2.50E-3) (2.47E-3)
Purchase 0.0554*** 0.0560*** 0.0412*** 0.0856***
(4.29E-3) (4.30E-3) (4.35E-3) (4.37E-3)
Cash-Out Refi. 0.0262*** 0.0261*** 0.0216*** 0.0269***
(2.62E-3) (2.63E-3) (2.66E-3) (2.64E-3)
Unemp. Rate -0.0619*** - - -
(1.47E-3) - - -
Unemp. x Bin 1 - -0.0902*** -0.0523*** -0.0636***
- (2.03E-3) (1.47E-3) (1.43E-3)
Unemp. x Bin 2 - -0.0777*** -0.0496*** -0.0369***
- (1.61E-3) (1.49E-3) (1.44E-3)
Unemp. x Bin 3 - -0.0684*** -0.0571*** -0.0179***
- (1.50E-3) (1.53E-3) (1.45E-3)
Unemp. x Bin 4 - -0.0540*** -0.0295*** -0.0117***
- (1.48E-3) (1.54E-3) (1.48E-3)
Unemp. x Bin 5 - -0.0494*** -0.0099*** -0.0023
- (1.59E-3) (1.75E-3) (1.59E-3)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Orig. Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bin Type None FICO HP App. Equity
N 6,911,395 6,911,395 6,911,395 6,911,395
Pseudo-R2 0.0622 0.0631 0.0655 0.0699
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for refinancing, sample is all loans in matched dataset.
Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Interaction terms use equally-sized
deciles of the corresponding variable (higher bins correspond to lower credit risk). ***/**/* indi-
cates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A26: Alternate Refinance Probit Model with Decile Bins
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
̂Unemp. Rate -0.0422*** - - -
(1.52E-3) - - -
Ûnemp. x Bin 1 - -0.0874*** -0.0482*** -0.0535***
- (2.28E-3) (1.63E-3) (1.63E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 2 - -0.0805*** -0.0270*** -0.0364***
- (2.08E-3) (1.60E-3) (1.64E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 3 - -0.0682*** -0.0254*** -0.0218***
- (1.90E-3) (1.60E-3) (1.64E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 4 - -0.0625*** -0.0346*** -0.0083***
- (1.76E-3) (1.66E-3) (1.63E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 5 - -0.0580*** -0.0644*** 0.0018
- (1.67E-3) (1.79E-3) (1.64E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 6 - -0.0529*** -0.0288*** 0.0087***
- (1.62E-3) (1.70E-3) (1.67E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 7 - -0.0490*** -0.0185*** 0.0138***
- (1.58E-3) (1.75E-3) (1.69E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 8 - -0.0409*** 0.0036** 0.0165***
- (1.56E-3) (1.83E-3) (1.74E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 9 - -0.0332*** 0.0001 0.0212***
- (1.55E-3) (1.99E-3) (1.81E-3)
Ûnemp. x Bin 10 - -0.0255*** -0.0105*** 0.0299***
- (1.56E-3) (2.35E-3) (2.16E-3)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Orig. Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bin Type None FICO HP App. Equity
N 6,911,395 6,911,395 6,911,395 6,911,395
Pseudo-R2 0.0609 0.0667 0.0700 0.0623
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for refinancing, sample is all loans in matched dataset.
Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include LTV,
FICO, DTI, loan age, instrumented home equity, change in mortgage rates, and indicators for
investor-owned properties, third-party origination, purchase loans, and cash-out refinancing
loans. Hats denote instrumented variables. Interaction terms use equally-sized deciles of the cor-
responding variable (higher bins correspond to lower credit risk). ***/**/* indicates significance
at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A27: Refinance Behavior of HARP-Eligible High-LTV Borrowers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
FICO 2.04E-5*** 2.09E-5*** 1.27E-5*** 1.42E-5***
(1.72E-6) (1.70E-6) (1.93E-6) (1.93E-6)
DTI -2.63E-4*** -2.57E-4*** -3.38E-4*** -3.33E-4***
(6.13E-6) (6.11E-6) (7.05E-6) (7.05E-6)
Initial LTV 6.23E-3*** 6.25E-3*** 6.87E-3*** 8.85E-3***
(1.19E-5) (1.18E-5) (1.35E-5) (3.85E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 2.54E-2*** 2.58E-2*** 2.65E-2*** 2.72E-2***
(1.87E-4) (1.85E-4) (2.17E-4) (2.24E-4)
Loan Age -5.41E-4*** -6.60E-4*** -7.94E-4*** 2.59E-4*
(1.09E-5) (1.06E-5) (1.49E-5) (1.47E-4)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.05E-2*** -1.07E-2*** -1.00E-2*** -
(1.87E-4) (1.86E-4) (2.03E-4) -
Equity 2.87E-6*** 2.87E-6*** 2.65E-6*** 2.66E-6***
(2.50E-9) (2.49E-9) (2.63E-9) (2.62E-9)
Unemp. Rate 1.23E-2*** - 1.11E-2*** 1.16E-2***
(7.72E-5) - (1.65E-4) (1.64E-4)
Dec. 2 Unemp. - 5.75E-3*** - -
- (1.69E-4) - -
Dec. 3 Unemp. - 1.34E-2*** - -
- (2.04E-4) - -
Dec. 4 Unemp. - 2.11E-2*** - -
- (2.29E-4) - -
Dec. 5 Unemp. - 2.33E-2*** - -
- (2.50E-4) - -
Dec. 6 Unemp. - 2.86E-2*** - -
- (2.63E-4) - -
Dec. 7 Unemp. - 3.14E-2*** - -
- (2.84E-4) - -
Dec. 8 Unemp. - 3.82E-2*** - -
- (3.19E-4) - -
Dec. 9 Unemp. - 5.50E-2*** - -
- (3.94E-4) - -
Dec. 10 Unemp. - 1.20E-1*** - -
- (4.67E-4) - -
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments? None None Unemp./Equity Unemp./Equity/App.
N 12,191,940 12,191,940 12,191,940 12,191,940
R2 0.5981 0.5978 0.5982 0.5992
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in GSE dataset orig-
inated in 12 months prior to April 2009 with LTV ratios above 75% observed from January 2012
to December 2013. Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional con-
trols include include initial loan interest rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property
type, occupancy status, loan purpose, Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. Models 2 and
4 use instrumented values for unemployment rates and home equity, and Model 4 also includes
controls for combined LTV, age squared, instrumented home price appreciation, and quartiles of
mortgage-rate changes as indicators and interacted with changes in mortgage rates. ***/**/* indi-
cates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A28: Refinance Behavior of HARP-Eligible Borrowers Post-2013
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
FICO 9.44E-5*** 9.42E-5*** 9.35E-5*** 9.34E-5***
(2.92E-6) (2.94E-6) (2.92E-6) (3.13E-6)
DTI -2.31E-4*** -2.30E-4*** -2.49E-4*** -2.38E-4***
(1.88E-5) (1.86E-5) (1.99E-5) (1.85E-5)
Initial LTV 2.62E-3*** 2.62E-3*** 2.71E-3*** 3.68E-3***
(3.11E-4) (3.12E-4) (3.17E-4) (4.92E-4)
Int. Rt. Spread 5.68E-4*** 5.66E-4*** 1.41E-4 8.95E-4***
(1.94E-4) (1.93E-4) (1.89E-4) (1.90E-4)
Loan Age 1.15E-3*** 1.15E-3*** 1.10E-3*** 6.61E-3***
(3.32E-5) (3.46E-5) (6.26E-5) (2.57E-4)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -7.13E-3*** -7.13E-3*** -5.90E-3*** -
(2.26E-4) (2.25E-4) (2.51E-4) -
Equity 4.60E-7*** 4.61E-7*** 4.82E-7*** 4.85E-7***
(5.81E-8) (5.84E-8) (5.99E-8) (6.08E-8)
Unemp. Rate 4.44E-3*** - 9.00E-3*** 1.19E-2***
(7.42E-4) - (7.48E-4) (7.39E-4)
Dec. 2 Unemp. - 1.83E-3*** - -
- (4.90E-4) - -
Dec. 3 Unemp. - 4.83E-3*** - -
- (1.07E-3) - -
Dec. 4 Unemp. - 7.59E-3*** - -
- (1.50E-3) - -
Dec. 5 Unemp. - 1.31E-2*** - -
- (2.13E-3) - -
Dec. 6 Unemp. - 1.20E-2*** - -
- (2.08E-3) - -
Dec. 7 Unemp. - 1.60E-2*** - -
- (2.79E-3) - -
Dec. 8 Unemp. - 1.85E-2*** - -
- (2.98E-3) - -
Dec. 9 Unemp. - 3.24E-2*** - -
- (5.43E-3) - -
Dec. 10 Unemp. - 3.94E-2*** - -
- (6.73E-3) - -
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments? None None Unemp./Equity Unemp./Equity/App.
N 6,283,568 6,283,568 6,283,568 6,283,568
R2 0.1064 0.1066 0.1111 0.1118
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in GSE dataset orig-
inated in 12 months prior to April 2009 with LTV ratios above 75% observed from January 2013
to December 2013. Standard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional con-
trols include include initial loan interest rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property
type, occupancy status, loan purpose, Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. Models 2 and
4 use instrumented values for unemployment rates and home equity, and Model 4 also includes
controls for combined LTV, age squared, instrumented home price appreciation, and quartiles of
mortgage-rate changes as indicators and interacted with changes in mortgage rates. ***/**/* indi-
cates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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APPENDIX G: ALTERNATE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
Table A29: Differences in Credit Risk Characteristics by Eligibility
Ineligible Eligible t-Stat.
FICO 761.1 758.1 63.9
LTV 67.4 68.1 38.7
DTI 33.2 33.5 19.6
Int. Rt. 5.02 5.18 280.0
FTHB 10.3% 7.4% 91.0
SF 91.4% 92.2% 23.5
Own. Occ. 90.1% 91.5% 41.9
Purch. 31.0% 22.7% 165.0
Retail 52.8% 49.8% 52.6
# Obs. 1,569,630 1,493,292 -
Notes: Summary statistics for subsets of mortgage loans in HARP dataset at origination. “Eligible”
and “Ineligible” refer to loans originated in 6-month window before and after April 2009. “t-Stat”
denotes the t-statistics for the difference between the eligible and ineligible subsets.
Table A30: Refinancing Probability After X Years by Origination Date
Orig. Month Refi. 2-Year Refi. 3-Year Refi. 4-Year
2008-10 36.66% 50.79% 65.17%
2008-11 35.99% 50.15% 66.36%
2008-12 26.27% 43.21% 64.83%
2009-01 19.13% 38.39% 62.97%
2009-02 17.05% 37.38% 62.12%
2009-03 14.73% 35.45% 59.55%
2009-04 12.26% 31.78% 54.61%
2009-05 12.19% 29.67% 49.97%
2009-06 15.51% 33.65% 51.81%
2009-07 18.70% 37.72% 53.63%
2009-08 20.80% 40.33% 54.79%
2009-09 20.88% 40.88% 53.95%
Notes: Probability that a loan originated in a given month has terminated via prepayment within
specified number of years of origination.
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Table A31: Unconditional Difference-in-Differences Using 1-Month HARP Eligibility
Cutoff
Q1 Unemp. Pre-HARP Post-HARP Difference Diff.-in-Diff.
Ineligible 14.86% 27.17% 12.31% -
Eligible 18.55% 34.57% 16.02% 3.71%
Q2 Unemp. Pre-HARP Post-HARP Difference Diff.-in-Diff.
Ineligible 11.69% 25.54% 13.84% -
Eligible 15.37% 33.69% 18.32% 4.48%
Q3 Unemp. Pre-HARP Post-HARP Difference Diff.-in-Diff.
Ineligible 12.05% 23.73% 11.68% -
Eligible 14.96% 31.52% 16.56% 4.88%
Q4 Unemp. Pre-HARP Post-HARP Difference Diff.-in-Diff.
Ineligible 10.78% 23.62% 12.84% -
Eligible 12.68% 31.45% 18.77% 5.93%
Notes: Average CPR for subsets of mortgage loans in HARP dataset. “Eligible” and “Ineligi-
ble” refer to loans originated in 6-month window before and after June 2009, “Pre-HARP” and
“Post-HARP” refer to monthly observations before and after January 2012. “Difference” denotes
difference in CPR between loans observed during pre- and post-HARP period, “Diff.-in-Diff.” de-
notes difference in differences between eligible and ineligible loans. “Q1 Unemp.” through “Q2
Unemp.” refer to quartiles of the unemployment rate distribution, in order of increasing unem-
ployment rates.
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Table A32: Program Effect Estimates Using 1-Month HARP Eligibility Cutoff
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible 0.0069*** 0.0053*** 0.0035***
(3.67E-5) (6.45E-5) (1.52E-4)
Post-HARP 0.0070*** 0.0090*** 0.0119***
(4.74E-5) (6.04E-5) (5.06E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0011*** -0.0024*** 0.0011***
(7.30E-5) (9.65E-5) (1.38E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0051*** 0.0066*** 0.0041***
(5.37E-5) (6.15E-5) (7.73E-5)
FICO 5.06E-5*** 5.38E-5*** 5.34E-5***
(6.82E-7) (5.25E-7) (5.61E-7)
DTI -1.45E-4*** -1.63E-4*** -1.61E-4***
(4.56E-6) (5.11E-6) (6.04E-6)
LTV 9.96E-4*** 1.22E-3*** 1.30E-3***
(6.67E-5) (7.51E-5) (9.44E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 5.26E-3*** 7.09E-3*** 8.81E-3***
(1.01E-4) (9.63E-5) (1.11E-4)
Unemp. -2.50E-4*** -1.81E-4*** -1.71E-4***
(1.13E-5) (8.85E-6) (9.08E-6)
WALA 1.67E-4*** 1.89E-4*** 2.17E-4***
(5.19E-6) (5.02E-6) (4.95E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.48E-2*** -1.64E-2*** -1.21E-2***
(3.52E-5) (6.73E-5) (1.23E-4)
Equity 1.47E-7*** 1.83E-7*** 2.08E-7***
(1.00E-8) (1.06E-8) (1.29E-8)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 70,340,519 124,678,689 177,172,126
R2 0.0624 0.0589 0.0488
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose,
Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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Table A33: Program Effect Estimates with Instruments
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible 0.0022*** 0.0025*** 0.0028***
(4.36E-5) (4.11E-5) (4.17E-5)
Post-HARP 0.0048*** 0.0093*** 0.0126***
(1.06E-4) (1.01E-4) (1.08E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0010*** -0.0005*** 0.0021***
(2.01E-4) (1.49E-4) (1.15E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0077*** 0.0065*** 0.0038***
(8.01E-5) (6.82E-5) (5.80E-5)
FICO 5.32E-5*** 5.41E-5*** 5.21E-5***
(5.35E-7) (5.65E-7) (6.36E-7)
DTI -1.62E-4*** -1.64E-4*** -1.59E-4***
(5.98E-6) (4.78E-6) (3.95E-6)
LTV 1.16E-3*** 1.26E-3*** 1.31E-3***
(9.48E-5) (7.60E-5) (6.42E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 4.24E-4*** 5.91E-4*** 1.90E-3***
(4.31E-5) (3.85E-5) (4.29E-5)
Ûnemp. -1.12E-3*** -1.27E-3*** -1.40E-3***
(1.15E-4) (9.34E-5) (7.85E-5)
WALA 3.81E-4*** 4.03E-4*** 2.89E-4***
(5.22E-6) (5.37E-6) (3.40E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.10E-2*** -8.99E-3*** -8.99E-3***
(6.22E-5) (4.82E-5) (3.48E-5)
Êquity 1.73E-7*** 1.92E-7*** 2.12E-7***
(1.34E-8) (1.11E-8) (9.85E-9)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 82,998,950 120,265,979 175,338,982
R2 0.0562 0.0595 0.0626
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose, Fan-
nie Mae loans, and origination channel. Hats denote instrumented variables. ***/**/* indicates
significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A34: Heterogeneity in Program Effect by Unemployment Rate Using 1-Month
HARP Eligibility Cutoff
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible 0.0068*** 0.0049*** 0.0022***
(2.78E-4) (2.03E-4) (1.72E-4)
Post-HARP 0.0070*** 0.0090*** 0.0118***
(4.34E-5) (5.75E-5) (4.96E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0004 -0.0022*** -0.0006
(3.89E-4) (4.24E-4) (5.20E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0025*** 0.0034*** 0.0026***
(2.49E-4) (2.66E-4) (3.31E-4)
Eligible x Unemp. 1.805E-5 4.566E-5* 1.390E-4***
(2.99E-5) (2.55E-5) (2.25E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Unemp. -9.320E-5* -3.665E-5 1.900E-4***
(3.84E-5) (4.11E-5) (4.94E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Unemp. 3.407E-4*** 4.199E-4*** 2.214E-4***
(2.74E-5) (3.14E-5) (3.97E-5)
FICO 5.06E-5*** 5.39E-5*** 5.35E-5***
(6.80E-7) (5.22E-7) (5.59E-7)
DTI -1.45E-4*** -1.63E-4*** -1.61E-4***
(4.55E-6) (5.11E-6) (6.04E-6)
LTV 9.96E-4*** 1.22E-3*** 1.30E-3***
(6.67E-5) (7.52E-5) (9.44E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 5.64E-3*** 4.46E-3*** -8.50E-4***
(1.29E-4) (3.15E-4) (4.70E-4)
Unemp. -2.84E-4*** -2.58E-4*** -3.28E-4***
(1.74E-5) (2.02E-5) (2.42E-5)
WALA 1.67E-4*** 1.90E-4*** 2.20E-4***
(5.43E-6) (5.32E-6) (5.35E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.48E-2*** -1.63E-2*** -1.21E-2***
(3.34E-5) (6.07E-5) (1.12E-4)
Equity 1.47E-7*** 1.83E-7*** 2.08E-7***
(1.00E-8) (1.06E-8) (1.29E-8)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 70,340,519 124,678,689 177,172,126
R2 0.0624 0.0589 0.0488
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose,
Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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Table A35: Heterogeneity in Program Effect by Unemployment Rate with Instruments
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible 0.0000 -0.0012*** -0.0010**
(3.26E-4) (3.59E-4) (4.13E-4)
Post-HARP 0.0047*** 0.0092*** 0.0125***
(1.00E-4) (9.45E-5) (9.80E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0083*** -0.0075*** -0.0027***
(6.88E-4) (5.53E-4) (4.45E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0051*** 0.0054*** 0.0025***
(4.38E-4) (3.75E-4) (3.25E-4)
Eligible x Ûnemp. 2.37E-4*** 3.96E-4*** 4.04E-4***
(3.56E-5) (3.87E-5) (4.39E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Ûnemp. 8.60E-4*** 8.08E-4*** 5.54E-4***
(6.12E-5) (4.98E-5) (3.97E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Ûnemp. 3.73E-4*** 2.08E-4*** 2.31E-4***
(5.38E-5) (4.57E-5) (3.85E-5)
FICO 5.32E-5*** 5.42E-5*** 5.21E-5***
(5.35E-7) (5.63E-7) (6.35E-7)
DTI -1.62E-4*** -1.64E-4*** -1.59E-4***
(5.99E-6) (4.78E-6) (3.94E-6)
LTV 1.16E-3*** 1.26E-3*** 1.31E-3***
(9.49E-5) (7.61E-5) (6.43E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 4.12E-4*** 5.78E-4*** 1.89E-3***
(4.29E-5) (3.83E-5) (4.24E-5)
Ûnemp. -1.48E-3*** -1.67E-3*** -1.73E-3***
(1.40E-4) (1.19E-4) (1.04E-4)
WALA 3.92E-4*** 4.11E-4*** 2.95E-4***
(5.73E-6) (5.74E-6) (3.65E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.08E-2*** -8.85E-3*** -8.89E-3***
(5.88E-5) (5.14E-5) (3.53E-5)
Êquity 1.73E-7*** 1.92E-7*** 2.12E-7***
(1.34E-8) (1.11E-8) (9.86E-9)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 82,998,950 120,265,979 175,338,982
R2 0.0562 0.0595 0.0626
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose, Fan-
nie Mae loans, and origination channel. Hats denote instrumented variables. ***/**/* indicates
significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A36: Heterogeneity in Program Effect by Quartiles of Unemployment Rate
Panel A: Baseline
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0060*** 0.0051*** 0.0025***
(9.22E-5) (1.08E-4) (1.26E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q2 Unemp. 2.027E-3*** 2.051E-3*** 2.148E-3***
(1.36E-4) (1.61E-4) (1.92E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q3 Unemp. 2.571E-3*** 2.319E-3*** 2.242E-3***
(1.58E-4) (1.87E-4) (2.16E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q4 Unemp. 2.926E-3*** 2.028E-3*** 2.218E-3***
(2.08E-4) (2.51E-4) (3.03E-4)
Panel B: Using 1-Month HARP Eligibility Cutoff
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0038*** 0.0049*** 0.0025***
(8.51E-5) (1.04E-4) (1.38E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q2 Unemp. 1.886E-3*** 2.196E-3*** 2.136E-3***
(1.21E-4) (1.43E-4) (1.79E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q3 Unemp. 2.022E-3*** 2.823E-3*** 2.499E-3***
(1.57E-4) (1.83E-4) (2.32E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q4 Unemp. 2.386E-3*** 3.175E-3*** 2.823E-3***
(2.03E-4) (2.43E-4) (3.03E-4)
Panel C: With Instruments
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible 0.0037*** 0.0068*** 0.0076***
(9.47E-5) (1.10E-4) (1.29E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q2 Unemp. 5.91E-4*** 3.69E-4** 7.49E-4***
(1.40E-4) (1.66E-4) (1.94E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q3 Unemp. 1.09E-3*** 8.69E-4*** 9.87E-4***
(1.51E-4) (1.77E-4) (2.08E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x Q4 Unemp. 5.47E-4** -1.37E-4 8.57E-4***
(2.26E-4) (2.69E-4) (3.20E-4)
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include FICO, DTI,
LTV, unemployment rate, WALA, change in mortgage rates, equity, loan interest rate and interest
rate spread, and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan pur-
pose, Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-
level respectively.
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Table A37: Heterogeneity in Program Effect by Unemployment with LTV Controls Us-
ing Additional HARP Controls
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible x High LTV 0.0119*** 0.0090*** 0.0072***
(9.36E-5) (1.25E-4) (1.72E-4)
Post-HARP 0.0148*** 0.0202*** 0.0146***
(3.80E-4) (4.40E-4) (4.37E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0033*** -0.0035*** -0.0019***
(4.05E-4) (4.99E-4) (6.38E-4)
Post-HARP x Eligible x High LTV -0.0117*** -0.0129*** -0.0131***
(6.66E-4) (6.98E-4) (8.00E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x High LTV 1.145E-2*** 1.146E-2*** 8.626E-3***
(3.67E-4) (4.31E-4) (5.22E-4)
Eligible x High LTV x Unemp. -3.361E-4*** -6.050E-4*** -6.724E-4***
(3.42E-5) (3.29E-5) (3.48E-5)
Post-HARP x Unemp. -6.610E-4*** -9.052E-4*** -2.583E-4***
(4.64E-5) (4.85E-5) (4.79E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Unemp. 4.379E-4*** 5.143E-4*** 4.209E-4***
(3.94E-5) (4.89E-5) (6.10E-5)
Post-HARP x Eligible x High LTV x Unemp. 8.365E-4*** 1.112E-3*** 1.291E-3***
(8.38E-5) (8.29E-5) (9.42E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x High LTV x Unemp. -7.872E-4*** -8.342E-4*** -6.925E-4***
(4.23E-5) (5.10E-5) (6.29E-5)
FICO 5.41E-5*** 5.51E-5*** 5.49E-5***
(6.40E-7) (5.86E-7) (5.26E-7)
DTI -1.61E-4*** -1.62E-4*** -1.56E-4***
(4.41E-6) (5.36E-6) (6.76E-6)
LTV 1.22E-3*** 1.33E-3*** 1.37E-3***
(6.92E-5) (8.26E-5) (1.02E-4)
Int. Rt. Spread 7.19E-3*** 1.09E-2*** 9.52E-3***
(1.18E-4) (1.54E-4) (1.43E-4)
Unemp. 3.92E-4*** 6.07E-4*** -4.86E-5
(3.71E-5) (3.76E-5) (3.46E-5)
WALA 1.82E-4*** 2.64E-4*** 2.24E-4***
(5.26E-6) (6.88E-6) (6.56E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.82E-2*** -1.41E-2*** -1.32E-2***
(5.16E-5) (5.48E-5) (1.22E-4)
Equity 1.70E-7*** 1.89E-7*** 2.08E-7***
(1.01E-8) (1.14E-8) (1.37E-8)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 83,824,948 121,448,185 177,172,126
R2 0.0627 0.0596 0.0563
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose,
Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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Table A38: Heterogeneity in Program Effect by Unemployment with LTV Controls Us-
ing 1-Month HARP Eligibility Cutoff
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible x High LTV 0.0114*** 0.0103*** 0.0077***
(9.08E-5) (1.41E-4) (2.46E-4)
Post-HARP 0.0078*** 0.0097*** 0.0124***
(5.76E-5) (6.87E-5) (5.68E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 0.0014*** 0.0002 0.0017***
(2.35E-4) (3.14E-4) (4.32E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x High LTV -0.0031*** -0.0025*** -0.0039***
(3.88E-4) (4.15E-4) (5.14E-4)
Eligible x High LTV x Unemp. -6.031E-4*** -6.962E-4*** -6.653E-4***
(1.44E-5) (1.66E-5) (2.16E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Unemp. 6.417E-5 8.133E-5*** 1.383E-4***
(2.40E-5) (3.15E-5) (4.14E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x High LTV x Unemp. 2.027E-4*** 3.734E-4*** 4.518E-4***
(4.10E-5) (4.34E-5) (5.45E-5)
FICO 5.05E-5*** 5.39E-5*** 5.42E-5***
(6.66E-7) (5.21E-7) (5.61E-7)
DTI -1.43E-4*** -1.59E-4*** -1.57E-4***
(4.49E-6) (5.03E-6) (5.98E-6)
LTV 1.07E-3*** 1.31E-3*** 1.38E-3***
(6.87E-5) (7.76E-5) (9.74E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 5.12E-3*** 6.86E-3*** 8.63E-3***
(9.79E-5) (9.62E-5) (1.11E-4)
Unemp. -6.77E-5*** 4.62E-5*** 5.24E-5***
(1.12E-5) (8.49E-6) (1.07E-5)
WALA 1.64E-4*** 1.96E-4*** 2.31E-4***
(5.43E-6) (5.22E-6) (5.18E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.52E-2*** -1.68E-2*** -1.24E-2***
(3.68E-5) (6.87E-5) (1.22E-4)
Equity 1.48E-7*** 1.84E-7*** 2.08E-7***
(1.01E-8) (1.06E-8) (1.29E-8)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 70,340,519 124,678,689 177,172,126
R2 0.0626 0.0591 0.0490
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose,
Fannie Mae loans, and origination channel. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively.
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Table A39: Heterogeneity in Program Effect by Unemployment with LTV Controls
with Instruments
3-Month Window 6-Month Window 1-Year Window
Eligible x High LTV 0.0077*** 0.0082*** 0.0079***
(1.70E-4) (1.47E-4) (1.23E-4)
Post-HARP 0.0056*** 0.0100*** 0.0131***
(1.19E-4) (1.13E-4) (1.19E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 -0.0062*** -0.0047*** -0.0002
(4.88E-4) (3.66E-4) (2.55E-4)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x High LTV -0.0016 -0.0041*** -0.0089***
(1.21E-3) (1.03E-3) (9.67E-4)
Eligible x High LTV x Ûnemp. -9.03E-4*** -9.94E-4*** -9.66E-4***
(3.36E-5) (2.85E-5) (2.43E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Ûnemp. 9.60E-4*** 7.42E-4*** 3.78E-4***
(4.28E-5) (3.27E-5) (2.25E-5)
Post-HARP 2.0 x Eligible x High LTV x Ûnemp. 4.90E-4*** 7.05E-4*** 1.07E-3***
(1.31E-4) (1.13E-4) (1.07E-4)
FICO 5.36E-5*** 5.49E-5*** 5.37E-5***
(5.34E-7) (5.48E-7) (6.03E-7)
DTI -1.59E-4*** -1.60E-4*** -1.54E-4***
(5.88E-6) (4.68E-6) (3.85E-6)
LTV 1.25E-3*** 1.36E-3*** 1.40E-3***
(9.93E-5) (7.97E-5) (6.70E-5)
Int. Rt. Spread 4.86E-4*** 5.86E-4*** 1.80E-3***
(4.28E-5) (3.79E-5) (4.11E-5)
Ûnemp. -1.11E-3*** -1.18E-3*** -1.23E-3***
(1.18E-4) (9.45E-5) (7.80E-5)
WALA 4.03E-4*** 4.24E-4*** 3.11E-4***
(5.90E-6) (5.91E-6) (3.92E-6)
∆ Mtg. Rt. -1.09E-2*** -9.08E-3*** -9.18E-3***
(6.10E-5) (4.73E-5) (3.53E-5)
Êquity 1.74E-7*** 1.93E-7*** 2.13E-7***
(1.35E-8) (1.12E-8) (9.93E-9)
Lender FE? Yes Yes Yes
State FE? No No No
N 82,998,950 120,265,979 175,338,982
R2 0.0564 0.0598 0.0629
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator for prepayment, sample is all loans in HARP dataset. Stan-
dard errors clustered at individual-level in parentheses. Additional controls include loan interest
rate and indicators for first-time home buyers, property type, occupancy status, loan purpose, Fan-
nie Mae loans, and origination channel. Hats denote instrumented variables. ***/**/* indicates
significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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APPENDIX H: DETAILS ON STRUCTURAL MODEL
ESTIMATION
First Stage
The first stage of the model is estimated with a combination of maximum likelihood
and a selection-corrected regression. I observe four separate discrete outcomes in the
data: loan applications that are denied, approved loan applications where the offer is
rejected, and originated loans that are either held or securitized. Denote these outcomes,
respectively, as ai,t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. I also observe the continuous interest rate ri,t, but only
for a sample of loans that were securitized (ai,t = 4). Suppressing for clarity any time-
and agent subscripts as well as any dependence on state (Xi,t, Zi,t, Si,j,t) or structural
parameters (φ0, φ1, τL, β), the likelihood function is given by:
Application Denied: L(a = 1) = 1− PFUND(c)
Offer Rejected: L(a = 2) = PFUND(c)
∫ ∞
e=−∞
PREJ(c, r∗(c) + e) dΦ(e)
Originated, Held: L(a = 3) = PFUND(c)
∫ ∞
e=−∞
[1− PREJ(c, r∗(c) + e)][1− PSEC(c, r∗(c) + e)] dΦ(e)
Originated, Securitized: L(a = 4) = PFUND(c)
∫ ∞
e=−∞
[1− PREJ(c, r∗(c) + e)]PSEC(c, r∗(c) + e) dΦ(e)
where the probabilities PFUND, PREJ and PSEC are as defined in Section 4.3. I use the
assumption that e is distributed Standard Normal to write the
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numerically-approximated log likelihood as:
logL(a = 1) = τL − log(eτL + eΣm wm[log(e
π0(r∗+nm)+eπ
1(r∗+nm))+γ][1−PREJ(r∗+nm)])
logL(a = 2) = Σm wm[log(eπ
0(r∗+nm) + eπ
1(r∗+nm)) + γ][1− PREJ(r∗ + nm)]
− log(eτL + eΣm wm[log(eπ
0(r∗+nm)+eπ
1(r∗+nm))+γ][1−PREJ(r∗+nm)])
+ log(Σm wmPREJ(r∗ + nm))
logL(a = 3) = Σm wm[log(eπ
0(r∗+nm) + eπ
1(r∗+nm)) + γ][1− PREJ(r∗ + nm)]
− log(eτL + eΣm wm[log(eπ
0(r∗+nm)+eπ
1(r∗+nm))+γ][1−PREJ(r∗+nm)])
+ log(Σm wm[1− PREJ(r∗ + nm)](1− PSEC(r∗ + nm)))
logL(a = 4) = Σm wm[log(eπ
0(r∗+nm) + eπ
1(r∗+nm)) + γ][1− PREJ(r∗ + nm)]
− log(eτL + eΣm wm[log(eπ
0(r∗+nm)+eπ
1(r∗+nm))+γ][1−PREJ(r∗+nm)])
+ log(Σm wm[1− PREJ(r∗ + nm)]PSEC(r∗ + nm))
where (wm, nm) are a set of m Gauss-Hermite weights and nodes.
If the optimal interest rate r∗ were observed, solving for the likelihood and gradient
would be straightforward. Because r∗ is not observed, I infer it as the solution to the




[1− PREJ(c, r∗(c) + e)][φ0r (1− PSEC(c, r∗(c) + e)) + φ1r PSEC(c, r∗(c) + e)
+ βrPREJ(c, r∗(c) + e)[log(eπ
0(c,r∗(c)+e) + eπ
1(c,r∗(c)+e)) + γ]] dΦ(e)
where βr, φ0r and φ1r are the elasticities with respect to the interest rate of, respectively,
the borrower’s offer acceptance value and the lender’s profit from holding and
securitizing the loan.
At each guess of the structural parameters (φ0, φ1, τL, β), I first solve for r∗ for each
observation by iterating on a linearized first-order condition. I then project the price of
the originated mortgage using the recovered latent interest rate and MBS pricing model
266
from Table A40 of Appendix I, estimated in advance on MBS data. I then also calculate
the gradient of optimal r∗ with respect to the structural parameters under the
assumption that the interest rate offer is linear52 in the neighborhood of the optimum
given the current-iterate values of the structural parameters. With these objects in hand I
construct the likelihood and likelihood gradient53, approximating any integrals using
Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 8 quadrature nodes. I iterate to convergence using
KNITRO, a nonlinear optimization software tool, with the overall convergence
parameters set at 10−14 in parameter space and 10−8 for the objective function. I set the
tolerance for solving the interest rate offer at 10−5 and cap the number of iterations on
the linearized first-order condition at 25. Standard errors are calculated with a
finite-differences approximation of the Hessian, using the analytical gradient, again
approximated with Gauss-Hermite quadrature, and with a step size of 10−8 relative to
the maximum likelihood parameter estimates.
Having thus recovered estimates for (φ̂0, φ̂1, τ̂L, β̂), the final task is to estimate α, the
parameters governing the lender’s interest rate offer. I assume that observed interest rate
ri,t = r∗i,t + ei,t, as in the model and seek to estimate a model r
∗
i,t = Γ(ci,t, Xi,t, Si,j,t)α + ui,t
for the optimal mean interest rate offer. Since I observe a sample only of loans for which
ai,t = 4, I face the sample-selection problem that in the regression:
E[ri,t|ai,t = 4, ci,t, Xi,t, Si,j,t] = Γ(ci,t, Xi,t, Si,j,t)α + E[ei,t|ai,t = 4, ci,t, Xi,t, Si,j,t]
the error term on the right is neither mean zero nor uncorrelated with (Xi,t, Si,j,t).
However, by applying Bayes’ rule and the model-implied probability that a loan
application results in securitization, I numerically approximate the conditional
52Literally, that the linear approximation to the interest rate first-order condition is true.
53While not shown, given the model’s assumptions the gradient can be expressed analytically.
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distribution of the error, as in Heckman (1979), [111] by:
f (ei,t|ai,t = 4, ci,t, Xi,t, Si,j,t) =







2 PFUND(r∗i,t)[1− PREJ(r∗i,t + ei,t)]PSEC(r∗i,t + ei,t)
PFUND(r∗i,t)Σm wm[1− PREJ(r∗i,t + nm)]PSEC(r∗i,t + nm)
and hence construct the following sample-selection correction term:
E[ei,t|ai,t = 4, ci,t, Xi,t, Si,j,t] = Σm wm
PFUND(r∗i,t)[1− PREJ(r∗i,t + nm)]PSEC(r∗i,t + nm)
PFUND(r∗i,t)Σm′ wm′ [1− PREJ(r∗i,t + nm′)]PSEC(r∗i + nm′)
nm
I construct this term for each observed originated refinance mortgage at the estimated
values of (φ̂0, φ̂1, τ̂L, β̂). I then regress the spread of the interest rate on those loans over
the ten year swap rate and current guarantee fees, assuming that guarantee fees pass
through to estimates one-for-one, as I estimate in Chapter 2, less the selection correction
term, on a variety of borrower credit risk characteristics to estimate α̂.
Second Stage
The second stage of the model is estimated with filtered maximum likelihood. For
each borrower-month in the data, I observe three discrete outcomes, either default,
continuation, or refinance, denoted ai,t ∈ {0, 1, 2} respectively. Whenever ai,t = 2, I also
observe the continuous LTV choice ci,t ∈ [0, c̄]. Three key pieces of information are
hidden. First, I do not know whether an observed continuation or default followed from
a failed refinance application or not, and as such must estimate these choice probabilities
as a mixture. Second and relatedly, in cases where a borrower first applied for credit but
subsequently continued or defaulted, I do not observe their LTV choice or offered
interest rate, and hence must project these latent choices. Finally, I do not observe the
borrowers state Zi,t, only the average probability that Zi,t = 1 (the unemployment rate)
in the borrower’s area, and hence must filter out an estimate for P(Zi,t = 1).
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I specify that the realized-action-specific value function, V(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t, is a
parametric function of the observed state and continuous choice with parameters θ that
depend on the discrete action and latent state:
V(ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t, θ) = v(ci,t, Xi,t)θa,Z
and that the latent-state transition probabilities are a logistic function of observed state
Xi,t and parameters ρ:
P(Zi,t = 0|Zi,t−1 = 0, ρ) =
eXi,tρ0
1 + eXi,tρ0
P(Zi,t = 1|Zi,t−1 = 1, ρ) =
eXi,tρ1
1 + eXi,tρ1
This specification implies that unemployment is Markovian and that the probability of
entering or exiting the unemployment state is time-varying and depends on, among
other things, the current unemployment rate and average unemployment duration. My
specification for the value function uses different set of parameters θa,Z for each of four
(a, Z) combinations, normalizes V(0, 0, Xi,t, Zi,t) to zero for all (Xi,t, Zi,t), and allows the
value function to depend on a cubic spline in four important state variables (principal
balance, home price, income, and monthly payment) with ten gridpoints, plus other
macroeconomic variables (such as interest rates) and home-value proxies (such as square
feet) and measures of total cash extracted on refinance.
Under these assumptions, I can write the likelihood of each potential outcome as
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follows:
Default: L(a = 0) =
1












[1− PREJ(c∗(eh), r∗(c∗(eh)) + e)] dΦ(e) dΦ(h)]
Continue: L(a = 1) =
ev1,Z












[1− PREJ(c∗(eh), r∗(c∗(eh)) + e)] dΦ(e) dΦ(h)]
Refi. at c∗ < c̄: L(a = 2, c∗) =
eEV2,Z−τB




[1− PREJ(c∗, r∗(c∗) + e)] dΦ(e)φ(log(η(c∗)))]
Refi. at c∗ = c̄: L(a = 2, c̄) =
eEV2,Z−τB




[1− PREJ(c̄, r∗(c̄) + e)] dΦ(e)][1−Φ(log(η(c̄)))]
where v1,Z denotes the value of continuation in state Z, η(c) the value of the continuous
preference shock η required to rationalize the observed choice, and EV2,Z the integral
over η of EVR, and all other dependence on state (Xi,t, Zi,t, parameters θ, and time- and
agent subscripts is suppressed for clarity. Note that the likelihood of default and
continuation includes a term that captures the probability that those choices are optimal
as well as a term capturing the probability that refinancing was optimal, multiplied by
the probability that the loan application was either denied or the interest rate offer was
rejected, integrated over all potential LTV choices and interest rate offers. Then using the
assumption that e is distributed Standard Normal and η Standard Lognormal, I can
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numerically approximate the log-likelihood as:
logL(a = 0) = − log(1 + ev1,Z + eEV2,Z−τB)− log(1 + ev1,Z)
+ log[1 + ev1,Z + eEV2,Z−τB(1− Σm wmPFUND(c(enm))Σm′ wm′(1− PREJ(c(enm), r∗(c(enm)) + nm′)))]
logL(a = 1) = v1,Z − log(1 + ev1,Z + eEV2,Z−τB)− log(1 + ev1,Z)
+ log[1 + ev1,Z + eEV2,Z−τB(1− Σm wmPFUND(c(enm))Σm′ wm′(1− PREJ(c(enm), r∗(c(enm)) + nm′)))]
logL(a = 2, c∗) = EV2,Z − τB − log(1 + ev1,Z + eEV2,Z−τB)
+ log(PFUND(c∗)Σm wm[1− PREJ(c∗, r∗(c∗) + nm)]) + log(φ(log(η(c∗))))
logL(a = 2, c̄) = EV2,Z − τB − log(1 + ev1,Z + eEV2,Z−τB)
+ log(PFUND(c̄)Σm wm[1− PREJ(c̄, r∗(c̄) + nm)]) + log(1−Φ(log(η(c̄))))
where (wm, nm) and (wm′ , nm′) are sets of Gauss-Hermite weights and nodes.
The set of structural parameters to be estimated is (θ, τB, ρ), and if I could observe
latent state Zi,t, I could write the full log-likelihood as a function of these parameters
as54:
logL(aT, cTZT|θ, τB, ρ) = Σz∈{0,1} 1[Z1 = z]L(a1, c1|Z1 = z, θ, τB)
+ ΣTt=2
{
Σz∈{0,1} 1[Zt = z]L(at, ct|Zt = z, θ, τB)
+ Σz∈{0,1} [1[Zt = z, Zt−1 = 0] log(P(Zt = z|Zt−1 = 0, ρ0))
+ 1[Zt = z, Zt−1 = 1] log(P(Zt = z|Zt−1 = 1, ρ1))]
}
where superscripts denote “history up to” and agent subscripts are omitted for clarity.
However, since I do not observe Zi,t, I must instead form an expectation of the
probability distribution of Zi,t and then maximize the expected log likelihood.
Following Diebold et al (1999), [66] I iteratively filter out an estimate for the
54Note that if one were to write the full likelihood conditional on Zi,t and take the log, it would not be
the same as the expression below. However, both the function written below and the true log-likelihood
achieve their maximum at the same value of the structural parameters, as discussed in Baum et al (1970). [27]
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distribution of Zi,t and then update the parameters (θ, τB, ρ) using an EM algorithm. In
the E-step, conditional on the current guess of the structural parameters, I use a
forward-backward algorithm to compute P̂(Zt = z) = E[1[Zi,t = z]] and
P̂(Zt = z, Zt−1 = w) = E[1[Zt = z, Zt−1 = w]]. These estimates are then substituted into
the expression for the log-likelihood above to form the expected log-likelihood. In the
M-step, conditional on these estimates for the latent state probabilities, I maximize the
log-likelihood with respect to the structural parameters (θ, τB, ρ). Note that the
log-likelihood is additively separable into a block dependent on (θ, τB) (the first two
lines) and a block dependent on ρ (the last two lines). Maximizing the ρ-block is
straightforward, and I do so using KNITRO optimization software.
If the optimal LTV choice ci,t and offered interest rate ri,t were observed for each
unsuccessful refinance application, maximizing the θ-block would also be
straightforward. However, because these variables are unobserved, I must project them
out for each observation. At each iteration of the EM algorithm, I first use the estimated
parameters (φ̂0, φ̂1, τ̂L, β̂, α̂) to project the probabilities PFUND and PREJ . I then iterate on
the first-order condition the borrower’s LTV choice problem:




e=−∞ [1− PREJ(c, r
∗ + e)][log(eπ
0(c,r∗+e) + eπ










[1− PREJ(c, r∗ + e)][
∂v2,Z(c, r∗ + e)η
∂c
+ (βc + βrαc)
× (1− PREJ(c, r∗ + e))[v2,Z(c, r∗ + e)η − log(1 + ev1,Z)− γ]
}
dΦ(e)
until the system converges to the optimal c∗(η), where βc and αc are the elasticities with
respect to LTV of, respectively, the borrower’s offer acceptance value and the offered
interest rate.
During each θ-block of the M-step, given the current-iterate guess of the structural
parameters (θ, τB) and the current-iterate latent state distribution P̂(Z), I first solve for
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c∗(η) for each non-refinance observation by iterating on the linearized first-order
condition. I solve the LTV choice problem in this fashion at 8 values of ηm = enm , where
nm are the first 8 Gauss-Hermite nodes. I assume that the borrower’s optimal c∗(η) is
capped at an exogenous upper limit c̄, and in cases where c∗(η) > c̄ I set it equal to c̄.
Because by construction the borrower’s LTV choice problem satisfies the monotone
choice assumption from Blevins (2010), [40] c̄ will always be the borrower’s
most-preferred feasible alternative whenever c∗(η) > c̄. For refinance observations, I
solve the first-order equation analytically for η to obtain η(c) for the observed LTV
choice. As before I assume that c∗(η) is linear in the neighbordhood of the optimum at
the current-iterate values of the structural parameters and calculate the gradient of the
optimal LTV choice with respect to parameters. I then use the estimates (φ̂0, φ̂1, τ̂L, β̂, α̂)
to project r∗, PFUND and PREJ for each observation and construct the likelihood and
likelihood gradient55, as before approximating any integrals with Gauss-Hermite
quadrature. I set the convergence criterion in parameter space to 10−5 for both the inner
maximization problem (each M-step) and the outer maximization problem (the EM
algorithm) and iterate to convergence.
Third Stage
The third and final stage in estimation involves recovering the action-specific utility
functions and estimating a parametric form for them. The process to recover utility
involves estimating a transition function for the observable states; simulating observable
states according to that function, as well as unobservable states according to the
latent-state distributions estimated in Stage 2; projecting a future discounted
continuation value; and then subtracting that from the projected value. To implement
this procedure, I first estimate place-by-place vector autoregressions (VARs) of the key
55As in Stage 1, the setup of the model allows the gradient to be computed analytically, although I for
sake of space I do not present it here.
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exogenous observable state variables, treating the VAR estimates as transition functions.
I estimate single-lagged VARs in 10 state variables: house price indices, mean
unemployment duration, unemployment rates, mortgage rates, 30-year swap rates, and
10-, 7-, 5-, 3- and 1-year treasury rates.56 I use the standard identification (Cholesky
decomposition), ordering the variables in the same order presented here.57 I then draw a
series of s = 10 errors from the estimate error covariance matrix, assuming that the VAR
error is multivariate normal, and project a set of s simulated future states accordingly. I
allow the borrowers’ choices in the previous period to affect the evolution of the
endogenous states (e.g. equity) in the future period. I also project the future latent state
probabilities using the estimated latent state distribution and transition density from
Stage 2.
Given the value function projections estimated in Stage 2, I then construct the
expected future logit-inclusive value at each of these s simulated future states. I set the
discount factor exogenously to .995, corresponding to a roughly 6% annual rate of
discount58. I subtract the discounted average future expected value, which owing the
transition of the latent and endogenous observable states is Zi,t- and (ai,t, ci,t)-specific,
from the projected values for the observed states, which are also Zi,t- and
(ai,t, ci,t)-specific. This generates an estimated utility as a function of (ai,t, ci,t, Xi,t, Zi,t) for
each observed state Xi,t, and each of four (ai,t, Zi,t) combinations. For the refinancing
actions ai,t = 2 at each observed state Xi,t and each potential Zi,t, I calculate the optimal
LTV choice c(η) for the mean value of η = 1 and the mean interest rate offer
corresponding to this optimal LTV choice choice. Using the optimal LTV choice and
mean interest rate, I calculate mean equity extracted on refinancing for each state
(Xi,t, Zi,t), as well as the monthly payment on the refinance loan. Note that all of these
56Error-correction-based panel cointegration tests strongly support the presence of a cointegrating rela-
tionship between these ten variables.
57The order was chosen to represent a plausible order of non-propagation in shocks, e.g. this ordering
imposes that shocks to the shorter end of the term structure affect the later end, but not vice-versa.
58Specifying the discount factor at .99 did not substantively change the utility parameter estimates.
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terms are calculated even for borrowers who are observed to either continue or default.
These terms are included as regressors for refinancing utility, along additional variables
intended to capture the flow value of housing services and the flow value of improved
credit. I then regress the action-specific utility value ua,Z on these covariates in order to
recover borrower preference parameters.
APPENDIX I: ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL ESTIMATES
Table A40: Estimated MBS Pricing Model
Variable Est. S.E. Mean S.D.
Coupon Spread ×1[Spread < −2] 5.0564*** 0.118 -0.001 0.039
Coupon Spread ×1[−2 < Spread < −1] 4.8897*** 0.023 -0.108 0.351
Coupon Spread ×1[−1 < Spread < −0] 4.5139*** 0.023 -0.322 0.307
Coupon Spread ×1[0 < Spread < 1] 2.4250*** 0.047 0.056 0.150
Coupon Spread ×1[1 < Spread < 2] 2.0656*** 0.070 0.012 0.121
Coupon Spread ×1[Spread > 2] 2.5414*** 0.375 0.001 0.034
Coupon × 1-Year Treasury 0.0765*** 0.005 11.694 11.048
Coupon × 3-Year Treasury 0.1084*** 0.021 13.276 9.682
Coupon × 5-Year Treasury -0.2607*** 0.045 15.381 8.774
Coupon × 7-Year Treasury 0.0704*** 0.026 17.069 8.070
Coupon × 10-Year Swap -0.3752*** 0.011 20.951 8.746
Coupon × 30-Year Swap 0.2349*** 0.008 23.016 8.217
G-Fee -0.8963*** 0.039 0.536 0.151
Avg. LTV 0.0268*** 0.001 74.968 8.913
FICO (620) 0.5033*** 0.068 0.003 0.055
FICO (640) 0.1958** 0.080 0.003 0.050
FICO (660) 1.5300 0.053 0.007 0.086
FICO (680) 0.8600 0.031 0.023 0.149
FICO (700) -0.6500 0.024 0.076 0.265
FICO (720) -1.2600 0.018 0.230 0.421
FICO (740) 0.9300 0.017 0.240 0.427
Constant 104.5745*** 0.084 - -
N 40,307 - - -
R2 0.9107 - - -
Dependent Variable - - 101.474 2.937
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors from MBS pricing model used as structural
model Stage 1 input. Variable means and standard deviations shown in columns 3 and 4 respec-
tively. FICO scores refer to MBS mean values. “Coupon Spread” denotes spread over 10-year swap
rate. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively. Estimated guarantee fee
elasticity with respect to LTV is .59 bp per 100% LTV.
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Table A41: Estimated Lender Policy Parameters
φ0 Est. S.E. Mean S.D.
Constant 4.6699*** 0.017 1.000 0.000
LTV -1.178*** 0.009 0.625 0.123
Unemp. -2.662*** 0.031 0.074 0.029
FICO (620) -1.370*** 0.044 0.000 0.016
FICO (640) -1.129*** 0.034 0.000 0.021
FICO (660) -1.111*** 0.021 0.001 0.035
FICO (680) -0.702*** 0.009 0.006 0.078
FICO (700) 0.770*** 0.003 0.064 0.245
FICO (720) 0.875*** 0.002 0.359 0.480
FICO (740) 0.532*** 0.002 0.259 0.438
Income 1.003*** 0.063 0.008 0.010
Owner Occ. -0.071*** 0.003 0.910 0.286
Int. Rt. Spread 1.367** 0.662 0.016 0.004
φ1 Est. S.E. Mean S.D.
Constant 1.835*** 0.067 1.000 0.000
Price 1.998*** 0.064 1.020 0.020
τL Est. S.E. Mean S.D.
Constant 2.516*** 0.010 1.000 0.000
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors for parameters governing lender profits from
Stage 1 structural estimates. Sample is all loans in HMDA dataset. “Int. Rt. Spread” is spread of
latent interest rate over prevailing national mortgage rate. “Price” is estimated secondary-market
mortgage price using pricing model from Table A44. Variable means and standard deviations
shown in columns 3 and 4 respectively. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level
respectively. N = 17,109,796.
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Table A42: Estimated Borrower Rejection Parameters
β Est. S.E. Mean S.D.
Constant 0.223*** 0.011 1.000 0.000
Income 10.602*** 0.087 0.008 0.010
LTV 1.127*** 0.006 0.625 0.123
FICO (620) 1.456*** 0.094 0.000 0.016
FICO (640) 1.427*** 0.045 0.000 0.021
FICO (660) 1.200*** 0.028 0.001 0.035
FICO (680) 0.360*** 0.007 0.006 0.078
FICO (700) -0.213*** 0.002 0.064 0.245
FICO (720) -0.280*** 0.002 0.359 0.480
FICO (740) -0.155*** 0.002 0.259 0.438
Unemp. 0.288*** 0.039 0.074 0.029
Int. Rt. -2.725*** 0.114 0.059 0.011
Int. Rt. Spread -3.384*** 0.127 -0.002 0.005
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors for parameters governing borrower offer rejec-
tion policy from Stage 1 structural estimates. Sample is all loans in HMDA dataset. Additional
controls include year- and county fixed effects. “Int. Rt. Spread” is spread of latent interest
rate over prevailing national mortgage rate. Variable means and standard deviations shown in
columns 3 and 4 respectively. ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
N = 17,109,796.
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Table A43: Estimated Interest Rate Offer Curve
α Est. S.E. Mean S.D.
LTV 0.321*** 0.002 0.607 0.170
FICO (620) 0.861*** 0.005 0.032 0.177
FICO (640) 0.815*** 0.005 0.033 0.178
FICO (660) 0.784*** 0.005 0.049 0.215
FICO (680) 0.755*** 0.005 0.066 0.248
FICO (700) 0.746*** 0.005 0.081 0.273
FICO (720) 0.733*** 0.005 0.096 0.295
FICO (740) 0.728*** 0.005 0.105 0.306
FICO (850) 0.696*** 0.005 0.538 0.499
Borrower Income -1.51E-6*** 8.30E-8 4778.4 3764.2
Owner Occ. -0.313*** 0.001 0.913 0.282
Unemp. Rate 0.064*** 0.000 7.539 2.741
N 3,611,896 - - -
R2 0.8389 - - -
Dependent Variable - - 1.230 0.578
Interest Rate - - 5.707 1.027
Int. Rt. Spread - - 1.444 0.599
Selection Correction Term - - -0.026 0.018
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors for parameters governing interest rate offer
curve from Stage 1 structural estimates. Dependent variable is difference between spread of
interest rate over 10-year swap rate and selection correction term, sample is all California refi-
nance loans in GSE dataset. Additional controls include county fixed effects. Variable means
and standard deviations shown in columns 3 and 4 respectively. ***/**/* indicates significance at
99%/95%/90%-level respectively. N = 3,611,896.
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Table A44: Estimated Latent Transition Density Parameters
ρ Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
ρ0 ρ1
Unemp.×Q4 Inc. 46.2910*** 0.4462 -37.7050*** 0.6625
Mean Unemp. Dur.×Q4 Inc. 24.2090*** 0.3429 -33.4930*** 0.4844
∆Unemp.×Q4 Inc. -16.5500*** 1.3201 3.4904** 1.8484
∆Mean Unemp. Dur.×Q4 Inc. -43.2200*** 1.6107 10.8350*** 2.1981
Unemp.2 ×Q4 Inc. -187.4900*** 1.6912 188.9400*** 2.9259
Mean Unemp. Dur.2 ×Q4 Inc. -87.6690*** 0.9782 105.1000*** 1.3897
∆Unemp.2 ×Q4 Inc. 2.9542 93.9240 -2.5726 137.6700
Unemp.×Q3 Inc. 45.6820*** 0.4553 -37.4980*** 0.6721
Mean Unemp. Dur.×Q3 Inc. 25.3220*** 0.3551 -34.2090*** 0.5018
∆Unemp.×Q3 Inc. -18.4680*** 1.3721 4.3859** 2.0240
∆Mean Unemp. Dur.×Q3 Inc. -42.5660*** 1.7130 9.3402*** 2.4685
Unemp.2 ×Q3 Inc. -177.1500*** 1.5446 180.5700*** 3.0458
Mean Unemp. Dur.2 ×Q3 Inc. -93.8720*** 0.9962 107.8700*** 1.4515
∆Unemp.2 ×Q3 Inc. 4.9343 92.7530 -3.7695 140.2500
Unemp.×Q2 Inc. 47.0990*** 0.4540 -38.7360*** 0.6659
Mean Unemp. Dur.×Q2 Inc. 26.4850*** 0.3566 -33.6390*** 0.4988
∆Unemp.×Q2 Inc. -18.1970*** 1.4260 3.7207** 2.0696
∆Mean Unemp. Dur.×Q2 Inc. -44.1600*** 1.7466 8.3949*** 2.5142
Unemp.2 ×Q2 Inc. -186.9000*** 1.5491 178.2400*** 2.9263
Mean Unemp. Dur.2 ×Q2 Inc. -99.5460*** 0.9953 108.0200*** 1.4227
∆Unemp.2 ×Q2 Inc. 1.4233 95.3120 -4.4616 143.8900
Unemp.×Q1 Inc. 47.8670*** 0.4549 -38.1110*** 0.6634
Mean Unemp. Dur.×Q1 Inc. 25.5240*** 0.3523 -33.8880*** 0.4947
∆Unemp.×Q1 Inc. -19.3680*** 1.4187 4.5482** 2.0721
∆Mean Unemp. Dur.×Q1 Inc. -46.1540*** 1.7413 10.6840*** 2.5005
Unemp.2 ×Q1 Inc. -185.6200*** 1.6115 169.1300*** 3.0455
Mean Unemp. Dur.2 ×Q1 Inc. -98.1890*** 0.9822 111.0700*** 1.4130
∆Unemp.2 ×Q1 Inc. -2.2251 92.9310 2.0918 145.6900
Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors from Stage 2 latent liquidity preference transi-
tion density. “Unemp.” denotes local-area unemployment rate, “Mean Unemp. Dur.” denotes
county mean duration of unemployment, and income quartiles are defined within-county, i.e.
Q4 income is lowest-earning 25% of sample in their county. ***/**/* indicates significance at
99%/95%/90%-level respectively.
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Table A45: Credit Supply Model Fit by Borrower Type, Year, and Credit Risk
Panel A: Model Fit by Borrower Type
P(Deny) P(Reject) P(Hold) P(Securitize)
Overall Observed 0.224 0.217 0.325 0.234
Simulated 0.224 0.217 0.325 0.234
Ratio 1.000 0.999 1.002 0.999
Low DTI Observed 0.207 0.196 0.304 0.293
Simulated 0.210 0.202 0.322 0.266
Ratio 0.987 0.973 0.944 1.099
High DTI Observed 0.241 0.238 0.346 0.176
Simulated 0.238 0.233 0.327 0.203
Ratio 1.012 1.021 1.058 0.869
Low LTV Observed 0.211 0.221 0.334 0.235
Simulated 0.224 0.220 0.331 0.225
Ratio 0.941 1.001 1.009 1.044
High LTV Observed 0.234 0.214 0.319 0.233
Simulated 0.224 0.215 0.320 0.241
Ratio 1.043 0.997 0.995 0.968
Low Balance Observed 0.226 0.225 0.326 0.223
Simulated 0.232 0.226 0.327 0.215
Ratio 0.975 0.995 0.996 1.038
High Balance Observed 0.221 0.207 0.324 0.247
Simulated 0.215 0.207 0.322 0.257
Ratio 1.032 1.004 1.007 0.961
Notes: Observed and estimated choice probabilities by applicant type for Stage 1 outcomes. First
four columns correspond to observed choice probabilities, second four to simulated probabilities
at maximum-likelihood estimates, and final four columns to ratio of observed-to-simulated.
Panel B: Model Fit by Year
Observed Simulated Ratio
P(Deny) P(Reject) P(Hold) P(Securitize) P(Deny) P(Reject) P(Hold) P(Securitize) P(Deny) P(Reject) P(Hold) P(Securitize)
2000 0.339 0.237 0.336 0.089 0.322 0.264 0.266 0.149 1.053 0.898 1.262 0.599
2001 0.216 0.215 0.364 0.204 0.210 0.228 0.363 0.199 1.029 0.946 1.003 1.026
2002 0.184 0.216 0.348 0.252 0.191 0.211 0.376 0.222 0.964 1.022 0.926 1.135
2003 0.166 0.214 0.322 0.298 0.181 0.200 0.379 0.241 0.921 1.071 0.849 1.238
2004 0.226 0.249 0.361 0.164 0.233 0.239 0.333 0.196 0.969 1.044 1.085 0.838
2005 0.241 0.254 0.377 0.127 0.244 0.247 0.327 0.182 0.988 1.030 1.153 0.700
2006 0.256 0.268 0.377 0.100 0.262 0.253 0.313 0.173 0.977 1.059 1.205 0.579
2007 0.327 0.235 0.309 0.130 0.308 0.259 0.266 0.168 1.060 0.909 1.162 0.775
2008 0.348 0.236 0.200 0.216 0.340 0.245 0.219 0.196 1.023 0.964 0.914 1.102
2009 0.221 0.187 0.253 0.339 0.221 0.186 0.267 0.326 0.999 1.002 0.949 1.041
2010 0.217 0.156 0.300 0.327 0.202 0.172 0.269 0.357 1.074 0.908 1.116 0.915
2011 0.222 0.156 0.288 0.335 0.204 0.174 0.268 0.353 1.087 0.893 1.072 0.948
2012 0.192 0.141 0.220 0.447 0.179 0.155 0.294 0.372 1.076 0.907 0.748 1.201
Notes: Observed and estimated choice probabilities by year for Stage 1 outcomes. First four
columns correspond to observed choice probabilities, second four to simulated probabilities at
maximum-likelihood estimates, and final four columns to ratio of observed-to-simulated.
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Panel C: Model Fit by FICO Score
Observed Simulated Ratio
P(Deny) P(Reject) P(Hold) P(Securitize) P(Deny) P(Reject) P(Hold) P(Securitize) P(Deny) P(Reject) P(Hold) P(Securitize)
FICO (< 620) 0.301 0.190 0.263 0.246 0.148 0.071 0.181 0.600 2.033 2.664 1.454 0.410
FICO (640) 0.171 0.199 0.273 0.357 0.146 0.068 0.179 0.607 1.171 2.928 1.525 0.589
FICO (660) 0.194 0.191 0.267 0.349 0.150 0.071 0.173 0.607 1.295 2.681 1.546 0.575
FICO (680) 0.238 0.224 0.278 0.261 0.237 0.166 0.176 0.422 1.003 1.350 1.583 0.618
FICO (700) 0.256 0.244 0.320 0.180 0.255 0.245 0.319 0.181 1.007 0.993 1.004 0.992
FICO (720) 0.237 0.237 0.354 0.172 0.233 0.243 0.351 0.174 1.016 0.978 1.009 0.991
FICO (740) 0.214 0.226 0.343 0.217 0.220 0.220 0.346 0.214 0.972 1.028 0.991 1.014
FICO (> 740) 0.211 0.180 0.279 0.330 0.210 0.181 0.282 0.326 1.001 0.993 0.990 1.012
Notes: Observed and estimated choice probabilities by applicant FICO score for Stage 1 outcomes.
First four columns correspond to observed choice probabilities, second four to simulated probabil-
ities at maximum-likelihood estimates, and final four columns to ratio of observed-to-simulated.
Table A46: Credit Demand Model Fit by Year and FICO Score
Observed Simulated Ratio
P(Default) P(Continue) P(Refinance) P(Default) P(Continue) P(Refinance) P(Default) P(Continue) P(Refinance)
Overall 0.000 0.981 0.019 0.000 0.981 0.019 0.799 1.000 1.010
2000 0.000 0.959 0.041 0.000 0.961 0.039 0.554 1.003 0.942
2001 0.000 0.968 0.032 0.000 0.972 0.028 1.327 1.004 0.871
2002 0.000 0.976 0.024 0.000 0.978 0.022 2.433 1.002 0.908
2003 0.000 0.985 0.015 0.000 0.984 0.016 0.340 1.000 1.015
2004 0.000 0.986 0.014 0.000 0.987 0.013 1.293 1.001 0.926
2005 0.000 0.990 0.009 0.000 0.991 0.009 0.739 1.001 0.947
2006 0.000 0.989 0.010 0.000 0.986 0.013 0.436 0.997 1.291
2007 0.000 0.988 0.011 0.000 0.984 0.016 1.047 0.995 1.399
2008 0.000 0.981 0.019 0.000 0.977 0.023 3.495 0.996 1.189
2009 0.000 0.982 0.018 0.000 0.978 0.022 0.713 0.996 1.200
2010 0.000 0.979 0.021 0.000 0.979 0.021 - 1.000 1.017
2011 0.000 0.977 0.023 0.000 0.975 0.025 - 0.999 1.050
2012 0.000 0.987 0.013 0.000 0.975 0.024 - 0.989 1.843
FICO (< 620) 0.000 0.978 0.022 0.000 0.978 0.022 0.727 1.000 1.004
FICO (640) 0.000 0.979 0.021 0.000 0.979 0.021 1.087 1.000 1.000
FICO (660) 0.000 0.978 0.022 0.000 0.977 0.022 0.723 1.000 1.012
FICO (680) 0.000 0.979 0.021 0.000 0.979 0.021 1.099 1.000 1.007
FICO (700) 0.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.980 0.020 0.923 1.000 1.007
FICO (720) 0.000 0.981 0.019 0.000 0.981 0.019 0.487 1.000 1.011
FICO (740) 0.000 0.982 0.018 0.000 0.982 0.018 0.807 1.000 1.009
FICO (> 740) 0.000 0.981 0.019 0.000 0.981 0.019 0.598 1.000 1.013
Notes: Observed and estimated choice probabilities by borrower type for Stage 2 outcomes. First
three columns correspond to observed choice probabilities, second three to simulated probabilities
at maximum-likelihood estimates, and final three columns to ratio of observed-to-simulated.
APPENDIX J: DETAILS ON SIMULATION PROCEDURE
I simulate four policy scenarios outlines in Section 4.4 by iteratively stepping through
months, projecting borrower’s choices, and constructing key outcome variables. Starting
in January 2000, I construct the choice probabilities of all active borrowers. In the case of
refinance, I integrate over the shocks (η, e) to generate choice probabilities but use the
mean LTV and mean interest rate offers to evaluate outcomes. I evaluate choices
separately depending on the latent state, and then weight by the estimated latent state
distribution to form predictions. I track nine outcome variables: the probabilities of
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refinance and default, the volume of cash-out and total refinancing, the mean action
value and flow payoff, and the costs, revenue and market shares of the GSEs. I measure
GSE costs as the default probability times the remaining loan balance, revenue as the
guarantee fee times the loan balance, and market shares as the probability of
securitization conditional on refinance. In transitioning from month to month, I track ten
key endogenous variables: the borrower’s current interest rate, principal balance,
monthly payment, and time remaining, as well as their LTV, DTI, spread over prevailing
mortgage rates and average mortgage rates at origination, the probability at origination
that the originated loan was a GSE securitization, and the probability that the loan has
not been defaulted on up to that time. I update these ten variables as an average of the
level observed in the next period, weighted by the probability that borrower continues,
and the current level, modified based on the terms of refinancing and weighted by the
probability of refinancing. In this way, the current level approximately captures a mean
value over all possible histories of the borrower’s refinancing and continuation
decisions59. I remove borrowers when they are observed to leave the dataset.
After simulating the entire history, I rescale some of the outcome variables to match
observed levels. In particular, I rescale refinancing and cash-out volume to match
observed agency refinancing volumes and GSE revenues to match observed guarantee
fee income. The assumptions that go into this rescaling are shown in Figure A7. I take
data on outstanding GSE mortgage obligations from FHLMC and the FHFA,
interpolated from annual to monthly values, and scale them by the FRM share of
mortgages estimated by the FHLMC Chief Economist to estimate the volume of
outstanding agency FRMs. I impute quarterly refinancing volumes using the figures for
total cash-out and cash-out as a percent of refinancing originations in the FHLMC
Refinance Report and interpolate to monthly frequencies. These figures are shown in
Figure ??. In Table A47, I show the combined guarantee fee income and single-family
59Actually simulating such a history, with 2T possibilities per borrower, is computationally infeasible.
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guarantee costs of FHLMC and FNMA, drawn from their annual 10K filings. I treat this
figure as their guarantee fee revenues and costs and rescale the simulation values
accordingly.
The first simulation is a baseline simulation, where I use only the observed data. For
the second simulation, I analyze the effects of a HARP-type policy by assuming that
starting in June 2009, loan applications are never denied for HARP-eligible borrowers. I
measure eligibility as the probability in the simulation that the borrower’s current
mortgage was originated prior to June 2009, was GSE securitized, and has a current LTV
ratio of at least 75%, effectively downweighting borrowers for histories in which they
refinanced after June 2009, refinanced into a low LTV ratio, or their lender held the loan
in portfolio. I assume that lender’s interest rate policies and borrowers rejection policies
are as in the baseline, and for ineligible borrowers I assume lenders deny applications
according to their estimated policy60. In the third simulation I restrict borrowers to 80%
LTV ratios on refinance by replacing their latent LTV choices c∗(η) with 80% whenever
they would prefer an LTV greater than 80%. Because by construction the continuous
choice function c∗(η) is monotone in η this solution method is accurate. I also use these
adjusted latent LTV choices in order to predict the mean LTV borrowers select upon
refinancing. Finally for the fourth simulation I replace the observed guarantee fee policy
shown in blue in Figure A8 with the alternative fee policy shown in red and simulate
accordingly as in the baseline model. In each simulation except the fourth I treat the path
of all exogenous state variables such as house prices, unemployment rates and interest
rates as given. For the fourth simulation, I assume that the average mortgage interest
rate, a state variable included in the borrower’s value function projection, is the average
of interest rates actually received by borrowers obtaining new loans in that period,
weighted by the probability that they received a new loan (1 if the borrower is entering
the sample or the probability of refinance otherwise). This allows the simulation to
60Although the HARP program also placed restrictions on cash-out refinancing, it is beyond the scope of
this simulation to model this feature.
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accurately capture pass-through from guarantee fees to mortgage interest rates, as
documented in Chapter 2.
Table A47: Total GSE Revenue and Cost Assumptions
FNMA Rev. FHLMC Rev. Total GSE Rev. FNMA Cost. FHLMC Cost. Total GSE Cost.
2000 2,430 1,489 3,919 71 40 111
2001 2,591 1,639 4,230 78 45 123
2002 2,516 1,527 4,043 284 122 406
2003 3,281 1,653 4,934 365 -5 360
2004 3,715 1,382 5,097 363 143 506
2005 3,925 2,076 6,001 428 307 735
2006 4,174 2,393 6,567 783 296 1,079
2007 5,816 2,889 8,705 5,003 3,014 8,017
2008 8,390 3,729 12,119 29,725 16,657 46,382
2009 8,002 3,448 11,450 71,320 30,273 101,593
2010 7,206 3,635 10,841 26,420 18,785 45,205
2011 7,507 3,647 11,154 27,218 12,294 39,512
2012 8,151 4,389 12,540 -919 3,168 2,249
Notes: Annual FNMA and FHLMC Single-Family Guarantee Fee Income and Provision for Credit-
Related Losses, in $ million.
Figure A7: Total GSE FRMs Outstanding and Refinancing Volume Assumptions
Notes: Imputed combined volume of FHLMC and FNMA FRM mortgages outstanding and refi-
nanced, by month. Grey shading indicates NBER recession dates.
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Figure A8: Observed and Alternative Guarantee Fee Policy
Notes: Observed and alternative average charged guarantee fees used as inputs for simulation.
Grey shading indicates NBER recession dates.
APPENDIX K: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
• ARM: Adjustable-Rate Mortgage
• BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics
• bp: Basis Point
• CPR: Conditional Prepayment Rate
• CPS: Current Population Survey
• DTI: Debt-to-Income Ratio
• EM: Expectations Maximization
• FEDS: Finance and Economics Discussion Series
• FICO: Fair Isaac Corporation
• FHA: Federal Housing Administration
• FHFA: Federal Housing Finance Agency
• FHLMC: Freddie Mac or Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
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• FNMA: Fannie Mae or Federal National Mortgage Association
• FRM: Fixed-Rate Mortgage
• GSE: Government-Sponsored Enterprise
• GNMA: Ginnie Mae or Government National Mortgage Association
• HAMP: Home Affordable Modification Program
• HARP: Home Affordable Refinance Program
• HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
• HMDA: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
• LTV: Loan-to-Value Ratio
• MBS: Mortgage-Backed Security
• MOVE: Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Index
• MSA: Metropolitan Statistical Area
• NBER: National Bureau of Economic Research
• QE: Quantitative Easing
• SCF: Sectional Center Facility or 3-Digit ZIP
• SMM: Single-Monthly Mortality
• TARP: Troubled Asset Relief Program
• TBA: To-Be-Announced Security
• VA: Department of Veterans Affairs
• VAR: Vector Autoregression
• WAC: Weighted-Average Coupon
• WRLURI: Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index
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